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The U.S. military is asked to perform statebuilding operations far more often than it engages in 
conventional warfare against opposing uniformed state militaries. The U.S. military has engaged 
in 13 major armed statebuilding operations during and since WWII, along with numerous smaller 
operations throughout the world, and the most optimistic measures of success are less than 50 
percent. Why, despite statebuilding being the most common task it is asked to perform, is U.S. 
military performance in statebuilding operations still so poor. This puzzle cannot be answered by 
current research on military effectiveness since this body of research focuses exclusively either 
on a military’s effectiveness in conventional combat, or on a military’s effectiveness in the 
conventional combat aspects of non-conventional operations. This gap is detrimental since 
militaries are frequently asked to perform a wide range of missions far beyond conventional 
operations. The U.S. military consistently resists statebuilding operational tasks when conducting 
such operations and consistently dismantles what little statebuilding capacity it does build 
following the statebuilding operation. This dissertation takes a novel approach by disaggregating 
between the three statebuilding tasks the U.S. military identifies as tasks it should be able to 
perform in statebuilding operations, building infrastructure, building and training local security 
forces, and building and supporting local governance. It finds that the military actually performs 
well in some statebuilding tasks and poorly in others. This dissertation presents the Primary 
Mission Theory to explain this divergence in effectiveness, which argues that militaries will 
preference those tasks that contribute to what they consider to be their primary mission, which is 
almost always conventional combat. Thus, statebuilding tasks will be preferenced only if they 
can also contribute to conventional combat capabilities. I trace the historical development 
statebuilding institutions within the U.S. military and conduct case studies on operations in 
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Chapter 1: Forced to Govern 
 
Introduction 
 I graduated early from high school in 2005 so I could enlist in the U.S. Army. I had 
always expected to go to college after high school, but the terrorist attacks on 9/11 changed 
everything. Instead of worrying about what subject to major in, I was worried I would miss the 
wars if I waited to join until after college. I did not miss the wars. Instead, my entire adult life 
has been defined by the wars; first by participating in them, then by studying them, and finally 
by analyzing and teaching them. Wars are not supposed to be generational endeavors, they are 
supposed to be decisions of last resort and then, if chosen, executed as quickly and efficiently as 
possible to try to contain the immense destruction and suffering. The wars were expected to be 
quick, but instead they dragged on for years and became known as the forever wars.  
Previous generations of American soldiers certainly had their lives defined by the wars 
they participated in, but the wars do not continue for the entirety of it. Why was that different for 
our generation? Why was the U.S. military able to capture Baghdad in three weeks, but the Iraqi 
army they trained over the subsequent decade were unable to present even the façade of 
resistance to a much smaller and poorly trained Islamic State force moving on Mosul in 2014? 
The U.S. military is exceptionally good in conventional operations but bad at achieving success 
in armed statebuilding operations, even by optimistic measures. This disparity exists despite the 
fact that the U.S. military is asked to perform unconventional and statebuilding operations far 
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more than conventional operations.1 Why, then, are they so ineffective at actually conducting 
statebuilding operations?  
The U.S. military is frequently observed engaging in a vicious cycle that leaves itself 
unprepared for statebuilding operations once they begin. Consider the following from a 2018 
RAND report: “The U.S. military found itself unprepared for stabilization in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq and then expanded its focus and spending enormously as the U.S. Department of 
Defense directed the military to develop proficiency in a wide range of stabilization tasks.”2 
Why? The U.S. was engaged in statebuilding operations frequently under President Clinton and 
before that Vietnam was one of the largest armed statebuilding operations ever. The professional 
culture of the U.S. Army was established during the Civil War.3 Statebuilding was a vital part of 
the Civil War and WWII. Thus, statebuilding should be deeply engrained in its culture and 
practices. The U.S. military should have been well prepared for such operations. The report goes 
on to say one of the key findings was a “common pattern of forgetting that stabilization is a vital 
function that must be performed across the range of military operations.”4 This forgetting leads 
to institutional atrophy, and by the time the institutions are rebuilt the conflict has advanced to a 
point that the institutions have fewer options to impact the outcome. The U.S. military had built a 
wide array of competent institutions that could build infrastructure, train local security forces, 
and support local governance. By the time the operations began in Afghanistan and Iraq, few of 
 
1 Richard F. Grimmett, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2010,” Congressional 
Research Services, March 10, 2011. 
2 Robinson, Linda, Sean Mann, Jeffrey Martini, and Stephanie Pezard, Finding the Right Balance: Department of 
Defense Roles in Stabilization. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2441.html. iii. 
3 Long, Austin. The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK. Cornell 
University Press, 2016. 35.  
4 Robinson, Linda, Sean Mann, Jeffrey Martini, and Stephanie Pezard, Finding the Right Balance: Department of 
Defense Roles in Stabilization. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2441.html.  
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these institutions still existed and were once again built from scratch as they were in Vietnam 
(and post-WWII before that).  
Despite a frequent and clear awareness among military and civilian leaders, the U.S. 
military still finds itself unprepared for statebuilding operations and even resists statebuilding 
innovations during these operations. Military effectiveness scholarship has been primarily 
concerned with explaining effectiveness in conventional battles. This work is extremely 
important but militaries, especially since the end of WWII, have been asked to perform a wide 
variety of tasks far beyond merely conventional warfare. The military being used for domestic 
and international statebuilding has a long history throughout the world. They are asked to build 
states, deliver humanitarian aid, and even to provide support in domestic policing and internal 
statebuilding at home, among many others. This lack of attention comes with significant 
consequences. Very important questions are left unanswerable whenever the military steps out of 
this conventional arena. The U.S. military, in particular, has been asked to perform statebuilding 
tasks far more often than conventional warfare tasks, and yet it performs poorly in these tasks 
relative to others and still primarily trains, equips, and organizes almost exclusively for 
conventional battles.5 Why is the U.S. military, and many others, so resistant to the performance 
of statebuilding tasks. This is especially puzzling considering U.S. military doctrine identifies the 
tasks they should be effective at in such operations, building infrastructure, security force 
assistance, and governance assistance.6  
Three puzzles need to be explained in understanding the primary question posed above: 
Why, if the U.S. military is frequently asked to perform statebuilding operations, do they 
 
5 Patterson, Rebecca. The Challenge of Nation-building: Implementing Effective Innovation in the US Army from 
World War II to the Iraq War. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014.  
6 U.S. Department of the Army, Stability, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 
2014).  
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perform so poorly? 1) Why, even when conducting ongoing statebuilding operations and under 
intense civilian pressure to perform well at statebuilding, does the military still devote less effort 
and resources to those tasks specific to statebuilding? 2) Why does the military allow the cyclical 
process that results in atrophying statebuilding capacity during peacetime only to leave 
themselves unprepared for the next statebuilding operation? 3) When looking at the three tasks 
identified above, the military’s performance is significantly different between the tasks. Why, 
then, is the U.S. military good at some statebuilding tasks and bad at others?   
 
U.S. Armed Statebuilding Operations Cases 
Armed statebuilding operations are military operations that seek to build a functioning 
state, or the components of a state, as part of a broader military/civilian effort during a time of 
war or immediately following hostilities. They are “armed” because the armed forces play a 
primary role in the operation. This is different from UN peacekeeping where the armed aspect of 
their involvement is intentionally minimalized. Generally, although not always in the case of 
civil wars or territorial expansion, these operations occur outside the intervening state’s territory. 
Significant scholarship has focused on statebuilding, but few have focused specifically on 
military operations intended to accomplish this goal. The U.S. military refers to the types of tasks 
involved in armed statebuilding operations as “stability operations” in official doctrine.7 
According to this doctrine, the U.S. military should be able to perform five tasks as part of 
stability operations: the delivery of humanitarian aid, the provision of security, the building of 
infrastructure, the building of local security forces, and the building of local governance 
 
7 U.S. Department of the Army, Stability, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 
2014). An earlier publication of the same manual referred to the activity as “stability operations”. U.S. Department 
of the Army, Stability Operations, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2008). 
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organizations. Infrastructure, security forces, and governance are vital components of the state 
and thus are the statebuilding tasks the military recognizes it needs to be able to perform. 
Humanitarian assistance and providing security (or occupying security) does not contribute to the 
state and are temporary functions.  
The U.S. military has engaged in a large number statebuilding operations in foreign 
countries in which at least one of the three tasks was performed.8 I narrow this large universe of 
cases to focus on major and comprehensive efforts by including only cases in which there was an 
ongoing conflict or within 2 years of the end of hostilities according to the Correlates of War 
project.9 This study is interested in armed statebuilding operations in which a military engages in 
statebuilding in a conflict or post-conflict environment. This narrows the universe of U.S. cases 
to 13. The cases, shown in Table 1, demonstrate the nature of the three tasks and how they relate 
to the military. Every single case included infrastructure since the military possesses internal and 
robust infrastructure capabilities. Fewer cases (11) involve security force assistance, and even 
fewer (4) involve any form of governance assistance. The most comprehensive statebuilding 
efforts where all three tasks were undertaken with substantial effort at each were the post-WWII 
cases of German and Japan, Vietnam, and then the post-9/11 cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. This 
list is not the universe of cases in which the U.S. military engages in these tasks. The U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers is constantly active around the globe on a variety of projects and the Global 
War on Terror has spawned a significant number of SFA missions throughout the world in 
environments that do not rise to the level of inclusion in the Correlates of War dataset. Again, 
 
8 Miller, Paul D. Armed state building: confronting state failure, 1898-2012. Cornell University Press, 2013: 218-
219.; Owen IV, John M. The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 
1510-2010. Vol. 123. Princeton University Press, 2010.; and Richard F. Grimmett, “Instances of Use of United 
States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2010,” Congressional Research Services, March 10, 2011. 
9 Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press. 
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their exclusion is because this study is interested in the conduct of armed statebuilding 
operations, which is statebuilding in the context of war or post-war environments. These outliers 
are addressed in more detail in Chapter 6.  
 
Table 1: U.S. and U.S.-Led Armed Statebuilding Operations Since WWII 
Case Begin End Era Timing/Type 
of War 
Infra.  SFA Gov. 
Iceland 1941 2006 WWII Interstate X   
Italy 1943 1955 Post-WWII Post-Interstate X X  
West 
Germany 
1945 1955 Post-WWII Post-Interstate X X  
South Korea 1945 1953 Post-WWII Post-Interstate/ 
Interstate 
X X X 
Japan 1945 1952 Post-WWII Post-Interstate X X  
Dominican 
Republic 
1965 1966 Cold War Intrastate X X  
South 
Vietnam 
1962 1973 Cold War Interstate/ 
Intrastate 
X X X 
El Salvador 1979 1992 Cold War Intrastate X X  
Colombia 1989 2016 Cold War Intrastate X X  
Somalia 1993 1995 Post-Cold 
War 
Intrastate X   
Afghanistan 2001 2021 Post-9/11 Interstate X X X 
Philippines 2000 2001 Post-9/11 Post-Intrastate X X  
Iraq 2003 2010 Post-9/11 Interstate X X X 
 
The United States has deployed its military abroad hundreds of times since 1798 and 
many of these deployments included at least some tasks that constitute some aspect 
statebuilding.10 In 2018 alone, the United States was conducting security force assistance (SFA) 
missions in seven countries in the Western Hemisphere, 21 in Africa (including Seychelles in the 
 
10 Grimmett, Richard F. "Instances of use of United States armed forces abroad, 1798-1999." Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, 1999. 
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Indian Ocean), 15 in the Middle East and Central Asia, six in Europe, and 12 in South and 
Southeast Asia.11  
The most optimistic measure of success and failure in statebuilding operations was 
presented by Paul D. Miller. His assessment includes operations by both the U.N. and the U.S. 
military from 1898 to 2012 and places successes at 50 percent, failures at 37.5 percent, and 
uncertain outcomes at 12.5 percent. Success is measured as continued progress in at least 4 of 5 
categories 10 years after the conclusion of the statebuilding operations, like no resumption of 
conflict with over 1,000 battle deaths per year, no genocide, and the continuation of 
constitutional democracy. Even with the inclusion of U.N. operations that are arguably not 
“armed” statebuilding operations and vast investments in personnel and resources, some in 
excess of the post-WWII reconstruction of Europe, the probability of a successful outcome is the 
same as flipping a coin.12 Removing UN cases make the probability of success even lower.  
Other measures that focus on the U.S. military since 1945 places success at 40 percent, 
failure at 40 percent, and uncertain outcomes at 20 percent.13 The measure of success for 
Rebecca Patterson’s study was if the country remained free of war and if they remained a 
democracy 10 years after the departure of U.S. forces. The two uncertain outcomes were the 
post-9/11 operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iraq became a clear failure after publication of the 
book with the 2014 collapse following the invasion of the much smaller Islamic State forces and 
Afghanistan currently seems unlikely to succeed as the Afghan government continues to lose 
 
11 Stephanie Savell. “Where we fight: US counterterror war locations 2017-2018.” Costs of War Project: Watson 
Institute for International & Public Affairs at Brown University. 
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2019/US%20Counterterror%20War%20Locations%2C
%202017-18%2C%20with%20Smithsonian%20and%20CoW%20attributions.pdf  
12 Miller, Paul D. Armed state building: confronting state failure, 1898-2012. Cornell University Press, 2013: 16.  
13 Patterson, Rebecca. The Challenge of Nation-building: Implementing Effective Innovation in the US Army from 
World War II to the Iraq War. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014: 36.  
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ground to the Taliban.14 The primary question that motivates this study is why, despite 
statebuilding being the most common task it is asked to perform, is the U.S. military 
performance in statebuilding operations still so poor.  
Historically, statebuilding has been internally driven, violent, and very long. Attempts at 
external, expedited statebuilding operations have increased significantly since WWII. This shift 
is driven by the post-WWII trend away from conquest and annexation and towards conquest and 
reconstitution of independent and (hopefully/optimistically) allied states. The trend is driven by a 
change in international norms, but primarily by the rise of nuclear weapons and the reduction in 
the value of industrial production capacity resulting in conquest and annexation being less 
profitable and desirable.15  
 
A New Theory is Needed 
 Explaining effectiveness in armed statebuilding operations is constrained less by the 
flaws in existing theories and more by the simple paucity of studies that have asked similar 
questions. Existing scholarship either looks at statebuilding generally but not from the military’s 
perspective, or scholarship looks at military effectiveness in battle but not in statebuilding. The 
result is an inability to effectively assess or explain the performance of the military in armed 
statebuilding operations. This study seeks to address this gap by studying the military’s 
performance in these tasks. Primary Mission Theory is presented as a theory to explain the 
military’s behavior in armed statebuilding operations.  
 
14 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Addendum to SIGAR’s January 2018 quarterly report 
to the United States Congress,” SIGAR, January 30, 2018, 
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Addendum_2018-01-30qr.pdf.  
15 While Liberman shows that conquest can still be profitable, he acknowledges that such circumstances are rare and 
difficult to achieve. Liberman, Peter. Does conquest pay?: the exploitation of occupied industrial societies. Vol. 74. 
Princeton University Press, 1998. 
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Primary Mission Theory provides an explanation for why the U.S. military’s performance 
at statebuilding tasks remains poor and largely ineffective despite the clear and consistent 
demand for such competence and substantial resources and civilian pressure directed towards the 
U.S. military improving its statebuilding capacities. Civilian pressure, a key component of a 
military’s ability to innovate, has, at times, pushed significantly for the military to improve 
statebuilding performance. During operations like those in Vietnam or Afghanistan/Iraq, 
resources where high for statebuilding operations. Therefore, organizational interests to maintain 
high budgets that would normally push towards expensive conventional training and organizing 
doesn’t always exist. Finally, previous studies have found that the military is in fact flexible 
during these operations and innovates to improve its statebuilding competencies.16 However, 
once these operations end, these competencies are quickly and enthusiastically jettisoned in favor 
of conventional competencies, thus leaving them once again unprepared for the next 
statebuilding operation.  
 Some scholars and researchers have recognized that U.S. foreign policy has become 
increasingly militarized over the years, meaning the military frequently finds itself tasked with 
duties traditionally reserved for civilian agencies.17 A better understanding of how the military 
performs in non-conventional warfare tasks throughout the spectrum of foreign policy activities 
will contribute to a better understanding of when a military option should and should not be 
used. This would be an improvement from the current debate of what strategies should be used 
after an operation has already begun. The Primary Mission Theory presented in more detail in 
chapter 2 argues that militaries will preference those tasks that contribute to the primary mission 
 
16 Patterson, Rebecca. The Challenge of Nation-building: Implementing Effective Innovation in the US Army from 
World War II to the Iraq War. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. 
17 Adams, Gordon, and Shoon Murray, eds. Mission creep: the militarization of US foreign policy?. Georgetown 
University Press, 2014. 
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as that particular military views it. For most militaries this will be viewed as conventional 
combat. While some tend to criticize the general ability of the military to engage in statebuilding 
operations, Primary Mission Theory argues that the military will actually be very good at some 
statebuilding tasks and very bad at others. This is because tasks like building infrastructure that 
are important to armed statebuilding operations are also very important to conventional combat, 
so the military sees a significant interest in cultivating these capabilities rather than resisting. 
Other tasks, like building local governance, is vital for armed statebuilding operations but 
contributes nothing to conventional combat. Primary Mission Theory is thus more effective at 
understanding military effectiveness in these armed statebuilding operations than those 
previously offered.  
 
 
The Significance of Armed Statebuilding Operations 
In Vietnam, the U.S. military was presented with an acute dilemma; train the Vietnamese 
forces to address the unconventional insurgency or train them to address the conventional threat 
of a North Vietnamese invasion. It was an impossible choice in which the U.S. leadership 
decided to address the conventional threat first since they viewed this as the more acute and 
timely threat. In this context, the choice seems logical and well intentioned. However, the U.S. 
military has consistently made this choice in armed statebuilding operations even when the threat 
of an external conventional invasion was wholly absent. The same choice was made to 
preference the construction of a conventional military force in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Why? 
Neither of these countries faced any real threat of foreign conventional invasions and were 
actively engaged in internal insurgencies while under U.S. security guarantees. In this light, the 
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choice to preference conventional forces in South Vietnam seems less a rational calculation and 
more institutional inertia.  
These types of patterns emerge frequently. The U.S. military (and all militaries generally 
speaking) prefers a certain type of mission, conventional combat against uniformed opposition. It 
is highly effective at preforming the tasks to enable success in these types of operations, and the 
majority of its resources, training, and institutional capacity are dedicated to performing these 
tasks at high levels. However, these operations constitute an extreme minority of the missions 
asked of the military by political leaders. More often than not, the U.S. military is asked to 
perform unconventional combat missions like counterinsurgency, stability, and statebuilding 
operations. Comparatively, the U.S. military performs poorly at the tasks require for success in 
these missions. “… even as the U.S. Army has been asked time and time again carry out nation-
building tasks, its focus has remined on firepower and maneuvers – two critical elements of 
large-scale ground war.”18  
The United States appears to be engaging in this cycle again as it shifts focus to great 
power competition with China. Indications of this cycle can be seen to be operating today. The 
2017-2018 National Security Strategy and the subsequent National Defense Strategy sets aside 
focus on the ongoing unconventional conflicts in exchange for a sole focus on great power 
competition and threats to regional security.19 However, even with this strong doctrinal focus on 
near-peer powers, there is a paucity of evidence that a pivot is actually occurring. Training 
missions continue throughout the African continent, the largest concentration of contingency 
 
18 Patterson, Rebecca. The Challenge of Nation-building: Implementing Effective Innovation in the US Army from 
World War II to the Iraq War. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014: 2.  
19 The White House. “National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” December 2017. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf; and The Department of 
Defense. “National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s 
Competitive Edge.” 2018. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-
Summary.pdf 
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operations forces and funds remains in the Middle East, and the initiation of new regime change 
conflicts remain a possibility that would almost certainly require stability and statebuilding 
operations. Although the military performs poorly at statebuilding operations, historical trends 
suggest they will be performing another one shortly.  
The U.S. military has shown an incredible ability to adapt, both from above and from 
below, in every type of mission it’s given, but this innovational improvement is never retained 
with statebuilding tasks.20 A military’s investment in training, organization, equipment, 
technology, and doctrinal innovation can have a significant impact on a military’s battlefield 
effectiveness. The Egyptian military performed poorly in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and then 
performed much more effectively in 1973 War.21 Similarly, Saddam’s military performed poorly 
during the early stages of the Iran-Iraq War, made several adjustments, and then produced 
several units that performed at high levels of effectiveness.22 After all the effort dedicated to 
improving the U.S. military’s ability to conduct counterinsurgency, stability operations, or armed 
statebuilding operations, they seem to be no better at it than they were when trying to reconstruct 
the post-Civil War South. Why is the U.S. military able to adjust and retain effectiveness in 
conventional combat tasks but unable to improve in non-conventional statebuilding operations? 
 The choice to consistently avoid dedicating precious resources to statebuilding tasks is 
not as arbitrary or irrational as it may seem at first. The U.S. military will consistently find itself 
unprepared for a wide range of challenges that go beyond statebuilding, like counterinsurgency, 
proxy wars, gray zone competition, and other forms of competition less than war. However, 
 
20 Patterson, Rebecca. The Challenge of Nation-building: Implementing Effective Innovation in the US Army from 
World War II to the Iraq War. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. 
21 Talmadge, Caitlin. The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes. Cornell University 
Press, 2015. 
22 Talmadge, Caitlin. The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes. Cornell University 
Press, 2015. 
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effectiveness and efficiency are so intricately linked in military strategy that they are rarely 
discussed in isolation or treated as distinct concepts, especially in the U.S. context. In business, 
inefficiency just means your profit margins are thinner. In military strategy, any effort becomes 
exponentially more difficult, adversaries identify weakness to exploit, and chance takes a toll. 
What this means is that an inefficient military strategy more often leads to a failure to achieve 
objectives rather than just paying a higher price for those objectives.  
 What this all means for a military that is being forced to engage in statebuilding while 
also being the primary organization responsible for defending against foreign conventional 
threats is that it cannot afford to be a jack of all trades and a master of none. Many national 
security experts argue that the U.S. military can deter great power war with China while also 
engaging in countless peripheral conflicts through non-conventional tasks like statebuilding and 
counterinsurgency. The U.S. military can certainly engage in statebuilding and 
counterinsurgency but doing so needs to be recognized for the substantial choice that it is. If the 
U.S. consistently engages and trains for non-conventional conflict, they will be masters of none, 
and more importantly they will not be the masters of great power conventional conflict. Military 
leaders know this, and they therefore resist developing statebuilding capabilities, they jettison 
statebuilding capabilities once they are no longer needed, and they resist civilian pressure by 
acquiescing to development of some statebuilding capacities only if they can later be directed 
towards conventional combat as well.  
 
Primary Mission Theory 
The current military effectiveness literature mostly disregards the military’s role in 
statebuilding operations, and therefore scholars, policy makers, and analysts have a very poor 
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understanding of what explains their effectiveness in the various tasks that occur during an 
armed statebuilding operation. I argue that military effectiveness in statebuilding tasks is 
determined by the extent to which individual tasks related to statebuilding can also contribute to 
the military’s primary mission as they see it. This is driven by structural constraints on the 
military that determine incentives, priorities, and beliefs. Militaries will commit resources, 
training, and preference to those tasks which contribute to the primary mission and divert 
resources from those that do not. For the U.S. military, the primary mission is viewed as 
conventional combat. This means the military will be effective at statebuilding tasks that also 
contribute to primary mission tasks, like offensive and defensive operations. Those tasks that do 
not contribute to this primary mission will not be institutionalized between wars and conflicts 
and will be under resourced during statebuilding operations. The ability to perform tasks that do 
contribute to conventional combat will be built and prioritized within the military and can then 
be redirected to statebuilding once such a mission begins. However, those tasks that do not 
contribute directly to this primary mission will not be institutionalized between conflicts and 
under resourced. This means the capability has to be built quickly after the operation has already 
begun, and institutions will be dismantled after the operation and institutional memory will be 
lost.  
 Primary mission means those missions that the military and civilian elites view as the 
most important function, their reason for existence. This is often articulated in public documents, 
such as the periodic publications of the National Security Strategy written by the White House 
and the National Defense Strategy written by the U.S. Department of Defense. These preferences 
are also articulated in less public or formal ways, like internal doctrine and documentation. It is 
also articulated in the organization of the internal structure of the military and the resources 
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allocated to various units. Budgets are also a high-cost, and therefore very credible, indication of 
what the military is willing to direct its resources to and what it is not. All of these sources 
indicate the preference of the military towards a primary mission of fighting in conventional 
combat.  
 A U.S. Marine Corps officer that deployed as a Civil Affairs Officer to both Afghanistan 
and Iraq from 2004 to 2006 said that there was focus prior to deployment on building and 
supporting governing institutions. However, they often found this focus difficult to maintain 
once the unit was deployed and facing violent attacks. The officer said there was a tendency 
among these units to revert back to what they know best and what they viewed as the more 
important mission, fighting for control of territory.23 Resources and personnel are then 
reallocated to this primary mission at the expense of the other tasks.  
 Initially, this inability to effectively adjust to statebuilding operations seems irrational. 
During the Vietnam war, and many other similar wars, it’s often noted that, “the military viewed 
proxy wars as a diversion from their main priority.”24 Why then does the military chose not to 
actually fight the type of war they are currently engaged in? Fixation by the military on 
conventional combat is not entirely irrational. There are strong norms that push militaries 
towards organizing for conventional warfare. These norms at times force irrational behavior, but 
the norm itself is grounded in very rational and realist considerations. Conventional warfare 
presents the biggest potential threat to a state relative to other forms of unconventional warfare. 
Organizing for conventional warfare is more predictable for militaries and helps justify larger 
budgets.  
 
23 Interview, U.S. Marine Corps Officer, April 10, 2019.  
24 Patterson, Rebecca. The Challenge of Nation-building: Implementing Effective Innovation in the US Army from 
World War II to the Iraq War. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014: 183.  
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Primary Mission Theory, therefore, produces the following expectations about a 
military’s statebuilding effectiveness: 
 The military will be highly effective at building infrastructure. Infrastructure is integral to 
conventional offensive and defensive operations. Infrastructure is key to success in conventional 
combat, from the ancient Romans to the modern era, for mobility, logistics, and defensive 
structures, and denying the same to the enemy. This has also been consistent throughout history. 
The Roman military consistently contained engineers that built defensive structures, siege 
devices, and roads to help the military move and maneuver through its environment. These 
engineers also completed civil projects when possible.25 
 The military will demonstrate mixed effectiveness at security force assistance. The ability 
to train new soldiers is integral the military’s conventional mission, but there is a misalignment 
between how the military needs to train itself and how it needs to train the militaries of small and 
failed or exceptionally weak states. Most states that are targeted for armed statebuilding 
operations need small, specialized forces that can engage internal threats in counterinsurgency 
and counterterrorism. They also cannot sustain a large military structured similarly to a modern 
western military. Thus, the military will specialize in a type of training that is ineffective for the 
types of militaries being built.  
 The military will be highly ineffective at building and supporting local governing 
institutions. The ability to build and support governing institutions contributes very little to the 
military’s primary mission and doing it well would drain substantial resources from other 
organizations within the military. Occupation and controlling a local population are important, 
but this is a different operation and task. Consequently, this task is only performed under the 
 
25 Southern, Pat. The Roman army: a social and institutional history. ABC-CLIO, 2006. 
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pressure of an ongoing mission and receives comparatively less resources. Institutions are 
usually cobbled together in an ad hoc manner with lower quality soldiers after an operation has 
already begun. Once the mission is officially complete the institutions recently organized to 
address governance are dismantled and the military’s internal organizations are again refocused 
on the primary mission.  
 
Research Methods 
 This research uses a variety of methods to investigate the dynamics of armed 
statebuilding operations. This study draws upon a wide variety of primary and secondary sources 
for analysis. These include historical first-hand accounts from participating military personnel in 
the various operations, declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and U.S. Department of 
Defense (DoD) and Department of State (DoS) documents, interviews conducted of living 
participants in the Iraq and Afghanistan operations, and numerous quantitative data sources like 
surveys and geospatial maps produced by both government agencies and private and non-
governmental organizations.  
The overarching design seeks first to disaggregate the military’s contribution to 
statebuilding operations. Previous studies on the subject often study civilian and military efforts 
in statebuilding as a black box, a singular effort by a singular actor. This limits our ability to 
understand the military’s role in statebuilding operations. Additionally, this study isolates the 
three tasks of infrastructure building, security force assistance, and governance assistance and 
observes varying performance at each. While previous studies on armed statebuilding operations 
tend to be pessimistic about the military’s performance with few exceptions, isolating the three 
tasks shows significant variance in military performance within statebuilding operations. In line 
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with the task isolation, this study traces the historical development of institutions within the U.S. 
military starting from WWII to test the institutional prioritization expectations of the Primary 
Mission Theory.  
 The Afghanistan case study is designed to test the expected outcomes of Primary Mission 
Theory. Most conflict zones are data deserts since collecting quality longitudinal data is a 
dangerous and expensive undertaking. However, international attention and the overall length of 
the conflict as allowed for the collection of relatively more data. Changes in infrastructure can be 
observed through nighttime light maps produced from satellite scans, something that was not 
possible for more historical conflicts like Vietnam or the post-WWII cases. The Asia Foundation 
has produced a sub-national survey of the Afghan people from 2006 to 2019. This allows for the 
longitudinal observance of locals’ views on governance legitimacy at the national and sub-
national levels. Additionally, the creation of the Special Inspector General for Afghan 
Reconstruction and academic and policy attention paid to Afghanistan has created an abundance 
of readily available primary source data. This study also uses a hard case study analysis in which 
a case is selected that should be very difficult for producing the outcomes expected by the 
Primary Mission Theory. More than any other case, Vietnam had most forces pushing the 
military towards sufficient dedication towards armed statebuilding operations.  
 
Plan for the Dissertation  
 Chapter 2 lays out in detail Primary Mission Theory. Many of the forces that drive 
Primary Mission Theory are well established in various literatures covering bureaucratic biases, 
organizational behavior, and military effectiveness. These forces are reviewed. However, some 
of the forces that lead to the dynamics of Primary Mission Theory are unique to military 
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organizations being asked to perform statebuilding tasks. These unique forces are explained in 
Chapter 2, which include the nature of military organizations and the differing severity of threats 
between conventional warfare and statebuilding operations, as well as the nature of warfare 
making the division of resources among numerous types of tasks highly costly and risky.  
 Primary Mission Theory sets certain expectations about the potential outcome of armed 
statebuilding operations, but it also expects that military organizations will behave in certain 
ways with regards to decisions about institutional design. It expects that institutions with dual 
use, that is those that can contribute both to statebuilding and conventional combat, will receive 
requisite manning and material during an operation, whereas single use institutions that only 
contribute to statebuilding will only be given minimal resources during a statebuilding operation 
and will be quickly dismantled after said operation. Chapter 3 established high confidence in this 
prediction by tracing the historical development of institutions in the U.S. military that are 
dedicated to specific statebuilding tasks from WWII onward. The methodological importance of 
this chapter is significant. The case studies that follow are positive cases of armed statebuilding 
operations. Negative cases also need to be studied to ensure methodological rigor. Does the 
military behave as expected outside of positive cases of armed statebuilding operations? Chapter 
3 traces institutionalization patterns through periods of armed statebuilding operations and 
periods outside of armed statebuilding operations.  
 Chapter 4 explores the Afghanistan case. This case is vital for testing Primary Mission 
Theory because the availability of sub-national data that is unique. There is a wide array of data 
that is available for Afghanistan that sets it apart from more historical cases and other modern 
cases like Iraq. This sub-national data allows for high-quality methods like within case 
comparison. This enables the study to answer important questions on outcome, like explaining 
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the differences in governing legitimacy between provinces to see if any of these differences were 
the result of the military’s statebuilding strategies.  
 Chapter 5 explores the Vietnam case. Vietnam is important because it presents a hard 
case for Primary Mission Theory. Compared to other U.S. armed statebuilding cases, Vietnam 
had far more forces united towards the adoption of a comprehensive statebuilding effort by the 
military. The operation, unlike the post-WWII or post-9/11 cases, did not have a conventional 
war that preceded it, and therefore was always an unconventional statebuilding operation. The 
U.S. president at the beginning of the operation was enamored with unconventional warfare and 
enabled the military to fund such efforts. Statements and written doctrine before and during the 
conflict confirms the military was well aware that Vietnam was an unconventional statebuilding 
operation and thus required a statebuilding strategy. The military pursued a conventional military 
strategy, nonetheless, confirming the power of the Primary Mission Theory.  
 Chapter 6 concludes by exploring some of the limitations of Primary Mission Theory. 
The main case studies look at comprehensive cases, where major operations were undertaken and 
all three statebuilding tasks were performed. The U.S. military performs far more statebuilding 
operations than these and some minor cases of statebuilding operations are explored where only 
one of the three tasks is performed. The United States is not the only country to engage in armed 
statebuilding operations, although the United States represents the overwhelming majority of 
such operations. Some non-U.S. statebuilding operations are explored. Finally, the implications 
of Primary Mission Theory for military strategy and strategic analysis are considered. 
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Chapter 2: Primary Mission Theory 
 
Primary Mission Theory: Explaining Divergent Performance 
 Primary Mission Theory says that a military will view a certain type of mission as their 
primary mission and will give priority to those internal institutions that are vital for the 
accomplishment of the primary mission to the detriment of all others. This is driven by structural 
constraints on the military that determine incentives, priorities, and beliefs.  Militaries will 
commit resources, training, and preference to those tasks which contribute to the primary 
mission and divert resources from those that do not. Militaries are good at infrastructure tasks not 
because they are important for statebuilding operations, they are good at it because it contributes 
to the primary mission of conventional combat. It just happens to also be useful for statebuilding 
operations. The importance of each task to conventional military operations is shown in Table 1 
below and the impact this will have on the subsequent predicted performance.  
 
Table 1: Summary of Institutionalization Mechanisms 
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Governance 




Individuals, inside and outside of the military, can have competing visions about what the 
priorities of the organization should be. A military is a vast bureaucracy that is influenced by a 
 22 
significant number of actors and structural influences, it cannot be treated as a unitary actor with 
independent and singular opinions and actions. Organizations are also known to be generally 
change resistant.1 When civilian leaders of the military diverge from this vision of what the 
military ought to do, they will pressure military officials to change. All organizations resist 
change, but militaries especially will resist change in specific ways depending on what civilians 
are trying to change. If the military views the changes being demanded as a departure from what 
they view as their primary mission, they will engage in various forms of resistance. If outright 
resistance fails, especially during times of war, the military will resort to passive forms that 
comply with the orders given but do not fully commit to the change, like assigning less important 
soldiers to the new mission, or other forms that look like compliance but in reality, is merely the 
appearance of compliance with real effort continuing to be directed towards the primary mission. 
Even efforts to change that are initiated internally are similarly resisted.2 
 In this way, the conception of the primary mission for the military acts as a filter. See 
Figure 1. It takes in civilian pressures to change, assesses whether this is consistent or 
inconsistent with their perceived primary mission, and then acts accordingly. Those tasks 
civilians are asking of the military that are consistent with the primary mission will be met with 
less resistance. Whereas those tasks that are inconsistent with the primary mission will be met 




1 See for example: Kier, Elizabeth. Imagining war: French and British military doctrine between the wars. Vol. 153. 
Princeton University Press, 2017.; Austin Long also clearly lays out the debate on organizational innovation, Long, 
Austin. The soul of armies: Counterinsurgency doctrine and military culture in the US and UK. Cornell University 
Press, 2016. 
2 For a clear example of this see Chapter 5 on Vietnam and the bottom-up innovation that occurred and how these 




Figure 1: Conception of Primary Mission as a Filter Against Civilian Pressure  
 
There are a number of mechanisms already identified in previous studies on how militaries 
organize themselves. These include bureaucratic forces, cultural forces, military responses to 
perceived threats, and civilian pressure. Primary Mission Theory utilizes many of these forces in 
explaining the mechanisms that lead to its predicted outcomes. However, it adds a strategic 
military consideration and revises certain assumptions about previous theories. Ultimately, it is 
the structure that surrounds the military that determines many of these forces. These other 
mechanisms are insufficient in themselves to explain outcomes.  
 
Civilian Pressure 
Militaries, along with most organizations, are change-resistant entities. They resist 
change, and this in turn reduces uncertainty and risk. This also inhibits adaptation to new 
challenges and threats. Therefore, change is possible but only under certain conditions and often 
at a slow pace. How militaries innovate is a matter of debate. Some argue that militaries can 
change if their civilian masters pressure them to do so.3 However, the preference given to tasks 
and innovation directed from civilian leadership is, by itself, insufficient in explaining innovation 
 
3 Austin Long provides a comprehensive overview of the debate in the literature. Long, Austin. The Soul of Armies: 





















for armed statebuilding operations. Frequently, the pressure to change by civilians results in 
changes that are merely performative. When civilians pressure the military to improve their 
statebuilding capacity, institutions are created, but these are under resourced and under 
prioritized. They are often assigned personnel with less training where the most valuable 
personnel are assigned to conventional combat units and missions. If civilian pressure alone is 
sufficient, we would expect more priority be given to statebuilding tasks when being pressured to 
do so during statebuilding operations, or at least similar prioritization or resistance to all tasks 
based on civilian preference. This is not the case.  
 
Bureaucratic forces 
Bureaucratic factors refer to the organizational preferences of the military as a cause of 
its behavior and institutionalization. The mechanisms that drive these theories are budgetary 
concerns, institutional prestige, path dependence, and inter-agency competition.4 These theories 
argue that interests and actions are determined by the structure of bureaucracy or by the interests 
of individuals within this structure. For example, an officer in the Air Force will prefer procuring 
more aircraft relative to an officer in the Army because they will seek the interests of the 
suborganizations they are in. Bureaucratic explanations for outcomes were most famously 
utilized by Graham Allison’s analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis.5 Militaries will seek larger 
budgets, branches within the military will compete with each other, and organizations and 
leaders will seek prestige. These mechanisms are insightful for military effectiveness in 
 
4 Snyder, Jack. The ideology of the offensive: Military decision making and the disasters of 1914. Vol. 2. Cornell 
University Press, 1989.; Zelikow, Philip, and Graham Allison. Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile 
crisis. Vol. 2. New York: Longman, 1999. 
5 Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis. Vol. 327, no. 
729.1. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971. 
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statebuilding. However, these theories are insufficient on their own. They’re limited in 
explaining which tasks will and will not become well-resourced and institutionalized.  
These arguments say those missions and tasks that secure larger budgets will be 
preferenced. However, infrastructural capabilities do not secure large budgets, they do not 
contribute to a military’s prestige; and yet every military gives high preference to infrastructural 
capabilities. Similarly, if budget space is the sole driver for behavior, then we would expect the 
U.S. Army to seek to absorb and institutionalize all of the governance and security force 
assistance capabilities and use them to argue for and justify a larger share of the budget. The 
shedding of these institutions following the conclusion of statebuilding operations is inconsistent 
with a purely bureaucratic explanation.  
 
Cultural forces 
Military culture, in the context of military effectiveness, is offered as an explanation as to 
why some militaries are more effective in particular types of conflicts at certain times relative to 
others. When these arguments are independent of theories explaining military endurance and 
capacity, they are essentially arguments about the military’s ability to innovate.6 The more a 
military is able to adapt to new threats and challenges, the more effective it will be in achieving 
its objectives. Austin Long’s arguments show that a military’s culture will result in differing 
levels of adaptation to new challenges, such as counterinsurgency operations.7  
 
6 Military effectiveness theories that focus on cohesion and endurance draw heavily on cultural explanations and 
characteristics of social groups within the military. See for example: Lyall, Jason. Divided Armies: Inequality and 
Battlefield Performance in Modern War. Princeton University Press, 2020.; and Castillo, Jasen J. Endurance and 
War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion. Stanford University Press, 2014. 
7 Long, Austin. The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK. Cornell 
University Press, 2016. 
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Culture theories also argue that a military’s culture is derived from its formative 
experience, the experience of the particular conflict and context in from which they can draw a 
continuous lineage to. The professional culture of the U.S. Army was established during the 
Civil War.8 It was also heavily impacted during WWII since that is the point at which a 
continuous standing army came into existence for the United States. Statebuilding was a vital 
part of the Civil War and WWII. Thus, statebuilding should be deeply engrained in its culture, 
but it is not. The U.S. military should be well prepared for statebuilding but instead continuously 
fails to prepare for, and execute, such operations.  
 
Perceived Threats 
This line of argument is the counter to the above theories about civilian pressure and 
interference. They argue that militaries can change independent of civilian pressure if they 
perceive a substantial threat to their organization. Militaries themselves will innovate in the face 
of new challenges that opposing militaries, or the threat environment, present them.  
 This theory is similar in many ways to Primary Mission Theory. However, it doesn’t 
explain performance in statebuilding operations completely. It is observed in later chapters that 
the military during armed statebuilding operations responds to the new threat of 
counterinsurgency and stability. These changes occur from civilian pressure to complete the 
mission they have been given, and it is also driven by a bottom-up process of innovation by units 
responding to the threats they are presented with.9 However, the institutions created, and the 
tactics being used, are not preferenced universally to levels the theory would predict. Bottom-up 
 
8 Long, Austin. The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK. Cornell 
University Press, 2016. 35.  
9 See for example: Patterson, Rebecca. The Challenge of Nation-building: Implementing Effective Innovation in the 
US Army from World War II to the Iraq War. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. 
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innovation that runs counter to the perceived primary mission is ultimately suppressed or 
dismantled. Similar to the limitations of the above theory, many of the institutions set up in 
response to statebuilding operations are frequently under prioritized, under resourced, and 
undervalued. If the simple presence of a threat was enough to explain military change and 
innovation, then these institutions, like Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), should have 
been given equal priority. The doctrinal documents coming out at the height of the Afghanistan 
and Iraq wars were arguing exactly that. However, they were still under-prioritized because they 
did not contribute to the primary mission. Resources were constantly pulled from these 




What Primary Mission Theory Explains 
 Existing theories therefore fall short of explaining effectiveness in armed statebuilding 
operations. As a result, Primary Mission Theory offers explanatory power in such operations that 
has been missing. The theory explains why different statebuilding institutions are given different 
priorities during a statebuilding operation and why they are institutionalized at different levels of 
priority. It explains why certain statebuilding capacities are maintained between wars, whereas 
others are not. These explanations therefore allow scholars and analysts to better explain and 
anticipate ultimate outcomes in armed statebuilding operations.  
 
Inconsistent Institutionalization During statebuilding operations  
 Primary Mission Theory explains the passive, and sometimes very active, resistance to 
building statebuilding capabilities. Previous scholarship has shown that the military is capable of 
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innovating during these operations and building statebuilding-task specific institutions. However, 
not all internal institutions within the military are created, or treated, equal. While more 
traditional warfighting institutions, like the U.S. Army Special Forces, were growing 
substantially during these operations, non-traditional warfighting institutions like PRTs were 
created in an ad hoc nature, lacked sufficient resources to grow effectively, and were often 
staffed with less trained and less experienced National Guard soldiers. Primary Mission Theory 
explains this discrepancy. The U.S. military will build statebuilding institutions under conditions 
of increased civilian pressure, but the military engages in passive resistance. It does not fully 
commit to being good at statebuilding and views the mission as a temporary distraction before 
they can then recommit to their preferred tasks.  
  
Atrophy of Capacity Between Statebuilding Operations  
Armed statebuilding capacity for the U.S. military improves and atrophies in repetitious 
cycles. They train for conventional near-peer adversaries, are asked to perform low-intensity 
statebuilding operations, and then return to focusing on near-peer adversaries once the 
statebuilding operation winds down.10 In 2009, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
advocated for the military to pragmatically focus on current stability operations (U.S. military 
doctrine refers to statebuilding operations and related tasks as stability or stabilization 
operations) in Afghanistan and Iraq rather than on preparing for a future hypothetical war with 
China. “Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to 
 
10 Patterson, Rebecca. The Challenge of Nation-building: Implementing Effective Innovation in the US Army from 
World War II to the Iraq War. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. 
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measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and 
efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit.”11  
DoD Directive 3000.05, release in 2005, declared that “stabilization is a necessary 
complement to joint combat power at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.”12 However, 
in the years following the official ends of the Iraq (2010) and Afghanistan (2014) conflicts, there 
has been an effort to refocus the U.S. military from training and preparing for wars with smaller 
adversaries that include counterinsurgency and statebuilding operations to training and preparing 
for wars with near-peer adversaries that would ultimately include higher intensity conflict against 
an opposing uniformed military.13 The first line of the summary of the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy says, “The Department of Defense’s enduring mission is to provide combat-credible 
military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation [emphasis added].”14 
The summary goes on to say that difficult choices should be made, and in that environment 
conventional combat is prioritized and stability operations are ignored. In fact, there is not a 
single mention of stability operations. The process of this cycle is illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
11 Gates, R. M. (2009). A Balanced Strategy-Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age. Foreign Affairs, 88, 29. 
12 Department of Defense, “Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.” (2005) https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_05.pdf 
13 Trump, Donald J. National security strategy of the United States of America. Executive Office of The President 
Washington DC Washington United States, 2017.; Mattis, Jim. Summary of the 2018 national defense strategy of the 
United States of America. Department of Defense Washington United States, 2018. 




Figure 2: Cycle of Institutional Capacity 
Those institutions that perform tasks that can contribute to both conventional and 
statebuilding tasks fare quite well under these conditions, like infrastructure. Institutions like the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or the U.S. Navy SeaBees find a usefulness under statebuilding 
operations building civilian infrastructure and related construction projects. They are also vital to 
conventional combat of ensuring the construction and security of sea and land lines of 
communication for the delivery of supplies and logistics. They therefore avoid the inter-war 
dismantling faced by other institutions that contribute to statebuilding tasks. 
 In the absence of Primary Mission Theory, this cycle seems illogical. Why would an 
organization dismantle the institutions that perform its most frequently required tasks and 
therefore leave itself vulnerable at the outset of almost every post-WWII conflict? Because 
statebuilding is not what the military thinks it should do and diverting resources from those tasks 




























Overall Effectiveness in Statebuilding Operations 
Primary Mission Theory increases our understanding of why militaries perform poorly in 
statebuilding operations. Most of the institutions necessary for the wide array of tasks that need 
to be performed will be improperly funded and prioritized, thus leaving the operation deprived of 
vital capacity and institutional memory. Institutional capacity varies substantially between the 
statebuilding tasks. Great effort is placed into cultivating and maintaining the ability to 
manipulate infrastructure. This is not a new phenomenon. While these infrastructure capabilities 
of the Roman Army were developed out of military necessity, they were often put to civilian 
uses.15 This is similar to the dynamics observed today.16 Comparatively less institutional capacity 
is devoted to security force assistance and almost no institutional capacity is devoted to 
governance building. Civil affairs units are often cited as a governance capacity, but they 
generally focus on maintaining order in occupied territories, which is temporary and thus not 
statebuilding.  
Task complexity also impacts the military’s ability to perform the various tasks. 
Infrastructure is the simplest task to complete because it is impacted by external factors to the 
smallest degree and is not relatively complex. Outside of supply and security issues, very little 
impacts the ability of the military to build a road. Comparatively, security force assistance is 
much more complex because of the external factors that determine its success outside of the 
military’s inputs. Tribal conflicts can weaken the local military’s cohesion. Local governance 
power struggles and insecurities can result in the government seeking to weaken or divide the 
 
15 Southern, Pat. The Roman army: a social and institutional history. ABC-CLIO, 2006. 
16 Strock, Carl A. “The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A History.” Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers. 2007. 
 32 
local military.17 It is also determined by the overall security situation. Governance building is by 
far the most complex. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3: Inverse Relationship Between Complexity and Institutional Capacity 
 
This relationship makes differences in the ability to complete various tasks nonlinear. 
Governance is the most complex but is also given less preference in resources and 
institutionalization. Thus, governance building is exponentially more difficult than building 
infrastructure. To deal with governance, temporary PRTs were set up for Afghanistan and Iraq, 
which were dismantled when the wars officially ended. Civil Affairs are often tasked with 
governance, but they come from varied civilian backgrounds before entering military service 
 
17 See, for example: Quinlivan, James T. "Coup-proofing: Its practice and consequences in the Middle East." 
International Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 131-165.; and Lyall, Jason. Divided Armies: Inequality and Battlefield 















and, at various times during Iraq and Afghanistan, comprised entirely of less-trained reserve 
soldiers. One Civil Affairs Officer noted that in 2004, 100% of Civil Affairs units were 
comprised of reservists.18  
Security force assistance is less complicated than governance, but more so than 
infrastructure. The primary soldiers responsible for this mission were U.S. Army Special Forces, 
but they are tasked with a dual mission, training local forces and conducting special operations. 
To make up for this labor shortfall, other units trained for conventional warfare are often tasked 
to perform SFA missions. Infrastructure, by far, is the least complex tasks, but consistently has 
dedicated institutions in both wartime and peacetime to deal specifically with infrastructure and 
nothing else. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers traces its history back to the American War of 
Independence, and each branch has dedicated construction units. In the U.S. Navy they are 
known as the SeaBees, which even have a monument dedicated to their service history near 
Arlington National Cemetery in Virginia. Other military statebuilding professions are not given 
the same treatment.  
 
The Primary Mission is Almost Always Conventional Warfare 
 The primary mission of most militaries, most of the time, is perceived to be conventional 
warfare. Some states occasionally recognize the adoption of a guerilla force structure is actually 
better for their defense and deterring invasion, but strong forces push most to adopt conventional 
doctrine and force structures, nonetheless. This does not mean that conventional warfare is 
guaranteed to be perceived as the primary mission or that this cannot change over time. Strong 
civilian pressure or changes in the threats faced by a military can force subtle, and sometimes not 
 
18 Interview, U.S. Marine Corps Civil Affairs Officer, April 10, 2019.  
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so subtle, changes to their perceived mission. The important point though is that the strong forces 
mentioned in this section make such pressure for change inefficient or ineffective, and most 
states will default to conventional combat as the primary mission.  
Most militaries, and especially the U.S. military, overly fixate on the battle as the sole 
purpose of a military and the only activity that decides wars. U.S. Army culture especially views 
the battle as the primary activity of war; and, therefore, the primary aim of a military is to win 
battles. U.S. Army professional education preferences Jomini, who was similar to Napoleon in 
his view that the battle is the primary objective of war, over strategists like Clausewitz who view 
the battle as subordinate to the political objectives of war.19 This institutional bias is not the only 
reason the U.S. military, and others, prefer conventional warfare as the focus for training and 
organizing. The perceived severity of threats emanating from conventional warfare, international 
norms that favor conventional high-tech militaries, and organizational bureaucracy and 
competition over budget share and prestige all push militaries to view or perceive their primary 
mission to be preparation and execution of conventional warfare.  
 It is impossible to explain why the primary mission of most militaries is viewed as 
conventional warfare without a clear understanding of the concept ‘conventional warfare.’ The 
concept is usually left to common assumptions rather than rigorously defined and is often heavily 
influenced by western conceptions of what is and is not acceptable forms of warfare.20 This bias 
in the use of the concept also alludes to how international norms preference a certain way of 
organizing a military along western, developed models.  
 
19 Jomini, Baron De, “The Art of War,” Translated by G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill, El Paso Norte Press, 
2005.; Howard, Michael, and Peter Paret. Carl Von Clausewitz: On War. Princeton University Press, 1984. 
20 Duyvesteyn, Isabelle. "The concept of conventional war and armed conflict in collapsed states." In Rethinking the 
nature of war, pp. 76-98. Routledge, 2005: 79.  
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Most place conventional war as the space between the use of unconventional weapons 
like nuclear, chemical, or biological on one end of the spectrum and combatants being non-state 
actors like terrorists or guerilla insurgents on the other side of the spectrum. “In an ‘ideal’ case of 
conventional war, two armies go to battle in a front manner, but sometimes it is the case that one 
of the sides is not organized as an army for the total duration of the conflict.”21 Stephen Biddle 
uses this conceptualization of conventional warfare in his influential book, Military Power.22 
By ‘conventional warfare’ I mean combat fought between military forces on or 
over major land masses. I thus exclude war at sea, and strategic bombing against 
civilian targets.23 
 
Another complication is that the conception of what is acceptable, ‘normal’ warfare and what is 
not is inconsistent over time. New weapons emerge in warfare, are proclaimed to be barbaric and 
beyond civilized warfare, and, if they are effective, eventually are adopted by the world’s 
militaries and become accepted as normal, conventional weapons.24  
 Conventional warfare is based on three component parts, the type of actors involved, 
their conduct in war, and the weapons used. Conventional warfare excludes non-state actors and 
is therefore an activity engaged in between uniformed militaries from internationally recognized 
states. Recent scholarship has noted that non-state actors are increasingly able to acquire the 
technology and skills necessary to employ conventional tactics.25 This, however, only covers one 
aspect of conventional war, the conduct. It is thus outside the bounds of conventional warfare. 
Conventional warfare excludes most forms of conduct except the competition over territory by 
 
21 Balcells, Laia. Rivalry and Revenge: the Politics of Violence During Civil War Cambridge, United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017: 10.  
22 Stephen D. Biddle. Military power: Explaining victory and defeat in modern battle. Princeton University Press, 
2004: 6.  
23 Biddle, Stephen D., and Stephen D. Biddle. Military power: Explaining victory and defeat in modern battle. 
Princeton University Press, 2004: 6. 
24 For example, see: Price, Richard M. The chemical weapons taboo. Cornell University Press, 2018.; and Ellis, 
John. The social history of the machine gun. JHU Press, 1986. 
25 Biddle, Stephen. "The determinants of nonstate military methods." The Pacific Review 31, no. 6 (2018): 714-739. 
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land forces. Objectives can stretch far beyond the mere conquering of territory, but in 
conventional warfare the taking of territory is the primary currency through which political 
objectives are purchased. Therefore, contemporary conventional warfare involves land forces 
employing the Modern System as described by Stephen Biddle for the purposes of taking and 
holding territory. Guerilla style tactics that simply seek to inflict casualties and then retreat 
before the adversary has time to respond is beyond the boundaries of conventional warfare. 
Finally, conventional warfare excludes weapons at both the high and low end of the intensity 
spectrum. Chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are all considered beyond conventional 
warfare, even if used at the tactical level in support of conventional objectives. Indirect weapons 
at the low end of the spectrum like suicide bombings, roadside bombs, or other guerilla or 
terrorist tactics are excluded. Conventional warfare, therefore, generally entails the use of 
medium- to high-tech weapons whose general purpose is in support of conventional tactics of 
taking and holding territory.  
 Based on this, the definition of conventional warfare can be stated as a form of 
controlled, organized violence by force of arms between uniformed state actors for the purposes 
of achieving some political objective through the taking and holding of territory without the use 
of guerilla or terrorist tactics or the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.  
 
Threat Intensity  
The threats emanating from the type of warfare in which conventional combat is 
characteristic are substantially more significant to the state relative to non-conventional conflicts. 
Non-conventional combat is the weapon of the weak when it falls on the low end of the 
spectrum, and is primarily the realm of deterrence, not conduct, when on the higher end of the 
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spectrum. Terrorism and guerilla style tactics are a threat but are employed by actors because of 
their weakness and almost never threatens the existence of a state. Nuclear weapons, along with 
chemical and biological, are viewed primarily as a civilian political matter, and the purpose of 
the military for such weapons is merely to deliver.  
Militaries, therefore, view competence in conventional combat as more important to the 
security of the state and themselves. Conventional warfare, from the perspective of the military, 
constitutes the greatest potential threat to the security of the state and one the military alone can 
address. Lose a statebuilding war and a state can simply accept some increased terrorism risk and 
come home. Lose a conventional war against a near-peer adversary and the odds of losing your 
country are significant, or the loss of a vital interest at the very least. Therefore, organizations 
charged with the security of the state will preference this bigger threat first and foremost.  
 
International Norms  
International norms also push militaries to organize for conventional, high-tech conflict. 
The first occasions of countries fielding large, standing and capital-intensive militaries was by 
the European polities that were creating the first states.26 Both the modern state, and the 
corresponding military that came with it, were exported around the word through European 
colonialism. It was also spread by emulation as polities sought to discourage the spread of 
colonialism into their territory, like Thailand (known as Siam at the time).27 Conventional 
standing armies then were spread globally through the need to resist other conventional standing 
armies and to also bestow upon the state that possessed it the accompanying prestige. 
International law, like the Hague conventions on the regulation of warfare and the 1863 Lieber 
 
26 Tilly, Charles. Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1992. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992. 
27 Baker, Chris, and Pasuk Phongpaichit. A history of Thailand. Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
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Code that outlawed unconventional, or guerilla style, warfare.28 The presence of this norm and 
the influence it holds is evident in the large number of countries that field conventional, standing, 
high-tech militaries that do not have the capital resources to support such an army or that do not 
face the type of security environment that would require it.  
 
Organizational bureaucracy and competition  
Organizational bureaucracy and competition also push militaries to preference 
conventional combat. This type of warfare brings higher levels of prestige and, along with it, 
bigger relative shares of the overall budget. Organizations create path dependences and tend to 
bend towards their own biased interests. Organizing for conventional battle has organizational 
benefits in terms of prestige and relative budget shares.  
There are also internal dynamics that make the adoption of non-conventional tasks very 
difficult and costly. Because the primary mission for most militaries is conventional warfare, 
talent within the military is more likely to prefer those jobs most closely related to conventional 
warfare. Those with combat experience gain major advantages in the promotion systems as those 
not involved in direct combat are considered to be lesser soldiers. This was a major argument for 
the integration of women into combat roles. Because women were excluded from combat 
occupations, they faced a major disadvantage relative to their male colleagues for higher end 
promotion who were more likely to have combat experience.29  
In the United Kingdom, British female officers are significantly disadvantaged in 
terms of promotion because of the exclusion from the combat arms and their 
under-representation in the combat support arms. Overwhelmingly, the senior 
ranks in the British army are dominated by officers who are from these arms and 
 
28 Farrell, Theo. "Global norms and military effectiveness: the army in early twentieth-century Ireland." in Risa 
Brooks, Creating military power: The sources of military effectiveness. Stanford University Press, 2007. 
29 King, Anthony. The combat soldier: Infantry tactics and cohesion in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. OUP 
Oxford, 2013. 
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it is very difficult to be promoted beyond one-star rank from combat service 
support branches.30 
 
Accordingly, major incentives were required to attract talented officers to the Security Force 
Assistance Brigades (SFABs) when they were formed because of the fear that joining the units 
would damage their personal careers since they were not directly involved in combat roles. The 
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) said of the promotion 
problems in SFABs, “Adviser roles continue to be seen as not career enhancing in the military, 
which contributes to high attrition rates — up to 70 percent for the 1st SFAB.”31 
 
Understanding and Measuring Military Effectiveness 
 What makes a military better or worse is an interesting question in its own right, but the 
consequences of the answer to that question could not be more significant. Those militaries that 
are ineffective risk losing battles at best and losing their country at worst. Therefore, substantial 
effort has been made to understand what dynamics impact the effectiveness of militaries. Most 
think of the primary mission of their military as fighting and winning conventional battles. 
Historically, this is primarily what they have been tasked to do. Modern international norms push 
states to build large conventional militaries even when it does not make strategic sense for their 
particular circumstances.32 However, since WWII, the rise of the international norm of not 
changing borders by force, and the adoption of nuclear arsenals among many world powers, 
conquest of others’ territory is increasingly uncommon. Competition below the level of 
 
30 King, Anthony. The combat soldier: Infantry tactics and cohesion in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. OUP 
Oxford, 2013: 414.  
31 Kyle Rempfer, “Army SFABs need to offer more incentives to staff and retain troops, watchdog says,” The Army 
Times, July 30, 2019, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/07/30/army-sfabs-need-to-offer-more-
incentives-to-staff-and-retain-troops-watchdog-says/.  
32 Farrell, Theo. "Transnational norms and military development: Constructing Ireland's professional army." 
European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001): 63-102.  
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conventional warfare in the so-called gray zone is the most likely form of warfare, especially in 
armed statebuilding operations. If conquest does occur, that territory is no longer absorbed into 
the conquering states sovereignty but is instead rebuilt to the intervenors liking and reestablished 
as an independent state. In this environment, militaries are increasingly asked to perform a wide 
range of tasks to build states, not just win the preceding battles. Therefore, it is exceedingly 
important to advance our knowledge of what makes militaries effective at statebuilding 
operations.  
 
Narrow Understanding of Military Effectiveness 
 Military effectiveness is consistently defined as a military’s ability to fight other 
militaries. This is so much the case that combat power and fighting power are often used in place 
of military effectiveness. Prominent studies on military effectiveness are often studies of what 
makes militaries good at combat. “Combat power is the ability to destroy the enemy while 
limiting the damage that he can inflict in return.”33 Risa Brooks asked, “Why are some states, at 
sometimes, better able to translate their basic material and human strengths into fighting 
power?”34 However, militaries are tasked to do more than simply fight. Even when fighting is 
asked of them, the end of the fighting is usually just the beginning of a military operation in a 
country or conflict. They provide humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, engage in military 
diplomacy, and conduct good will training missions, among many other tasks and activities.  
 
33  Allen R. Millett and Williamson Murray, Military Effectiveness, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).  
34 Risa A. Brooks. “Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military 
Effectiveness” in Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley. Creating military power: The sources of military effectiveness. 
Stanford University Press, 2007. 
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Brooks also says that “… few scholars of international relations have examined a key 
component of military power, that of effectiveness.”35 Very little attention is given to military 
effectiveness as it relates to conventional combat, even less is given to tasks outside of this 
primary mission. This oversight is puzzling. Very rarely is conventional victory sufficient to 
achieve all political objectives being sought in a conflict in the modern era.  
 International norms of sovereignty and the integrity of already established national 
borders has resulted in the necessity of reconstructing failed states rather than dividing 
conquered territory among the victors. On the topic of failed and collapsed states, Marina 
Ottaway said, “while historically such states simply disappeared, divided up into smaller units or 
were conquered by a more powerful neighbor, collapsed states are now expected to be rebuilt 
within the same international borders thanks to the intervention of multilateral organizations and 
bilateral donors.”36 This dynamic of the modern era has resulted in states asking their militaries 
to rebuild the territory they conquer, rather than simply occupying it.37 The tasks involved in 
each are substantially different. Occupations generally require providing security and policing 
and administering a territory. Statebuilding demands much more, like reconstructing 
infrastructure, training up indigenous security forces, and building and organizing local 
governing institutions that can operate independently. As such, it is more important than ever to 
understand military effectiveness in statebuilding operations.  
 
35 Risa A. Brooks. “Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military 
Effectiveness” in Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley. Creating military power: The sources of military effectiveness. 
Stanford University Press, 2007: 2.  
36 Ottaway, Marina. "Rebuilding state institutions in collapsed states." Development and change 33, no. 5 (2002): 
1001. 
37 Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg. "Why Africa's weak states persist: The empirical and the juridical in 
statehood." World politics 35, no. 1 (1982): 1-24. 
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War is the continuation of politics by other means.38 Trying to understand war 
independent of politics is meaningless. It is the political objectives that make a brutal and 
inhuman affair morally justifiable rather than violence for the sake of violence. Similarly, 
understandings of military effectiveness that only focus on the combat phase, and not the myriad 
phases employed to achieve the political objectives are of limited use. Defeating the German and 
Japanese militaries was one step along the path of reconstructing their countries, initiating 
democratic regimes, and integrating them into the international order as allies. The U.S. military 
was conventionally overwhelming in Vietnam, but failures at statebuilding led to an overall 
strategic failure. Going back even further, during the U.S. civil war, the Union North triumphed 
militarily over the Rebel South. However, the political victory fell short as the South was 
allowed to reconstitute a system of black suppression and subordination once the reconstruction 
force pulled out. Only the more limited political objective of preserving the union was achieved.  
Furthermore, this oversight is unfortunate considering the U.S. military has conducted 
armed statebuilding operations far more frequently than conventional operations.39 The current 
military effectiveness literature mostly disregards the military’s role in statebuilding operations, 
and therefore scholars, policy makers, and analysts have a very poor understanding of what 
explains their effectiveness in the various tasks that occur during an armed statebuilding 
operation. If scholars do focus on non-conventional combat operations for military effectiveness, 
this is usually focused on counterinsurgency operations and not the myriad of other statebuilding 
tasks, which is still focused on kinetic tasks of seeking and destroying and more closely mirrors 
conventional combat procedures and tactics.  
 
38 Howard, Michael, Peter Paret. Carl Von Clausewitz: On War. Princeton University Press, 1984. 
39 Barbara Salazar Torreon and Sofia Plagakis, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-
2019,” Congressional Research Services, July 17, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf.  
 43 
Early explanations of military power were predicated on the comparison of raw resources 
that were possessed by various countries, resources like population size, raw mineral resources, 
industrial capacity, and economic output. Latter theories began incorporating more complex 
explanations, like technology in the offense/defense balance theory.40 More sophisticated 
versions of this definition incorporated conceptions of efficiency.  
Military effectiveness is the process by which armed forces convert resources into 
fighting power. A fully effective military is one that derives maximum combat 
power from the resources physically and politically available. Effectiveness thus 
incorporates some notion of efficiency. Combat power is the ability to destroy the 
enemy while limiting the damage that he can inflict in return.41 
 
The latest iteration of this theory by Michael Beckley brings in considerations of per capita 
economic wealth, innovation, and immigration.42 Beckley argues that great power competition 
and war is best predicted not by the gross production of a country and their raw resources, but 
rather by production and resources relative to their population size. For example, China must 
divert more resources than the United States to policing and providing for their own large 
population relative to the United States. The United States, therefore, can divert more resources 
to competition and war than China.  
Since the publishing of Biddle’s Military Power, the emphasis has been not just on 
material resources but on how countries utilize these resources to employ the modern system in 
battle.43 The modern system involves small unit maneuvers with covering fire and combined 
arms, which in turn requires those units to be capable of performing complex tasks. Those 
 
40 Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation under the security dilemma." World politics 30.2 (1978): 167-214. 
41 Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H.Watman. “The Effectiveness of Military Organizations.” In 
Allan R Millett and Williamson Murray. “Military Effectiveness Volume I: The First World War.” Cambridge 
University Press, 2010: 2.  
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43 Stephen D. Biddle. Military power: Explaining victory and defeat in modern battle. Princeton University Press, 
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military units that employ the modern system diminish the lethality of their opponent and 
increase their own lethality, tipping the balance against adversaries that do not employ such a 
system. For example: 
The creation of military power only partially depends on states’ material human 
resources. Wealth, technology, and human capital certainly matter for states’ 
ability to create military power. Equally important, however, are how a state uses 
those resources.44  
 
Biddle demonstrates that theories that explain military power in terms of possession of 
material capability can only explain war outcomes approximately 60% of the time.45 For 
Beckley’s theory, the country with the net resource advantage performs much better in 
international disputes. Beckley shows that “Gross flow indicators … perform little better than a 
coin toss at predicting the winners and losers of these conflicts.”46  
Armed statebuilding operations are much more complex, and thus predicting outcomes is 
far more difficult. For armed statebuilding operations, every failure of statebuilding is a failure of 
the more powerful state since the target state is likely to be a fragile or failed state or was 
severely weakened by losing the preceding war. Not only do adversaries utilize tactics that are 
designed to negate the power disparity, but the task being performed is far more complex and not 
easily solved by the simple use of force.  
 
Measures of Military Effectiveness 
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Measures of military effectiveness have been based on either battlefield outcomes, the 
organizational practices of the military, or the ability of officers and soldiers to perform their 
assigned tasks. Subsequent works, however, have utilized more universal, broad definitions.  
1) Battlefield outcomes. Reiter and Stam state that “winning wars is about winning 
battles.”47 Although they say that competency at winning battles is insufficient to guarantee 
winning the war, this is taken as their definition. Similarly, Biddle and Long use battle outcomes 
as a measure of military effectiveness because, “whereas wars can be won by militarily 
ineffective but highly resolute states, success in battle requires military effectiveness.”48 
2) Organizational practices. Talmadge explains that the ability of militaries to translate 
state power into military power as being predicated on the specific organizational practices of the 
military. “These practices, related to promotion patterns, training regimens, command 
arrangements, and information management in the military, serve as the critical link between 
state resources and battlefield power.”49 
3) Performance of assigned tasks. Pollack explains military effectiveness as “the ability 
of soldiers and officers to perform on the battlefield, to accomplish military missions, and to 
execute the strategies devised by their political-military leaders.”50 Pollack is referring 
specifically to the skills of soldiers to perform assigned tasks, rather than looking only at the 
 
47 Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness." The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 42, no. 3 (1998): 260.  
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49 Caitlin Talmadge. The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes. Cornell University 
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outcomes of operations or missions. Reiter’s definition also requires the measurement of 
assigned tasks.51  
4) Resource Utilization. Brooks, discussed further below, defines military effectiveness 
as, “the capacity to create military power form a state’s basic resources in wealth, technology, 
population size, and human capital.”52 Brooks utilizes the measurement of both attributes of the 
organization itself and its performance on the battlefield.   
 While most scholars use the general term, military effectiveness, some specify the type of 
military effectiveness they are studying. Talmadge opts to use the more specified term of 
battlefield effectiveness. This is particularly useful in clarifying that Talmadge is interested in a 
military’s ability to perform in medium-intensity combat in which rival militaries compete for 
territory.53 Talmadge operationalizes battlefield effectiveness as the ability of units to perform 
basic tactics and the ability to conduct complex operations. Talmadge identifies the tasks which 
modern militaries must be able to perform as basic tactics like being able to operate their 
equipment and use cover and concealment, and the ability to conduct complex operations that 
involve small-unit-level initiative and command-level coordination.  
 Dan Reiter, although also focused primarily on conventional combat, presents an 
effective definition that is broad enough to incorporate into the study of armed statebuilding 
operations. Reiter says military effectiveness is “the degree to which militaries can accomplish at 
acceptable costs the goals assigned to them by political leaders.”54 From this, scholars can then 
distinguish which tasks are being observed for their specific research questions. Those interested 
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in battlefield effectiveness can look specifically at tasks related to medium intensity conflict, and 
those interested in statebuilding operations can look specifically at tasks related to statebuilding 
operations. Thus, the best way to define military effectiveness that does not unnecessarily limit 
its applicability, is the ability of the military to perform the tasks assigned to it by political 
leaders at acceptable costs. This definition also makes clear the deficiency of the military 
effectiveness literature writ large. Studying only a small portion of the tasks assigned to the 
military by political leaders leaves the majority of tasks unstudied.  
 
Table 2: Measures of Military Effectiveness 
 Focused on 
Performance 








Not Focused on 
Institutions 
Battlefield Outcomes Null 
 
 
Measuring Effectiveness in Statebuilding Operations 
The definition of military effectiveness focuses on individual tasks that are assigned to 
the military to be performed. Therefore, effectiveness for this study is disaggregated between the 
three tasks that is asked of the U.S. military in FM 3-07 Stability that contribute to statebuilding, 
and it is observed at two levels.55 Effectiveness is measured separately for infrastructure, security 
force assistance, and governance assistance. These are the tasks in FM 3-07 that contribute to the 
local state. Additionally, effectiveness is measured at a basic level of simple completion of a task 
 
55 U.S. Department of the Army, Stability, Field Manual 3-07 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 
2014). 
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and at a higher level of achieving intended outcomes. Both are necessary to understand military 
effectiveness. It is important to study more than just the highest-level war outcomes, or the 
outcomes of entire statebuilding operations. One can be effective, execute the tasks well, and still 
miss the outcome due to unforeseen forces outside effectiveness issues. Stephen Biddle does the 
same by trying to explain the outcome of individual battles rather than the outcome of wars, 
which is determined by more than just military effectiveness.56 
 
Two Levels of Effectiveness 
This study observes effectiveness at two levels. The first looks at the tactical level, 
effectiveness is simply the ability to complete the task at the micro level. It is observing the 
military’s simple completion of a task, and the institutional capacity for each task, regardless of 
its contribution to the broader operations or objectives. For infrastructure, this asks if military 
units were able to build roads, construct schools, and repair electrical grids, among others. This 
does not account for the overall impact of those projects, just the military’s ability to complete 
the tasks. For security force assistance, this asks if military units were able to train units, help 
build the local force and command structure, and assist in fielding these units. This does not 
account for whether these units were effective at securing the county or winning the conflict, just 
that the military was able to train the local forces. For governing institutions, this asks if they 
were able to stand up governing institution at the local and national levels and assist in their 
operation. This does not account for the effectiveness or legitimacy of these institutions, just that 
they were established and assisted.  
 
56 Biddle, Stephen D., and Stephen D. Biddle. Military power: Explaining victory and defeat in modern battle. 
Princeton University Press, 2004. 
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 The second looks at the strategic level of effectiveness and determines the extent to 
which each of the three tasks achieved their intended objectives with regards to the broader 
political goals. For infrastructure, were schools used, roads utilized, and electrical grids 
effectively integrated into the population centers that needed them. For security force assistance, 
how effective were the trained units? Were they able to provide security and conduct complex 
operations? For governing institutions, how legitimate were they viewed by the local 
populations? Were they able to administer effectively? How much was corruption a problem? 
Were the institutions effectively integrated into the national system as designed?  
 
Statebuilding 
 Many previous writings on the topic covered here consistently miss-label the type of 
operation they are trying to understand. Nation-building has been the favored term to describe 
foreign interventions that sought to rebuild the country and to transfer sovereignty back to 
indigenous actors, especially during the 1990s. President George W. Bush frequently criticized 
the activity of “nation-building” as a candidate.57 While most tacitly accepted this misnomer and 
incorporated the terminology into scholarly work, nations are very different from states and 
almost never are foreign military interventions actually attempting to build nations. The goal of 
these missions is to rebuild a central bureaucratic organization to administer the territory, deliver 
goods and services, and to monopolize the legitimate use of violence within their borders. This is 
a state.58 A nation on the other hand, is an imagined community that share a sense of common 
 
57 Bush, George W. Presidential Candidate Debate October 11, 2000. https://www.c-
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identity, usually through a common ethnicity, language, or origin story.59 These communities 
also either possess a state or aspire to possess a state.  
 To advance an understanding of military effectiveness in statebuilding operations, it is 
necessary to understand whether or not the U.S. military’s tasks in FM 3-07 stability operations 
manual correspond with what is known about how states are formed and strengthened. In other 
words, how consistent are the U.S. military’s self-prescribed statebuilding tasks with what is 
actually needed to build a state?  
 
External Statebuilding 
 State building can occur internally by local actors, or it can occur externally through 
foreign interventions. External statebuilding is the type of interest here. The expansion of the 
modern state outside of the European continent created some of the first examples of external 
statebuilding in the form of colonialism. However, this process was very different from the 
internal statebuilding experience in Europe and came with varying levels of success. External 
statebuilding has been attempted frequently since, occasionally in conjunction with foreign 
imposed regime changes or promotions, occupations, or through cooperation between alliance 
countries (like the assistance from the United States to Iceland during WWII to deter German 
moves against the strategically placed island).60  
 External statebuilding has increased significantly since the end of the Cold War. The 
primary intervening agent has been the United States, but the Soviet Union and others have also 
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launched such operations. The reasons for the rise of statebuilding operation are many, but this is 
primarily due to great power competition during the period and the increasingly strong 
international norm of not changing borders through military force. States now, instead of being 
annexed into the conquering country, now must be rebuilt and returned to indigenous 
sovereignty.  
 The internal statebuilding process in Europe, and in the other regions it occurred 
successfully, was a very long and violent process. Traditional centers of power did not give up 
their control easily and the centralization of power and coercion was resisted, often violently, by 
the populations the state sought to control. For an armed statebuilding operation, the intervening 
state often does not have the patience or resources to commit to such a violent decades-long, 
sometimes centuries-long, project. Therefore, armed statebuilding operations seek to move 
political development at hyper-speed while also lacking legitimacy as an external actor engaged 
in an occupation and under disadvantageous conditions. Both the British from 1914 to 1932 and 
the United States after 2003 sought to expedite the construction of strong administration in Iraq. 
The British depended on coercion by aircraft and neglected the construction of other necessary 
institutions.61 The United States did not commit enough troops early in the operation to secure 
Iraqi territory (along with de-Bathification and disbanding the Iraqi Army) and led to a 
breakdown of administrative capacity.62 External statebuilding operations have seen few 
successes because of these inherent limitations.63  
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 Given what the state is and how it is formed, how does this line up with the three tasks 
the U.S. military is asked to do during statebuilding operations? Although it is not a necessary 
condition, most statebuilding operations occur in failed states. Either the state was weak and 
fragile through internal or external processes and the outward effects of this fragility justified the 
intervention or the intervention itself first defeated the military and overthrew the regime thus 
creating a failed state. Some statebuilding tasks are conducted in states that have not yet failed 
but their fragility is a concern. However, countries that are the target of all three statebuilding 
tasks simultaneously are always failed states.  
 
Infrastructure and the State 
 Infrastructure is vital to the power of the state. States that lack infrastructure lack the 
ability to access their population and to deliver goods and services. States without infrastructure, 
importantly, also lack the capacity to extract resources from their territory and population. This 
significantly hinders the ability of the state to monopolize the legitimate use of forces within a 
given territory, a necessary condition of being a state. James C. Scott argued that the limitations 
of transportation in certain areas of Southeast Asia made the expansion of the state beyond the 
lowland valleys impractical, therefore the taking of slaves and moving them into the territory 
already controlled by the state became a major objective of war and statebuilding.64 One of the 
reasons that strong states were constructed in Europe and not Africa was the prohibitive costs of 
building the infrastructure necessary for the states in Africa to penetrate the periphery, whereas 
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this was relatively easier to do in the smaller and more permissible landscape of western 
Europe.65  
 
Security Forces and the State 
 Security forces are perhaps the most vital feature of a state. The very definition of a state 
is an organization that monopolizes the claim to the legitimate use of force within a given 
territory. A state cannot exist without agents of coercion, usually in the form of both police and 
the military. It is so important, that one of the most prominent theories of the state inexorably 
links state making with war making.66  
A ruler’s creation of armed force generated durable state structure. It did so both 
because an army became a significant organization within the state and because 
its construction and maintenance brought complementary organizations – 
treasuries, supply services, mechanisms for conscription, tax bureau, and much 
more – into life.67 
 
War continues to be a vital component of statebuilding today and outside of the European 
experience. Losing a war often leads to the destruction of the state but fighting and winning a 
war today does not by itself lead to state construction. Often other factors are required to be 
present, like core ethnic homogeneity and fighting a war for revolution.68 States can often 
survive upheaval and civil unrest, but state failure is guaranteed (especially in a revolution) when 
the agents of coercion, the security forces, defect or desert.  
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Governance and the State 
 Governance is also vital for a state. The institutions and organizations that comprise the 
state are necessary to make decisions, carry out those decisions, and to penetrate society and 
extract resources. This is evident in the expansion of the state in every region of the world.69 
Governance in general is a necessary condition for the existence of a state, but it is also the case 
that poor governance is an indication of a fragile or failed state. States begin to fail when 
governments exploit their populations and engage in predatory behavior rather than extract at 
sustainable levels and reinvest in production and the prosperity of society.70 
 
Alternative Theories  
 Previous scholars who have looked at armed statebuilding operations have at times 
address very similar questions as the one studied here, and at other times have address isolated 
phenomenon within the broader context of armed statebuilding operations. Generally, these 
studies fall into one of two categories; they either address the question of effectiveness in 
statebuilding operations and do not focus on specific actors (especially not the military) 
attempting to build states, or they focus on one possible task that could be incorporated into a 
broader statebuilding operation. For example, Paul D. Miller’s study on armed statebuilding 
operations does not distinguish between military and civilian actors, it also does not distinguish 
between state actors and international organizational actors.71 Conversely, some studies focus on 
a singular task within these operations, like security force assistance. These studies fixate on 
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particular tasks or phenomena in isolation from other tasks that can be conducted or are being 
conducting in parallel.  
 The result of this is that enumerating clear alternative theories to the one presented here is 
not simple or straight forward. Thus, below I present both the general theories of statebuilding 
operations as well as the theories that have focused on the tasks I study here. For the specific task 
theories, only governance and security force assistance are presented since previous work has 
omitted the importance of infrastructure building to the success of armed statebuilding 
operations.  
 
General Theories of Statebuilding Effectiveness  
While many scholars have written on similar topics covered here, only two previous 
works look at sufficiently similar questions to the one raised here to be considered truly 
competing theories. The first is “The challenges of Nation-Building” by Rebecca Patterson, and 
the second is “Armed Statebuilding Operations” by Paul D. Miller.72 Patterson’s work is focused 
on explaining innovation, or the military’s ability to adapt to new challenges as the U.S. military 
is trained for conventional combat but is nonetheless asked to repeatedly conduct statebuilding 
operations. Miller is focused on explaining outcomes. Miller’s work argues that states can fail in 
different ways and the strategy of the intervenor should be tailored to the type and severity of a 
specific state’s failure. Important gaps are left despite these works.  
Patterson’s work is important in understanding how the U.S. military innovates to address 
new challenges. The opening puzzle is similar to the one presented here, why is the military so 
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poor at statebuilding despite being routinely asked to perform it. Patterson’s main contribution, 
an important one, explains how innovation can occur from the bottom up as units on the ground 
attempt to find new ways of conducting operations. What the Primary Mission Theory 
contributes to this understanding is why such important innovation is resisted during the 
operations and then cast aside once the specific statebuilding operation winds down. The U.S. 
military is most often forced to develop internal statebuilding capacities at the outset of every 
statebuilding operation, and innovation within such an operation cannot explain why this 
happens.  
Miller’s work more closely resembles the research question presented here. Miller argues 
that there are five different dimensions of state failure and that the statebuilding effort needs to 
address the specific type of failure.73 For example, if a state is suffering a collapsed economy but 
still has a functioning security apparatus and infrastructure, then state builders should focus their 
efforts on rebuilding the economy and tailor it to the degree of failure. State failure types, 
according to Miller, include security, legitimacy, capacity, prosperity, and humanity.   
Key questions about armed statebuilding operations remain unanswered by this study. 
The change to the definition of the state is too restrictive in what can and cannot be considered 
armed statebuilding. Miller believes that a state is no longer a state if it does not protect the 
humanitarian rights of its citizens. Legitimacy is a vital component of the state, the state must be 
the legitimate actor in a given territory, but legitimacy is not necessarily tied to the protection of 
humanitarian rights. States can violate many human rights and still be states and be viewed as 
legitimate by a majority of the population. Cambodia engaged in genocide in the 1970s and the 
state still existed. It only ceased to exist when Vietnam invaded, and Vietnam invaded because of 
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Cambodian incursions into their territory, not because Cambodia was violating human rights. 
More recently, Myanmar committed atrocities against the Rohingya minority, but the majority 
Buddhist population largely agreed with these actions. Thus, the Myanmar state did not lose 
legitimacy among the majority of their population for their inhumane actions. Similarly, 
legitimacy cannot be treated as synonymous with democratic governance, it is not.74 Miller 
recognizes that legitimacy comes from heavily contextual and diverse sources, but then uses 
democracy as the sole measure of legitimacy, nonetheless.  
The figure below shows Miller’s coding of outcomes for all of his cases.75 The coding 
would suggest that statebuilding operations, on the whole, are at least marginally successful. 
However, Miller does not distinguish between UN-led operations and US-led operations. The 
difference should be controlled for. The UN is an international organization and likely to be 
viewed as more independent and impartial relative to a U.S. invasion. Additionally, UN 
operations are less likely to be as heavily militarized as a U.S. led operation. These are 
significant differences and result in significantly different conclusion about the likelihood of 
success in a statebuilding operation.  
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Figure 4: Outcomes for all of Miller’s cases 
 
When these cases are separated, the difference is obvious. Miller only coded UN cases as 
uncertain, and the breakdown resembles the much more optimistic picture of all cases combined. 
However, as expected, U.S. cases are much more likely to fail. U.S. led operations have 
historically been less likely to succeed than UN operations and coding them together, or treating 
them both as armed statebuilding operations, is inappropriate.  
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These research design issues limit the usefulness of the theory and conclusions. Miller 
argues that changes in strategy are what is needed to be more effective at statebuilding 
operations, but this assumes such changes in strategy are possible. It assumes that the actors 
involved are either willing or able to just behave in different ways. Primary Mission Theory 
argues that the military behaves in certain ways because of overwhelmingly strong structural 
conditions that determine the small spectrum of potential behaviors from which to choose from. 
The U.S. military, at various times, was well aware of the fact that its approach to statebuilding 
operations needs to be fundamentally different from its approach to conventional war, this was 
especially the case during the Vietnam war. It nonetheless opts to conduct conventional 
operations anyway and resist the diversion of talent and resources to statebuilding tasks despite 
strong civilian pressure and clear recognition of the type of war they were facing. Even when 
some lower-level units successfully innovate for statebuilding operations, the military resists the 
broader implementation of their lessons learned and will even forcefully reassign such units to 
conventional tasks.  
 
Security Force Assistance Theories 
 Security force assistance is frequently employed independently of broader armed 
statebuilding operations. States often see the employment of trainers and advisors as a way to 
achieve the same foreign policy objectives that would require a larger deployment of their own 
forces. Therefore, states see it as war or foreign policy on the cheap. However, these cheap 
operations, and even SFA missions that were historically expensive, have produced marginal 
outcomes. Additionally, these missions have often failed to achieve objectives, failed to produce 
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liberal and humanitarian reforms, and at times have even led to humanitarian crises and the 
prolongation of hostilities.76 
These programs are sometimes called partner capacity building, train and assist 
programs, or security sector reform, among others. This form of engagement in foreign policy 
has become a vital part of U.S. strategy since WWII.77 In recent years, and especially during the 
Cold War, many of these programs have resulted in catastrophic failures. When the Islamic State 
advanced towards Mosul in 2014, the stronger, more numerous, better equipped Iraqi army 
collapsed without much of a fight.78 By that point, the United States had spent over $26 billion to 
help build up Iraq’s police and military alone (not to mention the many U.S. lives lost in the 
process). 79 U.S. forces had to redeploy to the region after the official withdraw from Iraq to 
engage ISIS.80 This is problematic since the strategy is intended to save the principal state blood 
and treasure by not having to use their own forces to fight the conflict.  
The current literature can broadly be placed into two groups based on their general 
arguments. The first makes a divergent interest argument. These works center around the fact 
that the interests of the client state do not always align with the interests of the patron state. 
Some argue that the nature of the relationship and the types of likely states receiving assistance 
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mean that interest misalignment is almost guaranteed. The second body of work argues that there 
are structural limitations. Local capacity to support the forces being built, the local government 
structure, and other conditions determine the effectiveness of the forces being trained.  
Stephen Biddle argues that the problem is a misalignment of interests between the 
principle and agent (PA). The most likely recipients of SFA are those most likely to have 
divergent interests from the United States. “As with any other PA problem, SFA is thus subject 
to agency loss as a consequence of interest asymmetry, information asymmetry, moral hazard 
and adverse selection; unfortunately, the particular circumstances of SFA promote agency losses 
that are much larger than many SFA advocates expect.”81 
 Ladwig III argues that interests will be divergent because of the position of the regime 
relative to that of the United States. The client regime will have interests in regime security, not 
just external security or defeating an insurgency. The client regime will often prioritize the 
maintenance of power. This will undermine many of the needed reforms like improving the 
military chain of command, reforming economic practices, or building broad and multiethnic 
governing coalitions.82 Similar to this argument, Savage and Caverley argue that military training 
increases the power of the military relative to the civilian government since human capital cannot 
be shifted during coup-proofing.83 
Even if there is enough interest alignment between governments, the structural limitations 
of target countries will limit effectiveness. Afghanistan for example, has neither the human 
capital nor the tax revenues to support a modern military, especially not one with more than 
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300,000 personnel. The military the international community has built in Afghanistan will never 
be supported absent outside funding, which defeats the purpose of building partners to do your 
job for you. Much of what the RAND Corporation has produced on this subject makes similar 
points.84 Giustozzi and Quentin argue that attempts to impose western models on countries that 
lack educational and structural conditions similar to western countries are bound to fail.85 Daniel 
Byman argues that it is the structural conditions that cause the misalignment of interests. 
U.S. allies that are fighting al-Qaida-linked insurgencies often have four 
categories of structural problems that explain some of their distinct interests and 
lead to particular challenges against insurgents: illegitimate (and often 
repressive) regimes; civil-military tension manifested by fears of a coup; 
economic backwardness; and discriminatory societies. Because of these 
problems, allies frequently stray far from the counterinsurgency ideal, both 
militarily and politically.86 
 
Berg argues that security sector reform is more likely when the ruling coalition is 
fragmented. Conversely, unified leadership is less likely to accept reforms that have the effect of 
limiting the regimes power. Leaders that rely on multiple factions are more likely to accept 
reforms that limit the power of political factions. This is similar to arguments above about 
divergent interests but is uniquely tied to structural conditions. “Understanding the evolution of 
the governance of security forces requires looking beyond the tactics and strategies pursued by 
external actors through a deeper examination of political constraints and opportunities.”87 
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In Biddle’s 2005 article, he questions the assumptions that explain why the Afghan model 
of war worked. One assumption was that U.S. special forces and air power were so 
overwhelming that the Taliban didn’t stand a chance. This would imply that this model could be 
applied with similar success anywhere. A counter to this assumption was that local conditions 
were deterministic, and that the quick Afghan victory was a fluke. Biddle argues that only an ally 
that equals their enemy in skill and motivation will be able to complement U.S. support 
sufficiently.  
Inept or ill-motivated allies cannot realize the potential of U.S. airpower and SOF 
against competent enemies, whether in the first world or anywhere else. As many 
prospective allies are even less skilled than their state opponents, this implies 
many fewer opportunities for the model to produce Afghanistan’s results.88 
 
Building Local Governance Theories 
These theories generally fixate purely on regime change operations, but they often bring 
in governance selection and building during statebuilding operations that follow. Theories on 
governance building post-conflict fit into three categories based on what mechanisms are most 
significant in determining outcomes. First, the interveners’ inputs are the determining factor. 
Success is determined by strategy, how many troops are committed, or how much resources are 
dedicated to the effort. Second, local conditions are the most important factor. Little of what the 
intervenor does will matter if amenable preconditions are not present in the host country. Finally, 
the interaction between international and local actors is what determines success. Success will be 
unlikely if international actors attempt to set up a governing arrangement that fundamentally 
undermines the power of the most important local actors as this will incentivize them to engage 
in spoiling behavior and undermine the operations. Successful operations will therefore be a 
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negotiation between international and local actors on setting up a governing structure that 
incentivizes buy-in from local actors.  
This debate has important implications for the Primary Mission Theory of armed 
statebuilding operations presented here. It is argued that the military places less importance on 
those missions that are also most complex and more dependent on preexisting conditions. 
Understanding how these interact is, therefore, important. Current research frequently looks to 
the predominance of either strategy or preexisting conditions. “A key question is therefore 
whether democratization outcomes after intervention are the product of deliberate policy choices 
by interveners or a function of how hospitable local conditions are to democratic change.”89 
Recent literature is suggesting that the two interact to produce outcomes.  
 
Intervenor Strategy  
 Some theories have argued that the choices made by external intervenors has the most 
impact. Stephen Krasner, in alluding to the assumption that choices matter, said, “occupying 
powers cannot escape choices about what new governance structures will be created and 
sustained.”90 Roland Paris argued that the choices intervening powers make in setting up new 
regimes is determined by what governing scheme the intervenor itself has.91 When General 
Petraeus returned from his command in Iraq in 2005 he re-wrote the Army’s counterinsurgency 
manual, FM 3-24.92 A prominent feature in this manual was achieving legitimacy of the new 
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government in the eyes of the population. The field manual for stability operations was also 
developed around the same time, FM 3-07. The development of doctrine for these operations 
assumes that the choices made in the operation will affect the outcome.   
 Lyall and Wilson argue that the reduction in counterinsurgency (COIN) effectiveness 
following World War I was the result of the mechanization of forces, which facilitated the shift 
from foraging armies to isolated, armored force structures.93 This reduced the interactions 
between the occupiers and the occupied. The loss of intelligence gathering abilities meant that 
force was no longer applied discriminately, and the occupiers would lose the support of the local 
population more quickly. Lyall and Wilson are arguing that tactical choices reduce the 
effectiveness of intervening militaries.  
 The more general military strategy literature frequently argues that operations are won or 
lost based on how much resources are committed and how they are employed.94 It was a 
fundamental assumption that more troops can subdue an insurgency when the U.S. government 
ordered troop surges in Iraq (2007) and Afghanistan (2009). The idea that COIN operations can 
be planned by simply calculating the needed ratio of troops per 1,000 people is prominent, 
despite the poor empirical support for such claims.95 This concept has been extensively debated 
and even finds itself in official U.S. military doctrine (FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency Field 
Manual). Even when the search for this all-important ratio gets sophisticated, including factors 
like land size and accounting for fighting-aged males, it is always based on the assumption that 
policy or tactical choices can impact the outcome of an intervening operation.  
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Preexisting conditions that impact outcomes focus on socioeconomic development, 
ethnoreligious heterogeneity, and prior experience with democracy. “States that are economically 
underdeveloped, ethnically heterogeneous, or lack prior experience with representative 
government face serious obstacles to democratization, and even outsiders with good intentions 
are typically unable to surmount these barriers no matter how hard they try.”96 These primary 
preexisting conditions also demonstrate the literature’s assumption that building states means 
building democracy.   
Research on counterinsurgency has also revealed that local preexisting conditions have a 
major deterministic affect. Insurgencies are more likely to succeed if they are hierarchical 
organizations and have rural and rough terrain in which to operate.97 A large number of studies 
on insurgencies, political violence, and civil wars have found geography to play a significant 
causal role.98 Rough terrain in which to hide is not the only factor, the occurrence of natural 
resources, proximity of national borders to the conflict zone, and total geographic size have all 
been shown to impact the outcome of a civil war.99 Additionally, non-material preexisting 
conditions, like whether the opposing terrorist or insurgent group is religious also matters. It has 
been shown that religious terrorists groups have a much higher survivability rate than non-
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religious groups.100 Regardless of whether studies emphasize strategic choices or preexisting 
conditions, most recognize that both play a role in determining outcomes to some extent.  
 
Interaction between strategy and preexisting conditions  
Edelstein’s study on occupations found that occupations are more likely to be successful 
when the occupying force commits large amounts of troops and stays for the long-term.101 
However, both of these policy choices incite nationalism and resentment towards the presence of 
foreign troops in their homeland. The only way to mitigate the effects of these policy choices is 
the presence of certain structural conditions. 1) If the society and infrastructure is decimated, the 
people will recognize the need for the occupation. 2) If there is a strong external threat, the 
people will similarly recognize the need for the occupation. 3) If the occupiers have a credible 
exit strategy, the people are less likely to have a negative response to the occupation.  
Regime type selection is also a good example of the interaction between strategy and 
preexisting conditions. Interventions by the United States and the United Nations tend to 
prioritize the building of democratic institutions and regimes. Partly, this is used to legitimize 
interventions, especially in cases like the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 that did not receive UN 
approval. However, democratization is not something easily imported and depends to a 
significant degree on local conditions, many of which are accounted for in theories like 
Edelstein’s and Downes and Monten’s above. The choice does not need to be democracy, 
however, and authoritarian regimes have frequently followed foreign interventions. Therefore, 
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regime type selection of the intervening state can play a role, and the outcome is heavily 
dependent on preexisting conditions.102 
 
The Need for Primary Mission Theory 
 All of the previous theories have made important contributions to their respective 
questions. Many of these previous theories, however, have fallen short of explaining military 
performance in statebuilding operations, or they do not attempt to explain military performance 
specifically. The specific question being asked in this study has yet to be seriously addressed. 
Previous work has failed to explain why, despite a clear awareness among military and civilian 
leaders of the divergent demands of a statebuilding operations relative to a conventional military 
operation, militaries still fail to adapt to statebuilding demands, resist the adaptation, and/or 
jettison hard won capabilities once the operation winds down.  
Most importantly, military effectiveness literature has fixated on militaries in 
conventional combat despite the consistent utilization of militaries for operations other than 
conventional combat. This has resulted in a gap in our understanding of military effectiveness in 
the more common non-conventional operations that militaries engage in. Such a gap has resulted 
in the frequent repetition of the belief that the U.S. military can effectively perform well at both 
conventional and statebuilding tasks. It is continually asked to perform operations it is not 




102 Chandler, David. "The state-building dilemma: good governance or democratic government?." In State-Building, 
pp. 86-104. Routledge, 2007. 
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Military effectiveness has received attention by a large number of scholars and 
strategists, especially recently. However, this attention has been primarily focused on the 
military’s ability to win battles in conventional warfare. Increasingly since at least WWII, the 
U.S. military has been asked to perform tasks that extend far beyond those tasks involved in 
conventional battles. They are asked to build states, deliver humanitarian aid, among many 
others. This weak understanding of how the military specifically performs during armed 
statebuilding operations comes with substantial consequences.  
 U.S. foreign policy has become increasingly militarized over the years, and a better 
understanding of how the military performs in non-military tasks throughout the spectrum of 
foreign policy activities will contribute to a better understanding of when a military should and 
should not be used. The Primary Mission Theory presented in this chapter argues that militaries 
will preference those tasks that contribute to the primary mission as that particular military views 
it. For most militaries this will be viewed as conventional combat. While some tend to criticize 
uniformly the ability of the military to engage in statebuilding operations, Primary Mission 
Theory argues that the military will actually be very good at some statebuilding tasks and very 
bad at others. This is because tasks like building infrastructure that are important to armed 
statebuilding operations are also very important to conventional combat. Other tasks, like 
building local governance, is vital for armed statebuilding operations but contributes nothing to 
conventional combat. Primary Mission Theory is thus more effective at predicting outcomes in 
these armed statebuilding operations than those previously offered. Most importantly, the theory 
expects that the military will never divert the resources and effort necessary to be effective at 
statebuilding operations.  
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Chapter 3: Evolution of Statebuilding Institutions in the U.S. Military 
 
Introduction 
Primary Mission Theory predicts a specific way in which a military will organize itself, a 
specific force structure. Of the three statebuilding tasks, those institutions that focus on 
infrastructure will be well established, resourced, and supported. Those institutions that focus on 
training foreign militaries will not be well prioritized but will have some structure within the 
military and can be ramped up quickly when the need arises. Those institutions that focus on 
building foreign governance capabilities will receive almost no prioritization, will only come 
into existence when the specific need arises, and will be quickly dismantled once the specific 
need fades. This chapter demonstrates these force structure patterns within the U.S. military. 
Whereas subsequent case studies focus on what these institutions are able to accomplish during 
an operation, this chapter focuses on how the U.S. military prioritizes its own force structure to 
be able to engage in statebuilding operation tasks.  
A 2020 report on the state of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) procurement efforts 
found that planners wanted more weapon systems than their current budget could afford.1 This 
report was followed by press coverage stating, “The Pentagon can’t afford all the weapons it 
wants…”2 All militaries must make hard choices about which efforts and strategies get funded 
and which do not, even in the richest military in history. The U.S. Military cannot fund every 
project, weapons system, or institution it thinks it would plausibly need in some potential 
 
1 Govini, “The 2020 Federal Scorecard,” 2020, https://www.govini.com/the-2020-federal-scorecard/.  




conflict, despite it having the largest budget of any military in the world. It cannot even do this 
for current conflicts. The problem is further exacerbated by the nature of war. Any task, whether 
easy or difficult, is made exponentially more difficult in the fog of war. Clausewitz called this 
friction.3 In today’s modern military, bureaucratic battles frequently play out as military and 
civilian leaders decide what is, and what is not, to be funded and prioritized. As just one 
example, consider this quote from a Congressional Research Services report on the funding of 
security force assistance (SFA) missions and units:  
The training, organizing, and equipping of U.S. forces to conduct SFA competes 
for scarce fiscal and personnel resources among the services. Some critics of SFA 
attest that committing to this capability within the services detracts from their 
ability to conduct traditional combat roles.4 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate three things in support of Primary Mission 
Theory. First, it shows that priorities given to each of the three tasks vary throughout the cycle 
between war and peace. This divergent prioritization in turn effects the institutionalization of 
those tasks and the subsequent ability of the military to perform those tasks during the next 
armed statebuilding operation. Second, it shows that the priority given to each task is 
commensurate with that task’s ability to contribute to conventional combat operations. Third, the 
low priority given to the most difficult statebuilding tasks, like governance assistance, inhibits 
the military’s ability to conduct statebuilding when an operation begins. Only after initial stages 
are they able to eventually stand up most statebuilding capabilities, at which point the conflict 




3 Howard, Michael, and Peter Paret, eds. Carl von Clausewitz on war. Princeton University Press, 1984. 
4 Livingston, Thomas K. "Building the capacity of partner states through Security Force Assistance." Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, 2011: Summary.  
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Table 1: U.S. Military Statebuilding Institutions Since WWII 
 Permanent Institutions  Temporary Institutions 
Infrastructure - Army Corps of Engineers 
- Naval Construction (SeaBees) 
- Army Combat Engineers 





- Army Green Berets 
- Security Force Assistance 
Brigades 
- Combined Action Program 
- Civilian Irregular Defense Groups 
- Repurposed Combat Units 
 
Governance   - School of Military Governance 
- Repurposed Civil Affairs  
- Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
- CORDS 
 
Not all statebuilding tasks are performed by statebuilding task-specific institutions like 
the ones listed above. For less intensive statebuilding operations, and for early stages of an 
operation before institutions can be set up, personnel from standard combat institutions are 
simply asked to do a different job from what they were trained and originally assigned to do. For 
example, “From 2002 to 2005, American PRTs were gathered from forces already in 
Afghanistan.”5 These ad hoc groups would eventually be institutionalized, but the process was 
first initiated with soldiers from other institutions filling the role. For the purposes of analysis 
here, only those statebuilding organizations that reached a high level of institutionalization are 
considered since it is seeking to assess institutional histories. Chapters 4 and 5 consider 
institutions and ad hoc efforts as a combined effort in a specific armed statebuilding operation.  
There are a number of institutions that were developed for the purposes of supporting the 
U.S. military’s stability operations capabilities but do not focus on the three statebuilding tasks. 
 
5 Honore, Russel L., and David V. Boslego. Forging provincial reconstruction teams. ARMY (1ST) FORT 
GILLEM GA, 2007: 85-86.  
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Similarly, there are some institutions that are directed towards statebuilding or stability 
operations but not in actually conducting them. The Human Terrain Teams were an innovation to 
help improve the military’s stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, these teams 
were not intended to contribute to statebuilding efforts. They were intended to help local U.S. 
commanders understand with greater clarity the social and cultural environment in which they 
operated. The U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute was established under 
the U.S. Army War College. This institute, first founded in 1993, is intended to collect, research, 
and disseminate lessons learned from stability operations. Their funding and existence have been 
under persistent threat, especially after the 2017 National Security Strategy prioritized great 
power competition over statebuilding operations.6 Other institutions that were built to contribute 
to statebuilding were both ad hoc and multinational, and therefore not only a U.S. military 
institution. The Multinational Security Transition Command was established to train the Iraqi 
forces. U.S. forces contributed to this effort by contributing training personnel and financing 
without standing up a new institution within their own ranks.  
 
Tools, To What End? 
 Primary Mission Theory predicts that militaries will build and invest in tools that 
contribute to their primary mission as they see it. Because of internal and external structural 
constraints, for most countries this is conventional combat.7 However, once this tool is created it 
can be put to whatever purpose is required by current missions. For example, building 
 
6 The White House, National security strategy of the United States of America. Executive Office of The President 
Washington DC Washington United States, 2017.; War on the Rocks Staff, “Save the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping 
and Stability Operations Institute: An Open Letter,” War on the Rocks, August 8, 2018, 
https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/save-the-u-s-armys-peacekeeping-and-stability-operations-institute-an-open-
letter/.  
7 Farrell, Theo. "Transnational norms and military development: Constructing Ireland's professional army." 
European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001): 63-102. 
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infrastructure is significantly important to the completion of conventional tasks, but many 
militaries have put this capability to both military and non-military use as required and available. 
Primary Mission Theory does not say that militaries cannot successfully complete non-
conventional combat tasks, just that institutions dedicated to tasks that do not contribute to the 
primary mission will not be properly prioritized and resourced.  
 The Ancient Roman Army provides an excellent example of this. The Roman Army 
maintained robust infrastructure capabilities because of its importance to their military 
operations. Infrastructure was important for the protection of the forces during expeditionary 
operations. “Many army units in the eastern provinces of the Empire were quartered in cities, but 
in Europe and North Africa they built their own forts.”8 Infrastructure was also important for the 
Army to quickly deploy to the periphery and control the frontiers of the empire.  
The most common construction was that of camps to protect the army overnight. Many of 
these encampments survive throughout the frontier regions of the Empire, especially in modern 
day Scotland and Wales. “… soldiers in peacetime practiced building such temporary camps.”9 
Larger forts were constructed to control strategic locations during specific campaigns. This also 
included various barriers along the frontier to define the borders of the empire and deter 
incursions. Among the most famous of the building skills of the Roman army was roads.  
The army also built the roads that linked all the forts. These were carefully 
surveyed and often laid out in long straight stretches. The roads themselves were 
well engineered. A strip of ground was cleared and sometimes a bed of turf was 
first laid. Over this was a layer of large stones, gradually thinning to a skim of 
gravel on the surface. The roads were flanked by ditches to allow water to 
disperse. Even today in Scotland some small quarries from which the gravel was 
extracted to make or resurface the roads are still visible beside them.10  
 
 
8 Breeze, David J. The Roman Army. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016: 3. 
9 Breeze, David J. The Roman Army. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016: 111. 
10 Breeze, David J. The Roman Army. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016: 121-122. 
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 The capability for the Army to construct infrastructure was clearly a vital military 
necessity. However, once the capability existed, it could be applied to non-military missions 
when not constructing for the Army. The Army engineers and construction workers frequently 
engaged in civil projects. “In the middle of the second century, Nonius Datus, a surveyor in the 
Third Augustan Legion in Africa, surveyed a civilian aqueduct at the city of Saldae.”11 A similar 
pattern is shown in a review of institutional capacity in the U.S. Military. One prominent 
example is the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, which traces its origin to the construction of field 
fortifications and other similar projects during the American War for Independence. However, 
throughout its existence, it has been one of the primary actors in domestic statebuilding within 
the United States.12 The review of the institutional histories of the three tasks bellows shows this 
dynamic clearly.  
 
Methods 
 This section utilizes a congruence testing method to demonstrate the institutional capacity 
predictions of Primary Mission Theory. The theory argues that those institutions that complete 
tasks that contribute to the primary mission of conventional combat will be prioritized and 
sufficiently resourced, those that do not will be under prioritized and under resourced and 
frequently cease to even exist between conflicts. The first task then is to assess the degree to 
which each task contributes to conventional combat. Once the contribution to conventional 
combat is assessed, the institutional histories for each task are assessed with a focus on their 
contributions to operations and their changes during inter-war periods. 
 
11 Breeze, David J. The Roman Army. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016: 118. 
12 A Brief History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. “Beginning to 1815.” 
https://www.usace.army.mil/About/History/Brief-History-of-the-Corps/Beginnings/ 
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The ability of the military to manipulate the physical space in their area of operation is a 
fundamental skill. This is primarily the case because the quality of infrastructure impacts the 
ability of logistics to complete their mission. Every military operation is critically dependent on 
the logistics that deliver people, materials, and resources to the necessary location. Many have 
identified the necessity of logistics, and the infrastructure that underpins it. “Clearly, soldiers 
who run out of food, fuel or ammunition will cease to fight, and to the German troops who spent 
December outside Moscow in summer uniforms or the American soldiers of Task Force Smith 
who faced 33 North Korean tanks with only six rounds of effective armor-piercing ammunition, 
the importance of logistics would seem straightforward.”13 
Unlike the other two statebuilding tasks performed by the U.S. Military, infrastructure is 
vital to conventional combat operations. Its existence can enable rapid maneuvers during 
offensive operations, and it can also enable quick reinforcements to stop such operations. The 
ability to quickly manipulate it, by either destroying it or building it, can bestow battlefield 
advantages. Bridges are of particular importance in this scenario. If one of the belligerents needs 
to cross a river to attack, destroying the bridges that enable that will dramatically reduce the risk 
of attack. Similarly, if a belligerent assumes its adversary cannot cross a river and therefore 
leaves that flank unguarded, quickly spanning that river to allow a rapid crossing grants a 
decisive advantage. Infrastructure is important.  
 
13 Kane, Thomas M. Military logistics and strategic performance. Routledge, 2012: 2. 
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 Modern militaries depend upon lines of communication. Lines of supply, resources, 
reinforcements and also actual communications with commanders. Sea lines of communication 
are a primary concern of the navy, which are maintained by naval patrols, and engineers 
maintaining vital naval infrastructure like ports. On land, land lines of communication are also 
handled by engineers. Because of this need, army engineers are trained to build and maintain a 
wide range of infrastructure; roads, transportation hubs, refueling stations, airfields, base 
infrastructure, and much more.  
 Since the capacity exists throughout the war/peace cycle, the ability to build 
infrastructure can be put to use almost immediately in any conflict or operation. Unlike other 
statebuilding tasks, the requirements to increase infrastructural capacities during war time is 
substantially less demanding. Often, training schools already exists. This is in contrast to tasks 
like governance, where personnel are either not trained at all, or are trained in a newly created 
school by inexperienced instructors like the School of Military Governance established during 
the mobilization for WWII.14 
 Even projects during war time come to have dual civil/military use. During WWII, the 
British occupied Iceland because of the strategic importance of the sea lines of communication 
that flow through the two gaps between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. Control of 
these water ways are of vast strategic importance. The British were eventually replaced by U.S. 
forces. The United States completed a number of infrastructure projects intended to improve the 
allies’ ability to conduct operations from the island and protect the gaps. These projects included 
the dredging of the main maritime port near Reykjavik, the building of a naval and submarine 
base, and an air base. All of these ports and bases are still in operation today and were vital in 
 
14 Philip C. Pete Cooper, (1996) The Engineer in War and Peace: From Guadalcanal to Main Street. Gateway press, 
inc. LOC call number TA140.C65 A3 1993 FT MEADE. 
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transforming Iceland from one of the poorest countries in Europe before the war to one of the 
wealthiest after.15 
 Infrastructure is not only vital for tactical and operational success, but also for the general 
security of entire countries. In the late 19th Century in Afghanistan, ruler Abdur Rahman Khan 
was able to do what many could not in Afghanistan, he consolidated central control, extracted 
large amounts of resources for the state, and built a modern army. However, he refused to allow 
extensive infrastructural development of his country.  
The increased tax burden was not offset by government investment in education, 
infrastructure, or communications, which were transforming neighboring Iran and 
India at the end of the nineteenth century… The amir feared that any economic or 
transport development would only make the country vulnerable to outside 
interference.16 
 
The wisdom of Rahman’s reasoning at the time notwithstanding, his fears proved well founded. 
In 1979, the Soviet Union used the infrastructure developed by foreign powers (specifically the 
highway that circumnavigates the whole country) to rapidly deploy troops throughout the 
country in a matter of hours.  
 Infrastructure’s importance is also frequently cited in works on military strategy. Donald 
Stoker explained the importance of infrastructure while discussing how geography can place 
constraints on warfare. After explaining how oceans, rivers, and mountains can limit military 
operations, Stoker says:  
Physical geography can also apply to man-made geographical features that act 
as constraints, though these are more likely to affect operations. Roads, ports, 
railways, cities, canals, and their level of development have a direct effect upon 
 
15 Thorhallsson, Baldur, Sverrir Steinsson, and Thorsteinn Kristinsson. "A Theory of Shelter: Iceland’s American 
Period (1941–2006)." Scandinavian Journal of History 43, no. 4 (2018): 548. 
16 Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A cultural and political history. Vol. 36. Princeton University Press, 2010: 152-
153.  
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the means that will be needed, as well as the type of force required. A less 
developed theater of operations will make it more difficult to operate.17 
 
Important in this passage, is recognition of the importance of the level of development. The 
existence or non-existence of infrastructure is important, the quality of that infrastructure is of 
equal importance.  
 The building of infrastructure is so important, institutions that fulfill this mission are even 
memorialized in prominent ways. Below is an image of a monument to U.S. Naval Construction, 
known as the SeaBees. It is prominently located near Memorial Bridge in Arlington, Virginia 
between Arlington National Cemetery and the Lincoln Memorial. There is also a SeaBee 
Museum in Port Hueneme, California. Institutions that fulfill the missions of governance 
building are not similarly honored. The Green Berets are frequently depicted in monuments and 
memorials, but this is primarily due to their special operations capabilities, not their training 
capabilities.  
 
17 Stoker, Donald. Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019: 103.  
 80 
Naval Construction Memorial near Arlington National Cemetery and the Potomac River in Northern Virginia. 
Photo taken April 11, 2019.  
 
 Another factor that is indicative of the importance placed on the building of infrastructure 
to the ability to wage war is the prominent positions achieved by engineers within the military. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began its continuous existence in 1802 at the same time as 
the establishment of the West Point Military Academy. From its founding until 1866, the 
country's most prestigious military academy was continuously headed by an engineering 
officer.18 Furthermore, engineer is one of the official career classifications that an officer can 
receive. Others include infantry, artillery, military policy, and transportation. There is no similar 
designation for building local governance or even security force assistance.  
 
 
18 A Brief History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. “Beginning to 1815.” 
https://www.usace.army.mil/About/History/Brief-History-of-the-Corps/Beginnings/  
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Security Force Assistance  
 There is a connection between the ability to train the tasks required for combat and the 
ability to conduct conventional combat operations, but this connection is indirect. Training is 
vital to the conduct of conventional combat operations when it involves training themselves to 
complete these tasks. Training is consistently prioritized as the military persistently struggles to 
achieve and maintain high levels of readiness.19 Because of this need, the military maintains a 
vast institutional capacity dedicated exclusively to training. The United States Training and 
Doctrine Command is one of the U.S. Army’s largest commands. Vast compounds exist in 
several locations throughout the United States, like the National Training Center, that frequently 
rotates vast numbers of military personnel through their programs to train them how to complete 
their various tasks.  
 Thus, the U.S. Military should be exceptional at training, both based on the theory’s 
prediction that its contribution to conventional combat capabilities necessitate its prioritization 
and because of the vast institutional capacity that exists to conduct the task and conduct it well. 
However, there are four problems that arise in the local context in which these operations take 
place. 1) This capacity exists for the training and readiness of the U.S. military and diversion 
towards foreign militaries is resisted because doing so would undermine its ability to perform 
conventional combat, something Primary Mission Theory says it will not allow to happen. 
Essentially, it diverts vital capacity from one’s own military. 2) The U.S. military primarily 
trains a large, modern, western-style military in the performance of conventional combat. This 
model is seldom, if ever, appropriate for the militaries they are tasked to train during an armed 
statebuilding operation. These countries primarily need small forces that can be sustained on 
 
19 Betts, Richard K. Military readiness: Concepts, choices, consequences. Transaction Publishers, 1995. 
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very limited resources and are specialized to go after insurgencies using special operations 
tactics.  
3) Significant cultural and language barriers inhibit the ability to train units. The simple 
form of this problem, communication in a different language, can be solve through language 
training. The complex form of this problem, misunderstanding cultural norms and offending 
practices, is not so easily solved. 4) Training foreign forces is more complex than training your 
own. The U.S. military is a large conventional and non-conventional force with vast capabilities 
designed to deploy abroad against foreign adversaries. However, most SFA missions need to 
train only unconventional forces to go after insurgents and terrorists within their own borders. 
Training a conventional military to conduct internal missions is a strategic mismatch and 
unlikely to succeed. There are also problems of internal politics and principal agent problems.20  
Because of these factors, the capacity of the U.S. military to train is rarely translated into 
successful security force assistance.  
 The U.S. military should be very good at training other military forces, since training 
their own forces is a vital function of the military infrastructure and contributes significantly to 
their ability to fight and win wars. The military is constantly engaged in training new forces that 
enter the organization, as well as training forces before they deploy. The infrastructure and 
expertise to train is vast because of its importance to the organization. Complexity and diversion 




20 Biddle, Stephen, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker. "Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of 
security force assistance." Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1-2 (2018): 89-142. 
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 The U.S. military is a large, professional organization largely designed to stop or deter 
foreign conventional adversaries. It is utilized to accomplish more than this, to varying degrees 
of success, but it is primarily built to fight external, uniformed militaries. Therefore, the vast 
majority of the U.S. military’s training capacity is directed towards building an organization to 
accomplish this mission. However, the needs of those foreign militaries they train are vastly 
different from the needs of the U.S. military. Their capacity to operate and maintain expensive 
high-tech systems also varies. This leads to poor strategies.  
 The needs for most militaries that are trained by U.S. SFA are internal, not external. This 
is especially the case for the larger armed statebuilding operations, like Iraq and Afghanistan. 
The presence of the U.S. military and accompanying security guarantees ensures that external 
invasion is of little concern to militaries being trained by the U.S. Their primary concerns are 
internal. Fighting insurgencies, terrorist organizations, or destroying foreign supported militant 
opposition. This was even the case for much of the Vietnam war. Even though North Vietnam’s 
ultimate aim was reunification, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces primary 
concern was internal insurgents and the support from North Vietnam that had infiltrated into the 
South.  
 Frequently, U.S. SFA missions have either attempted to prevent the need to insert U.S. 
forces in the first place or have attempted to secure political progress and allow the withdrawal 
of forces already there. Since the latter is the context in which SFA occurs as part of an armed 
statebuilding operation, it is the focus here. Under such circumstances, the SFA mission has 
often been underprioritized early in a conflict. The United States never planned for SFA before 
or even during the first few years of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Then when the 
U.S. was attempting to expedite withdrawal, the SFA mission faced unrealistic time constraints 
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and pressures.21 The original plan in Afghanistan called for a 10-week training course. The low 
quality of recruits resulted in calls for a 6-month training course. This follow-on training was 
never adopted, and the quality of the forces suffered as a result.22 
 Regardless of whether the smaller Salvador model (small group of special forces trainers) 
is employed or the larger FM 3-24 model (comprehensive SFA involving conventional forces) is 
employed, it is unlikely that the United States, or any other state, can overcome the problems of 
the principal agent problem. The patron state will always have interests and priorities that 
diverge from that of the United States. Many leaders in the states receiving SFA will have an 
interest to insulate themselves from a military coup and will undermine military effectiveness 
using coup-proofing measures.23 There is also an interest in not completing the war against 
internal terrorist groups to ensure U.S. money and assistance continue to flow.24 Essentially, 
“…neither small nor large US deployments will suffice to outweigh the effects of misaligned 
interests or imperfect monitoring and enforcement.”25 
 
Diversion of Capacity 
 Directing resources towards the training foreign forces is a zero-sum game, if a U.S. 
trainer is training foreign forces, they cannot train U.S. forces and there is a finite number of 
personnel dedicated to training. The limited ability to divert resources are especially acute in 
 
21 Scott Sigmund Gartner, "Differing Evaluations of Vietnamization," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 29, no. 2 
(1998): 243-262; Robert Jervis, "The Politics of Troop Withdrawal: Salted Peanuts, the Commitment Trap, and 
Buying Time," Diplomatic History 34, no. 3 (2010): 507-516. 
22  Kelly, Terrence K., Nora Bensahel, and Olga Oliker. Security force assistance in Afghanistan: identifying lessons 
for future efforts. Rand Corporation, 2011: 22.  
23 Quinlivan, James T. "Coup-proofing: Its practice and consequences in the Middle East." International Security 24, 
no. 2 (1999): 131-165. 
24 Bapat, Navin A. "Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent." Journal of Peace 
Research 48, no. 3 (2011): 303-318. 
25 Biddle, Stephen, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker. "Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of 
security force assistance." Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1-2 (2018): 106. 
 85 
times of war, which is when SFA will occur in conjunction with many other missions as part of a 
large armed statebuilding operation. This fear of diverting the best soldiers to non-essential or 
less important missions is common within the military. In fact, FM 3-24 expresses concern over 
this dynamic in foreign forces as well. The manual preferences the training of conventional 
forces and advises against pulling good soldiers away for elite units. “Elite units tend to divert a 
large share of the best leadership and remove critical talent from the regular forces.”26  
Especially following 9/11, the military was engaged in increasing the overall force size 
which means training new recruits and increasing the operational tempo with more deployments 
overseas which means vast increases in pre-deployment training. The indigenous capacity to 
train forces is already being stretched by new demands of the U.S. forces engaged in the armed 
statebuilding operation, that available personnel that can be diverted towards training foreign 
forces is rare.  
 
Governance Assistance  
 Building local governance contributes essentially nothing to conventional combat. The 
U.S. military often trained officers and civil affairs units in what it called military governance. 
However, this trained units to administer conquered territory, not to build indigenous 
governance. There is a substantial difference between governing a foreign territory yourself, and 
working with local and international organizations to initiate, build, develop, and cultivate local 
governing institutions that are capable of administering a territory once the occupation has 
ended. The distinction is between occupational control of a territory and building local governing 
institutions that continue to exist independently once the occupation ends. These functions 
 
26 FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 6-38 and 142-282. 
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sometimes get confused for the same thing or assumed that the performance of occupation falls 
under the category of building local governance. These are two different things and the focus 
here is on building local governance, since this is the only one that contributes to the building of 
a state.  
Building local governance is such a long-term project that conventional combat is all but 
guaranteed to have concluded long before this becomes necessary or feasible. What is necessary 
for conventional combat is local population control. Under the requirement, militaries will 
engage in governance, that is, they will serve as the governors of the territory they control during 
an occupation. Resources have been dedicated to fulfilling this mission, like the U.S.’s School of 
Military Governance set up in the lead-up to WWII. However, this does not build sustainable 
local institutions, since these governing institutions leave when the army does. Building local 
governance, on the other hand, receives little attention, only become institutionalized in ad hoc 
organizations after an operation has already begun, and is quickly dismantled following the 
operation.  
 As part of a military campaign, building local governance is mostly a new phenomenon. 
Since the end of the WWII, the international norm of not changing national borders by force has 
made conquest very rare. Under conquest conditions, new territories can just be incorporated into 
existing governing structures. However, after an intervention now, attempts to legitimize any use 
of force usually requires intervening states to rebuild a state within the existing borders of the 
former failed state. Thus, governance, while not a primary mission of militaries, is nevertheless 
sometimes asked of militaries. Because of this dynamic, the U.S. military never prioritizes, and 
is never really asked to prioritize, governance building capacities until after the mission has 
already begun.  
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 Some argue that governance building is, in fact, a major contributor to the ability of the 
military to accomplish its objectives.  
As demonstrated by the U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
achieving favorable war termination requires more than defeating the enemy on 
the battlefield. Across the U.S. government, agencies have recognized the 
requirement to develop capabilities that address the myriad of tasks found during 
combat and post-conflict environments.27 
 
Again, the disconnect is in the distinction between occupational governance and building local 
governance, which is used interchangeably in most of the military strategy literature. For 
conventional combat, occupational governance is vital depending on the circumstances and the 
political objectives being sought. The inability to control to population of held territory increases 
the costs and resources necessary to hold that territory, which will divert resources from other 
missions, usually the taking of additional territory.  
Therefore, occupational governance is vital for conventional combat. Civil Affairs 
officers are expected to control civilian populations in occupied territories so that military 
operations are not impaired by civil unrest.28 However, building local governance is only 
important for militaries after conventional combat has ended and political leaders seek expanded 
objectives of statebuilding as a part of war termination. Instead of breaking off after the defeat of 
an opposing military, like the first Gulf War, local governance will be asked of the military only 
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Historical Development of Institutions 
 
 A clear pattern emerges when the historical timeline of each statebuilding institution is 
mapped. See Figure 1. Major armed statebuilding operations that occur either during a major war 
or immediately following a major war, births new statebuilding institutions into existence to fill 
capability gaps. This is a clear indication that these statebuilding capabilities rarely exist prior to 
the initiation of such operations. However, what happens to these institutions during the 
operation and, most importantly, what happens after, is highly illustrative of the mechanisms of 
the Primary Mission Theory at work. Some institutions barely survive the duration of the 
statebuilding operation while others become prized components of the broader military 
organization for decades, sometimes centuries.  
Infrastructure is clearly prioritized well above the other tasks. It either exists before a 
major operation begins or is created to fill a war time need, and they are not dismantled 
following the conflict. This results in a circumstance where the military is well prepared to build 
infrastructure before a statebuilding operation begins. SFA is far less prioritized, but the military 
occasionally finds such capabilities useful for other operations, thus some are maintained. They 
still find themselves needing to fill a capacity gap every time a major statebuilding operation 
begins. Governance capacity is almost non-existent throughout the history of the U.S. military. It 
is always dismantled after the conflict, and it is always created after the statebuilding operation 
has actually began. The only exception was the School of Military Governance, which was more 





Figure 1: Timeline of Statebuilding Institutions 
 
Infrastructure 
The most prominent institution dedicated to infrastructure in the U.S. Military is the 
Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps of Engineers has been involved in extensive projects 
throughout the world, has been an integral part of every U.S. war, and has contributed 
significantly to the development of the U.S.’s domestic infrastructure. Each branch maintains its 
own infrastructure capabilities. Naval construction is referred to as the SeaBees. Air Force 
construction is known as the RED HORSE units. The army also has a well-established combat 
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engineer career specialty, known as Sappers, who are responsible for manipulating infrastructure 
during combat operations.  
 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers traces its history back to the war for independence 
from the British. There is also a strong alignment, unlike the other two tasks, between civilian 
and military professionals that complete the same tasks. Military engineer Philip C. Pete Cooper 
wrote the following regarding his experience in WWII:  
I was also particularly gratifying to me to be a part of a military unit during 
World War II which recruited its personnel from the skilled ranks of construction 
and public service oriented agencies and trained them in the military aspects of 
war, in such a way as to have them perform critical support services for the 
fighting units in the forward areas, so vital to our ultimate victory.29  
 
Equivalency like this does not exist for security force assistance and governance. After the war, 
Cooper had a successful career in the same field as his military experience working throughout 
Maryland as a civil engineer. Attempts were made to recruit law enforcement officials and local 
government officials to build security forces and governance institutions. However, these 
professions vary significantly relative to military and civilian engineers. Cooper goes on to say 
that most of the 1,200 men in his unit were recruited for their construction experience and that as 
a result they were generally of an older age than other units.  
 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 
 The construction of infrastructure is so vital to the conduct of conventional war, that 
when the Continental Congress organized the Continental Army, they provided for a position of 
Chief Engineer.30 Congress struggled to pay its bills to finance the war but believed a 
 
29 Philip C. Pete Cooper, (1996) The Engineer in War and Peace: From Guadalcanal to Main Street. Gateway press, 
inc. LOC call number TA140.C65 A3 1993 FT MEADE: xxi.  
30 Strock, Carl A. “The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A History.” Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers. 2007.  
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construction capability vital enough to provide for it. Engineering and construction capabilities 
proved vital for the Colonist’s war effort. In the first major battle of the U.S. war for 
independence, the British occupation showed how important this skill is. British garrisons 
occupied the city of Boston and the Continental Army, led by George Washington, had 
surrounded the city. The British maintain significant leverage by maintaining control of the 
waterways and the high ground surrounding the city, preventing the American’s the ability to 
shell the city with the few artillery pieces they had. The final move that forced the British to 
make the decision to evacuate the city was due to a nighttime maneuver and the rapid 
construction of defensive positions by the Americans. 
On the night of March 5th, 1776, Washington ordered several thousand men and cannons 
sized from Fort Ticonderoga to take up position on Dorchester Heights overlooking the city. The 
men worked non-stop through the night to move into position and to construct defensive 
fortifications to deter or prevent a British counterattack. Innovation from the engineers was 
required to accomplish this construction overnight.31 The British awoke to an American fort 
within shelling range of their position in Boston. The British General is reported to have said, 
“My God, these fellows have done more work in one night than I could make my army do in 
three months.”32 The advantageous position forced the British to withdraw from Boston and 
ended British activities in New England. The ability to manipulate infrastructure was a vital 
factor.  
After the war, USACE capabilities were demobilized with the rest of the Continental 
Army. The continuous history of the USACE began in the early 19th century. Engineers were 
 
31 Strock, Carl A. “The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A History.” Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of 
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asked to run the U.S. military academy and did so exclusively for most of the academy’s early 
history. The USACE played a vital role in the War of 1812. They constructed fortifications in 
harbors and the entrances to vital water ways. These fortifications faced repeated attacks from 
the British Navy and were vital during the war.33 
The USACE also proved themselves vital to the conduct of wars during the American 
Civil War. Engineers from the Corps were instrumental in the abilities of armies to move about 
effectively in the expansive and, at times, underdeveloped landscape. Floating bridges were an 
innovation by the Corps that helped in this mobility. Similar contributions to army mobility were 
made during WWI. Hundreds of miles of railroad were constructed to move men and material to 
the western fronts in France. Similarly, Corps engineers were vital for facilitating the landings at 
Normandy and for building the infrastructure, like hospitals and housing, for the more than 4 
million soldiers stationed throughout the Pacific and European theaters of operation.  
Between these major wars, the engineers were not demobilized this time but instead 
turned inward. They were instrumental in the domestic American statebuilding effort and 
expanding westward. Engineers helped professionalize exploration after the Lewis and Clark 
expedition. They were also primary actors in many of the country’s early engineering marvels, 
including the construction of canals, improving water ways, lighthouses, and building major 
ports.34 They helped conduct surveys for the construction of a vast amounts of railroads. This is 
very similar to the Roman experience. Roman engineers’ primary purpose was to build 
fortifications for army garrisons. Since this did not occupy all their time, they were employed to 
other non-military tasks. This included building roads, waterways, and other infrastructure. Their 
 
33 Strock, Carl A. “The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A History.” Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of 
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purpose was to serve a vital military role, but because the capacity existed, they were also 
directed towards internal or frontier statebuilding.  
Their internal statebuilding effort (or civil works), for which the USACE is famous for, 
actually has its roots in military necessity. Civilian leaders, following the British invasion during 
the War of 1812, developed a plan to improve the country’s national defensive capabilities. The 
strategy that was developed included a call for improved harbors and transportation systems that 
would better allow for the quick concentration of military forces against an invading enemy. By 
1819, the USACE was directing its resources and expertise towards civil statebuilding projects.35 
In the 1820’s, the USACE was authorized by Congress to improve waterway 
infrastructure. They also contributed to work on constructing levees and locks to manage 
flooding and changing grades in river ways. This experience led directly to an engineering 
marvel in the early 20th century, the Panama Canal.  The USACE did not directly build the canal, 
but many of the engineers that contributed to the project came from the Corps. Throughout the 
20th century, the USACE focused not only on infrastructure, but also on disaster relief and 
prevention. Before the creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and 
later the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the USACE was called upon to provide clean 
up and rebuilding after disasters. They were also utilized to build new infrastructure to prevent 
certain disasters, like their flood prevention efforts along the Mississippi River following the 
Great Mississippi Flood of 1927. Today, the USACE contributes to the military abroad through 
the construction of various fortifications, barracks, and other forward facilities. The Corps also 
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SeaBees: Naval Construction 
 Naval Construction Battalions, named the SeaBees, trace their origin to the buildup to 
WWII. The first SeaBee units were formed on January 5th, 1942.36 The navy has always been 
heavily dependent on ports and related infrastructure for effective operations. The SeaBees were 
created in the lead-up to WWII because of the specific need to build or repair infrastructure as 
operations advanced into new territory throughout a theater of operation.37 The navy and marines 
needed construction units that could keep pace with their advances and keep the logistics 
flowing, while also being able to operate in a combat environment. Hence the motto of the 
SeaBees, “We Build, We Fight.”38 The SeaBees participated in every major amphibious landing 
of WWII. Over 300,000 men served with the SeaBees, in addition to almost 8,000 civil engineer 
officers. Following WWII, the ranks of the SeaBees were reduced substantially, but not 
completely. They had some residual duties in the Pacific and in Cuba. They also participated in 
missions in Antarctica around 1955.  
 After the United States entered the Korean War, SeaBees were quickly re-mobilized. The 
base at Davisville was reestablished in 1951. The primary function of the SeaBees in Korea was 
the construction and maintenance of airfields throughout the peninsula. They were also 
instrumental in the amphibious landings at Inchon. The SeaBees constructed causeways with 
floating pontoon bridges within hours of the landings. They were also tasked with the 
construction of a major naval base in the Philippines at Cubi Point during the war. Civilian 
contractors turned down the job because of the enormity of the task. Cubi Point opened in 1956 
 
36 Transano, Vincent. "History of the Seabees." Naval Historical Center. http://www. history. navy. mil/faqs/faq67-1. 
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and included a two-mile runway, a pier that could handle the Navy’s largest aircraft carriers, cost 
$100 million, and moved more earth than the Panama Canal project.39  
 The SeaBees expanded their mission substantially during the Vietnam War.40 They were 
among the first U.S. troops on the ground when the first arrived at the beach at Chu Lai. The 
SeaBees were tasked with far more than just building and maintaining airstrips like in Korea. 
They were tasked with constructing basses and logistics facilities throughout the country. They 
were tasked with building remote operating bases for special forces. There were 10,000 SeaBees 
serving in the Navy when direct U.S. involvement in the war began in 1965. At the peak of the 
U.S. presence, there were over 25,000 men serving in naval construction throughout 22 
battalions. Almost $100 million worth of construction projects were completed by SeaBees 
throughout Vietnam.41  
 During this time, the SeaBees began construction of a massive base complex in the 
middle of the Indian Ocean, named Diego Garcia. Base construction at this location began in 
1971. The project took 11 years to complete and costs approximately $200 million. The base can 
accommodate the Navy’s largest ships and the Air Forces larges aircraft. The base played a 
major logistics role in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Later, during Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
Operation Enduring Freedom, SeaBees contributed again with construction projects that helped 
facilitate operations in each country.   
 The primary function of the SeaBees is for military needs. However, because the tool 
existed in an environment with vast needs extending beyond direct military necessity, they have 
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often been tasked to non-military jobs when available. Philip C. Pete Cooper was an engineer 
assigned to a naval construction unit during WWII. Cooper said of the SeaBees mission:  
Even though there were many instances where the Seabees were in active combat 
situations, their prime mission was in support of the Marines, as they fought their 
way from Guadalcanal to Tokyo, to supply the combat forces with ammunition, 
fuel, living quarters, highways, airfields, hospitals, food, and all the other 
supplies and services needed for the war effort. An equally important function, so 
often overlooked, was the strong bond of friendship they forged with the native 
populations. Where there was hunger, they brought food; where fear, trust; 
where chaos, order. I salute the 88th Naval Construction Battalion and Seabees 
everywhere. It has been said that we can do anything, anywhere, at any time – 
the impossible just takes a little longer. [boldface original]42 
 
 In Vietnam, naval construction was also diverted to civil projects once the primary 
logistics and infrastructure projects were completed for the military mission. Not only were they 
tasked with more general-purpose construction for the military on bases, like recreation facilities, 
but they were also a primary part of the peace building mission to win hearts and minds. They 
built civil infrastructure for civilian villages and completed numerous projects in coordination 
with the United States Agency for International Development. The SeaBees today are maintained 
at approximately 10 active battalions, which only accounts for 33% of all available naval 
construction personnel (an additional 66% are reservists).  
 
Rapid Engineer Deployable, Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer 
 Air Force construction is, relative to the Navy’s SeaBees, a new institution. This is due 
less to the importance of infrastructure and more to the relative short history of the Air Force as 
an organization. The Army Air Corps was the predecessor to the Air Force, which became its 
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own military branch in the 1947 National Security Act.43 The Air Force utilized a number of 
temporary infrastructure units and capabilities early in its history. By 1965, it had formed a 
permanent institution dedicated to infrastructure, known by its acronym as RED HORSE units.44  
 The need for a dedicated construction capability came during the Vietnam war. The Air 
Force established temporary construction units to fill the need. These were called Primary Base 
Emergency Engineer Force teams. These temporary institutions were quickly strengthened and 
formalized to become a permanent fixture of the Air Force’s force structure. By 1965, there were 
nearly 1,000 airmen permanently assigned to the RED HORSE units. Rather than being 
dismantled similar to other statebuilding institutions established during the Vietnam war, the 
RED HORSE infrastructure capabilities was retained and strengthened.45 These units were 
viewed as a primary capability for conventional operations. Today, the Air Force maintains 
approximately 4 active-duty squadrons, 6 reserve squadrons, and 8 national guard squadrons. 
Similar to the Army Corps of Engineers, their primary purpose is to support conventional combat 
operations during wartime, but they are frequently utilized for civil project domestically and 
internationally in peace time.46 
 
Security Force Assistance 
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The early stages of the Cold War saw the first concerted efforts by the United States to 
achieve foreign policy objectives by training other countries’ militaries. The United States 
provided early training for the Turkish and Greek militaries to resist the possibility of a Soviet 
advance on those countries. By 1949, there were over 500 trainers in Greece and over 400 
trainers in Turkey.47 The Foreign Assistance Act was passed in 1948 codifying the provision of 
security force assistance by the United States. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 
created authorization to train and advise NATO member countries. The Mutual Security Act of 
1954 placed oversight over the quickly growing security force assistance industry and 
bureaucracy.48  
Modern SFA capabilities in the U.S. Military originated in the 1950s and 1960s when the 
United States began training and equipping militaries in Latin America and Southeast Asia.49 
Both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and most military special forces units trace their 
origins to the Office of Strategic Services which conducted covert operations during WWII.50 
Under a program called ‘security assistance’, agencies throughout the U.S. government began 
contributing to both military, economic, and diplomatic support to the security apparatuses of 
foreign countries. For the military’s part, however, training and advising missions became 
primarily a mission for the special operations community, specifically the U.S. Army Special 
Forces (known as the Green Berets).  
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The Vietnam war had profound impacts on U.S. security force assistance. Significant 
legislation was passed that altered the SFA bureaucracy. The creation and growth of the Green 
Berets also occurred at this time. The 1980s saw an 84 percent increase in security assistance 
through that decade. The statebuilding efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan again fundamentally 
altered the U.S. SFA efforts.51 During the 1990s, the United States also provided SFA to 
countries in Eastern Europe that were formerly members of the Warsaw Pact.52 Around this time, 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, SFA to Colombia significantly increased under Plan Colombia 
that would eventually make Colombia one of the largest recipients of U.S. SFA in the world.53 
Due to restrictions placed on the mission by the U.S. government on how many U.S. personnel 
could be in the country, Colombia’s SFA mission was primarily executed by special forces 
soldiers.  
 The United States worked with Germany (until 1949), South Korea (until 1950), Japan 
(until 1951), and Austria (until 1955) following WWII to help reconstruct and build their 
militaries. The United States had advisors during WWII working with the Nationalist Chinese. 
The United States also worked with countries during the war to improve their military 
capabilities. Following this period, the United States conducted SFA operations in the 
Dominican Republic (1965-1966), Vietnam (1961-1974), Lebanon (1982-1984), Panama (1989-
1994), and Somalia (1992-1994).54 The United States also had advisory groups working in 
Turkey and Greece following WWII. The United States conducted other SFA operations with 
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less clear contributions and timelines, like those conducted in Latin America, specifically 
Colombia and El Salvador. SFA Operations were also conducted in the Balkans starting in 1994.  
 Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United States, SFA operations 
have increased exponentially. In 2018, the Costs of War Project estimated there were 65 ongoing 
U.S. SFA operations under the umbrella of counterterrorism operations throughout the world.55 
 
Green Berets 
 U.S. Army Special Forces (USASF), unlike special forces units like the Navy Seals and 
Delta Force, have a dual mission. They are specialists in proxy warfare and their mission is to 
seek out, train, and support guerilla forces in other countries. Their other mission is to conduct 
kinetic operations like ambushes, hit-and-run, and sabotage, especially against forces that oppose 
those they are training.56 So, while they are specialists in SFA, their efforts and resources are 
divided between that mission and the mission to conduct their own kinetic operations.  
 The Office of Strategic Services was demobilized in 1945. The USASF began in 1952 
with the formation of the 10th Special Forces Group.57 They were originally envisioned as 
saboteurs to be employed behind enemy lines in the event of a hypothetical WWIII. They were 
generally viewed as inconsequential by commanders in the conventional army.58 The Green 
Berets would eventually establish their position within the Army bureaucracy during efforts 
surrounding the Vietnam War. They were first active in the region, specifically in Laos, in 1959. 
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They were tasked with training the Laotian resistance forces against the communists.59 This 
operation was the first true test of the USASF concept of inserting into and impacting wars for 
independence. The question was could they be effective training a guerilla force and have an 
impact in a country independent of conventional military forces.60 
 Their role, size, and experience would expand vastly as the war in Vietnam expanded. 
The Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program was started by CIA, but the Green Berets 
executed the majority of the program.61 The purpose of this program was to organize and train 
local militias in the countryside of Vietnam capable of resisting communist insurgents. By 1962, 
approximately 1,000 villagers were trained under the program from 28 villages.62 Eventually, 
these remote villages that had been trained and built defenses, known as hamlets, came under 
heavy attack from communist forces intent on destroying them. Because they were in remote 
locations, conventional forces were often unwilling or unable to respond to coordinated attacks. 
The special forces began to expand the other side of their dual mission to respond. Mobile Strike 
Forces, or Mike teams, were formed within the special forces units to be able to quickly respond 
to sieges themselves.63 During this time, the special forces also become relied upon for recovery 
missions of American and allied prisoners of war. This is also in addition to their own 
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unconventional warfare operations, intelligence gathering operations, civil affairs and 
psychological operations, and other supporting operations.64  
 
Security Force Assistance in Vietnam 
 Two temporary SFA institutions were initiated for the Vietnam operation, the Combined 
Action Program (CAP) and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program. Both were 
temporary institutions intended to fill specific gaps in capabilities for the Vietnam war, and did 
not survive the end of that particular statebuilding operations. Several existing institutions 
diverted personnel to these organization in order the fill the gap quickly. Primarily, these were 
personnel from the CIA and the U.S. Army Green Berets.  
 The CAP program paired a 14-person U.S. marine platoon with a 30-person Army of 
Vietnam (ARVN) unit. These paired units were lauded for their effectiveness. The ARVN forces 
benefited from marine experience and fire support, and the marines benefited from ARVN 
knowledge and information gathering capabilities. CAP began in 1965 when official combat 
operations in Vietnam began for the United States and combat marines were introduced to the 
operation. By 1966, CAP units grew to 57 and reached 79 by 1967.65 The CAP program was 
allowed to atrophy, however, as North Vietnamese incursions into the south became more 
common marines were pulled away for conventional operations. The CAP program ended two 
years before U.S. involvement in Vietnam ended in 1973, with the last CAP units being 
dismantled in 1971.66 
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 The CIDG program began as a covert operation under the CIA with help from U.S. Army 
special forces. As a result, the CIDG program began several years before U.S. combat operations 
officially began in 1965. Training under the program began in 1961. The program expanded 
quickly from 1,000 local Vietnamese personnel in the program in April 1962, to over 23,000 by 
the end of 1962. The program was eventually moved to the overt side and placed under the U.S. 
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). At this point, the military started to shift the 
mission of CIDG trained forces to more conventional tasks in support of their conventional 
goals. Under these pressures placed on it by MACV the CIDG program would eventually 
collapse, ending before the CAP program in 1970.67 
 
Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs) 
 The SFABs are the newest addition to the force structure of the U.S. Army. The first 
SFAB was stood up in February 2017 and deployed to Afghanistan in 2018, with the expectation 
that six brigades will eventually be stood up, with the addition of a headquarters. The 
development of the new units began in 2016.68 Initially, there was concern that the SFABs were 
fulfilling a redundant function, since Green Berets were already an Army unit that specialized in 
training foreign forces. The intent behind the conventional training brigades was that they would 
train large scale conventional forces. The Green Berets then would be freed up to focus on 
conducting their own mission and training other special forces units, like the Commandos in 
Afghanistan.  
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The units are an attempt to permanently institutionalize the ad hoc institutions set up for 
training and advising missions during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The difference between 
earlier versions and the SFABs is the amount of resources being dedicated to the effort. The 
SFABs are almost entirely commissioned and non-commissioned officers, they go through a 
rigorous selection process before entering the units, they operate in small teams of about 12 
personnel, they have their own logistics elements, go through specialized training (i.e., 
language), and the Army offers signing bonuses for those that join.  
If the SFABs are maintained, it would be a substantial departure from previous cycles for 
the U.S. military. Previously, SFA capabilities were either limited to the Green Berets or the 
capability was dismantled following the operation. This would be the first time the capability 
was maintained on a large scale. It coincides with the Global War on Terror that sees the U.S. 
military actively engaged throughout the world rather than demobilizing after war. However, the 
future viability and survivability of these units is in question. The Army still struggles to 
maintain the readiness of the units due to low interest in joining and low levels of retention. “The 
[Security Force Assistance] brigades are selected along elite criteria but have struggled to attract 
and retain soldiers over fears these assignments won't help their careers…”69 
The SFABs are unique in that they would be the only SFA institution to survive the 
operation they were originally constructed to address. However, it is most likely that their 
survival post Afghanistan and Iraq is a result of what they could potentially provide for 
conventional combat. The SFABs are staffed with senior non-commissioned officers and junior 
officers with very minimal junior enlisted personnel. In the event of a major conflict with a near-
 
69 Christopher Woody. “The Army wants to send its newest units worldwide, but the top watchdog in Afghanistan 
says it’s struggling to find enough troops to do the job.” Business Insider. September 5, 2019. 
https://www.businessinsider.com/army-considering-deploying-sfab-to-africa-asia-despite-troop-concerns-2019-9  
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peer adversary, the military would need to absorb a vast number of junior enlisted personnel to 
fill in the ranks. These SFAB officers and non-commissioned officers could be used to command 
these new soldiers. Essentially, the SFABs provide a conventional capability of rapid expansion 
in the event of great power war.  
 
Ad Hoc Institutions 
 Despite the fact that the U.S. Military maintains some institutions to complete the SFA 
task, these institutions are still insufficient for most the missions they are called upon to complete 
(especially in the post-9/11 era). Thus, ad hoc institutions are still needed once statebuilding 
operations are already underway. This comes in the form of either the vast expansion of existing 
institutions, diluting quality, or by creating new institutions with no prior training or institutional 
memory. “Despite that record, the military continues to ignore the lessons of the past. The Army 
has created ad-hoc war time SSTR [Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction] 
capabilities with no real joint or interagency backbone or lasting capability.”70 
 
Governance Assistance  
 Tracing the historical development of the military’s institutions that contribute to 
governance is difficult considering analysts and scholars frequently conflate military governance 
of territory that has been conquered (often referred to as occupation) and the building of 
indigenous governance institutions as the same thing, military governance. For example, prior to 
military campaigns in WWII, the United States established the School of Military Governance in 
Virginia. However, this was to train officers in the administration of conquered territory, not to 
 
70 Wuestner, Scott G. Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm. Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2009: 7.  
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train them in the building of local institutions. This conflation is important to remember in the 
historical development of governance capabilities in the U.S. military. Understanding the 
historical development of occupation capacity is nonetheless important since these institutions 
are usually the first to transition into governance building roles once the military is asked to 
perform the task.  
 Even with occupation governance serving as an important role for conventional combat, 
it is often still viewed as less vital than other tasks that contribute more immediate results. Thus, 
like other tasks not viewed as contributors to the primary mission, occupation governance is 
often under resourced and under prioritized.71 “By the 1940s the United States Army had been 
conducting civil affairs operations for nearly a century; yet American military government was 
usually established reluctantly as an afterthought.”72 Occupation governance has been a feature 
of U.S. military operations since the war for independence onward, but there have been few 
efforts to institutionalize this effort and prioritization has been limited.  
  
The School of Military Governance and Civil Affairs 
The U.S. military administered occupied territory in essentially every war it has been 
engaged in. The confederate South was occupied and administered after the Civil War.73 Former 
Mexican territory was administered by the military following the Mexican-American War.74 
Even WWI, where the United States disengaged and retrenched after, still saw the United States 
 
71 Patterson, Rebecca. "Revisiting a School of Military Government: How Reanimating a World War II-Era 
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73 Heather Cox Richardson. West from Appomattox: The Reconstruction of America after the Civil War. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. 
74 Dougherty, Kevin, and Robert J. Pauly Jr. American Nation-building: Case Studies from Reconstruction to 
Afghanistan. McFarland, 2017. 
 107 
administering territory.75 Leading up to WWII, there was a period of time from the declaration of 
war until large-scale engagement from the United States. The School of Military Government 
was authorized to be built in Charlottesville, Virginia in December of 1941 and began training 
six months later. This was the beginning of Civil Affairs as a permanent profession in the U.S. 
Army. 
 The School of Military Government expanded throughout the course of WWII, 
eventually opening on 10 campuses across the country and training over a thousand officers 
mostly from the U.S. Army, but also officers from other branches and other countries.76 The 
training these officers received was extensive but limited to administration and did not included 
construction of indigenous institutions. “The students were being trained to serve as the 
administrative and advisory assistants to military governors with a thorough curriculum that 
covered government and administration, legal affairs, government finance, money and banking, 
natural resources, agriculture, industry and commerce, labor, public works and utilities, 
transportation systems, communications, public health and sanitation, public safety, education, 
and public welfare.”77 
 Eventually, as the program grew, it became known as the Civil Affairs Training Schools 
(CATS). This expansion still did not concern itself with anything more than administering 
occupied territories. It was designed for expediency in the immediate aftermath of taking 
territory, not the long-term reconstruction of indigenous institutions.  
 
75 Edelstein, David M. Occupational hazards: Success and failure in military occupation. Cornell University Press, 
2011: 5.  
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Economics 3 (2011): 7.  
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[The CATS] were far less concerned with the high-level regional and national 
planning for which the SOMG graduates one day would be responsible. Instead, 
the civilian-run program would focus its curriculum more on the day-to-day work 
of running an occupied city or town; therefore, the students spent more time 
studying the individual nations that the United States expected to occupy and their 
characteristics.78 
 
Following WWII, the shift towards demobilization and deterrence with regards to the Soviet 
Union, Civil Affairs continued to exist but was a shadow of its former self. Civil Affairs officers 
were relegated predominantly to the reserves, rather than being on active duty and training 
consistently.79 For every subsequent war since WWII, when Civil Affairs were needed in large 
numbers, they needed to be called up from the reserve units. Comparatively, units that contribute 
significantly to conventional combat can be sufficiently allocated from active-duty units, at least 
in the early stages of the conflict.  
 
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) 
 The CORDS program began several years after the initiation of combat operations by the 
United States in Vietnam. The program was officially established in 1967 and was intended to be 
heavily civilianized effort at governance assistance but was ultimately dominated by the military 
as it was placed under the MACV command structure. CORDS brought together numerous U.S. 
and Vietnamese run governance programs in an attempt to coordinate and more effectively 
implement the programs.80 Prior to the establishment of CORDS, governance efforts were under 
the Office of Civil Operations and this office was chronically understaffed and underfunded. The 
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CORDS program was praised for its efforts to combine and coordinate between different 
programs and agencies. However, their effect was minimal due to the consistent diversion of 
resources and personnel to conventional combat tasks. The program was abolished in 1973 as 
U.S. combat involvement in Vietnam ended.81 
 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
Governance building, as opposed to solely occupation governance, became a significant 
task during Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, and the majority of the Civil 
Affairs officers assigned to this task again came from the reserves early in the conflict. Ad hoc 
institutions were also established to meet the demand the military was unprepared for. The 
primary institution responsible for governance building in Afghanistan and Iraq was the 
provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) initially focused on 
combat operations and tracking down the Taliban and Al Qaeda members. The International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) did not extend much beyond Kabul. Rebuilding the Afghan 
state was essentially left to the UN and they were under resourced. President Bush spoke 
frequently that so-called nation-building was not a job of the U.S. military, and as such, the early 
mission in Afghanistan focused on hunting enemy combatants rather than statebuilding. 
According to Seth Jones, then secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld “argued that deploying a 
peacekeeping force outside of Kabul would be unnecessary and would divert resources from the 
broader American campaign against terrorism.”82 Eventually, only after the U.S. military had 
committed itself to a war in Iraq, it became clear that statebuilding efforts would have to expand 
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if the United States were to prevent Afghanistan from slipping back into civil war. Prior to the 
establishment of PRTs, Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and U.S. Army Civil Affairs 
Teams–Afghanistan supported humanitarian assistance, relief, and reconstruction efforts in 
Afghanistan.  
 In the summer of 2002, U.S. focus shifted to “spread the ISAF effect” throughout the 
country. PRTs were a primary component of this expansion.  
PRTs combine military and civilian personnel from various governmental 
agencies, including diplomats, specialists in economic development, and a few 
representatives of the Afghan Ministry of Interior. Their mission is to extend the 
authority of the Afghan central government, promote and enhance security, and 
facilitate humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations.83  
 
PRTs are the primary vehicles for stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan.84 They were 
essentially the vehicle through which a functioning Afghan state was to be constructed and 
expanded throughout the territory. The first PRT was established in Gardez province in January 
of 2003. Although all the PRTs that would be established had the same stated mission, the 
structure, command, strength, and priorities varied based on location and country in command. 
By 2005, there were 20 PRTs operating in Afghanistan, with 13 of them operated by the United 
States.85 Three years later, there were 50 PRTs operating in Afghanistan and Iraq, with 25 in 
each country and the United States operating 12 and 22 in each country respectively.86 At its 
peak in Afghanistan, there were 33 different PRTs operated by 15 different countries.87   
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Conclusion 
 According to Primary Mission Theory, the perceived primary mission of a military will 
set certain preferences. For most militaries during the modern era, this perceived primary 
mission is conventional combat. Conventional combat presents the largest potential threat to both 
their country and their organizations. International structural constraints exert pressure towards 
the building of conventional, high-tech militaries regardless of strategic realities of an individual 
country. In a world of limited resources these preferences will drive decisions about what 
institutions will, and will not, be built and maintained. Especially in military organizations, the 
allocation of resources and the determination of organizational structure is a high-stakes 
endeavor.  
 Resources do not always remain constant, however. There are periods of boom and bust, 
especially for the U.S. military that is frequently cycling in and out of conflicts and wars. The 
fact that many of these conflicts require some degree of statebuilding has resulted in a frequent 
cycle of statebuilding capacity building within the military, followed by statebuilding capacity 
atrophy. While many have attributed this to ‘forgetting’, or otherwise irrational behavior, 
Primary Mission Theory presents the explanation that this behavior can be entirely rational, 
especially for the U.S. military. It is unreasonable and impractical to ask the military to do 
multiple things that require entirely different skills, force structures, personnel, and equipment. It 
is unreasonable to completely reconstruct the very nature of the organization every 10 years 
when a statebuilding operation comes up. Short of this, asking the military to do both things is 
essentially asking the military to be bad at both. With the attempt to impose this impossible 
paradox on the military, the military choses instead to either passively or actively resist the 
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reallocation of resources and efforts towards statebuilding, because they view conventional war 
as always more important than statebuilding.  
 The historical tracing of statebuilding task-specific institutions within the U.S. military 
supports this conclusion of Primary Mission Theory. Only those institutions that can both 
contribute to statebuilding and conventional combat are prioritized and those that cannot are 
passively supported during pressure to perform statebuilding and quickly dismantled after. 
During a statebuilding operation, the military willingly accepts resources to build conventional 
capabilities under the pretext of statebuilding.  
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Chapter 4: Afghanistan: Ad Hoc and Ineffective 
 
 
Figure 1: Provinces of Afghanistan 
 
Introduction 
 The U.S. statebuilding operation in Afghanistan began in 2001 following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan. Much of the statebuilding effort 
came to an end in 2014 when the United States officially ended combat operations in the 
country, although many efforts to strengthen and buttress the Afghan state continue. Early efforts 
gave little thought to the construction of a state and primarily focused on the overthrow of the 
Taliban regime and the pursuit of Al Qaeda members. The U.S. statebuilding effort grew at 
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significant rates as the Taliban reconstituted and the security situation began to deteriorate 
around 2006, eventually becoming one of the most expensive and comprehensive statebuilding 
operations in history.1  
 Consistent with Primary Mission Theory, those tasks that are maintained in peace time 
because they contribute to conventional combat operations were available to be quickly 
employed at the outset of the operations, whereas those not maintained in peace time were ad 
hoc, under resourced, and began long after the operation was initiated. Furthermore, the U.S. 
military was reluctant to divert any substantial resources too far from conventional combat 
operations. Even infrastructure, which is consistently well maintained, was primarily diverted to 
projects that benefited conventional operations and those projects that did not contribute were 
either overtly or passively resisted. Even when civilian pressure was at its height around 2009-
2010, the U.S. military was still reluctant to divert too much away from conventional operations 
to more unconventional counterinsurgency tasks.  
Ultimately, infrastructure and security force assistance were able to achieve some level of 
tactical success. Infrastructure’s strategic success was limited due to the deteriorating security 
situation and not because of gaps in capabilities on the part of the U.S. military. Security force 
assistance resulted in strategic failure because of an inability to translate the vast U.S. military 
training capacity from training themselves to training the Afghans in a foreign context. 
Governance assistance struggled to make even marginal tactical gains and made no impact 
towards strategic success.  
 
 
1 Neta C. Crawford, “United States Budgetary Costs and Obligations of Post-9/11 Wars through FY2020: $6.4 




Testing Infrastructure in Afghanistan 
 Infrastructure building in Afghanistan was generally successful at the tactical level of 
analysis. Infrastructure was vastly improved during the U.S. presence there in both quality and 
quantity. At the strategic level of analysis, this vast improvement in infrastructure greatly 
increased the state’s ability to access and extract from society. This access and extraction began 
to be rolled back as the conflict progressed and non-state groups increased the amount of 
territory they either controlled or contested. Essentially, infrastructure gains were negated by 
political and security failures.  
 As expected by Primary Mission Theory, infrastructure capabilities in Afghanistan were 
valued only to the extent they contribute to the primary mission of conventional operations. 
Anything viewed as a distraction or diversion of resources from this mission was 
underprioritized if not actively resisted. As an illustrative example, when briefing commanders in 
Afghanistan on the effectiveness of the Commanders Emergency Reconstruction Program 
(CERP), which was the primary funding mechanism for the military to engage in infrastructure 
projects, military officials who did not know if the program was effective would rather tell their 
commanders that it was working for their military counterinsurgency strategy, if not for 
development and legitimation of the Afghan government more generally. “[We] would regularly 
tell COMISAF [Commander, ISAF], ‘CERP is a terrible development tool, but it’s a great 
stabilization tool,’ but we never knew if it was true.”2 
 During the surge in Afghanistan, and the subsequent shift in counterinsurgency strategy 
towards winning hearts and minds, infrastructure enjoyed somewhat of a boost in terms of how 
commanders viewed its contribution to the primary mission. Instead of being viewed primarily as 
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just a way to improve roads and thus improve military units’ ability to traverse the battlefield, it 
was now viewed as a way to increase local buy-in from civilians for the government and the U.S. 
occupation. But even this shift was insufficient to significantly alter the U.S. military’s view of 
what its primary mission was, conducting strikes against the Taliban and Al Qaeda targets, and 
clearing and holding territory. Personnel were not trained to do development work, institutions 
were not supported for their civilian-centric roles, and problems predictably arose.  
The GAO, DOD IG, and Army Audit Agency attributed some of the bureaucratic 
dysfunction to poor training, but there was another layer to the problem that was 
often overlooked by outside observers. According to one senior CA officer, ‘When 
I would ask RC-E CERP managers to explain the impact of a specific project 
being considered, I was often told, it might work, as its justification. None of them 
had development backgrounds; they were only concerned with preventing waste, 
fraud, and abuse at the most simple level.’ Personnel were not only ill-prepared 
to document and implement projects, they were also sometimes unprepared to 
properly conceptualize projects.3 
 
Most tasks, even conventional combat planning itself, was problematic for the Afghan case. The 
biggest difference between the tasks, however, is that infrastructure suffered the least from this 
case wide shortfall. Infrastructural efforts suffered from inconsistency in unity of effort, but this 
inconsistency was mostly when infrastructure was applied to more civil needs rather than 
military needs.  
 
Methodology 
 Relative to the other two tasks, measuring and assessing the building of infrastructure is 
far less complicated. The tactical level of assessment is simply the degree to which the military 
built, and enabled the building of, infrastructure in Afghanistan. This is slightly complicated by 
the fact that a great number of actors contribute to infrastructure construction, including Afghan 
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firms and foreign contractors. As observed by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR), “The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was the 
lead agency for these efforts, but a range of other U.S. institutions played a role, including the 
Departments of Defense, Commerce, Treasury, and State, the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC), the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, the U.S. Trade Representative, 
and the U.S. Geological Survey.”4 To the degree that it is possible, the contributions from the 
military are disaggregated from non-U.S. Military contributions for the purposes of analysis 
here.  
 The strategic level of analysis is the degree to which this infrastructure allowed the state 
to penetrate and extract from society throughout its territory. This analysis draws on qualitative 
measurements of changes in infrastructure levels in Afghanistan over time. Additionally, it draws 
on reports, analysis, and research conducted on Afghanistan related to infrastructure efforts.  
 
Building Infrastructure in Afghanistan 
 Infrastructure building in Afghanistan saw significant contributions from civilian 
agencies relative to other areas like security force assistance. It even saw contributions from 
states not involved in the military effort, like India and Iran.5 However, the military contributed 
significantly since it maintains strong institutional capacity for such activities during both war 
time and peacetime. The U.S. military maintains significant capacity to perform certain tasks 
even when those tasks are not needed. This allows them to surge quickly to meet demand where 
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other organizations, like the state department, would take years to just train the personnel 
necessary to take on additional tasks they were not already doing. By 2015, the U.S. military had 
spent over $9 billion on infrastructure alone from just one fund dedicated to building up the 
Afghan Special Forces.6 That $9 billion contributed to 382 projects for the Afghan National 
Army and 730 for Afghan National Police.7 “While stabilization was often framed as the civilian 
component of COIN [counterinsurgency], the military also spent considerable resources on 
stabilization programming.”8 Much of this stabilization programing involved government 
assistance and building infrastructure. Overall, infrastructure in Afghanistan was improved and 
expanded significantly since the beginning of the war in 2001.  
 The DoD contributed a significant amount of effort and resources on infrastructure, 
primarily those which were deemed vital to the military and security mission, like 
communications networks for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) that 
also benefited the civilian population. However, insufficient coordination and communication 
between civilian and military agencies, as well as between different intervening countries 
significantly hindered progress and outcomes.9 Again, these issues plagued the completion of all 
tasks in Afghanistan, just less so for infrastructure. Generally, DoD took an interest in 
infrastructure because the poor state of roads and communications lines hindered their own 
security operations and those of the ANDSF. Civilian agencies took an interest in infrastructure 
because the poor state of those same assets hindered economic development and foreign 
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investment. Consequently, DoD focused efforts on infrastructure the contributed to their ability 
to traverse and communicate on the battlefield. Only later did they take an interest in public 
works as a part of their hearts and minds counterinsurgency strategy.  
A great deal of infrastructure was built in Afghanistan by the military through CERP. 
This program was the primary mechanism through which the military funded and engaged in 
public infrastructure work. Additionally, the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations 
(TFBSO) contributed significant funds to reconstruction and was under the DoD. Additionally, 
significant resources were spent on base construction and related infrastructure projects.10 The 
CERP concept was originally used in Iraq and authorized in Afghanistan in 2003.11 There were 
15 authorized categories for which CERP funds could be used. These included irrigation, 
agriculture, electricity, and transportation.12 They excluded projects primarily for entertainment 
or personal rewards.  
During the surge around 2009-2012, the CERP program expanded significantly from 
small grants for emergency and security needs to broad based and significant projects in 
infrastructure, agriculture, and even for small businesses and entrepreneurship.13 Beginning in 
2009, CERP funds were authorized for use towards private business in the form of micro grants. 
While USAID and international funds were directed towards infrastructure for the purposes of 
economic development generally, CERP funds were directed towards infrastructure and 
economic development in specific ways that altered the security environment. “Micro grants 
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were for the explicit purpose of increasing economic activity, particularly in areas where small 
businesses had suffered because of insurgent violence.”14 
 
 
Figure 2: CERP Disbursements from FY2004 – FY201715 
 
TFBSO was similar to CERP, in that the concept was created in the Iraq war and then 
imported to the Afghan context. Also similar to CERP, the primary purpose was to directly alter 
the security environment. The stated purpose was to “promote economic stabilization in order to 
reduce violence, enhance stability, and restore economic normalcy.”16 TFBSO was not 
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specifically focused on infrastructure, but its activities naturally involved infrastructure. 
Specifically, one of its priorities was to develop extractive capabilities of the state to take 
advantage of Afghanistan’s mineral deposits. Ultimately, TFBSO’s contributions were limited 
because they were a temporary agency and faced the threat of defunding each year, which 
limited the ability of the organization to plan and implement long term projects or activities.17 
TFBSO was a project that was far removed from conventional combat operations relative to 
other similar mechanisms. As a result, more than most mechanism and projects, TFBSO was 
consistently under prioritized and resourced.  
In addition to completing and funding their own reconstruction projects, the expertise in 
construction of the U.S. military was leveraged to train their Afghan counterparts in building and 
maintaining their own infrastructure. Although this effort did not begin until advanced stages of 
the conflict. Their first priority was in service of their own country’s primary mission. Engineers 
in the U.S. military helped train members of the Construction and Property Management office, 
the General Staff Engineers and the National Engineer Brigade all under the Ministry of 
Defense, as well as the Facilities Department under the Ministry of Interior.18 DoD has a 
consistent and ready supply of infrastructure experts and practitioners that can easily surge to 
meet this demand. This was not the case with the other tasks attempted in Afghanistan. One of 
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the earlier efforts in these training efforts was the establishment of the Afghan National Army 
Engineer School in 2010.19 
 Consistent with the expectations of Primary Mission Theory, the military was able to 
involve itself in infrastructure building very early on in the conflict because it maintains the 
institutional capacity between wars. It did not require a long readjusting and training period to 
create new units to perform functions similar to previous statebuilding operations. The military’s 
priority, especially early on, was focused on contributing to that infrastructure which contributed 
to their ability to conduct conventional operations. Roads and telecommunications improved the 
ability of themselves and their Afghan partners to move and communicate on the battlefield. The 
military was far less interested in infrastructure for general state and economic use early on.  
However, as the military shifted focus to counterinsurgency and civilian pressure for a 
quick conclusion to the conflict increased. The military began to shift focus to infrastructure 
development for more general state and economic use. Because infrastructure between wars is 
only prioritized to the extent it contributes to conventional combat, the U.S. military was 
unprepared for the requirements of more general economic development. They were able to 
quickly begin work on those projects that contributed to their ability to maneuver on the 
battlefield. They were capable of then transitioning this capacity to civilian projects more 
generally but both overtly and passively resisted the diversion of such capacity to non-
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Vast improvements were made to infrastructure in Afghanistan during the statebuilding 
operation. The relative improvement was all the more significant due to the poor state of 
infrastructure in the country when the operation began in 2001 after the nearly 30 years of inter- 
and intra-state conflict that had preceded it. Of particular importance for the statebuilding effort 
was the improvements in telecommunications infrastructure, allowing rapid improvements in 
accessibility and business potential in the country. The high pressure placed on rapid progress 
resulted in many poorly managed projects that preferenced completion over quality or basic 
functionality. Additionally, the increasing intensity of the war took a toll on the infrastructure 
that had been built. Infrastructure capabilities were highly effective in Afghanistan, but 
frequently undermined by corruption, waste, and war-related destruction, limiting its impact on 
the overall statebuilding operation.  
 
Tactical Level Assessment 
By 2013, as U.S. and coalition forces were shifting more responsibility to the Afghans 
and declaring an official end to combat operations, significant progress had been made in 
infrastructure development.20 From 2002 to 2013, 5,430 kilometers of national, regional, and 
provincial roads had been constructed.21 One of the major projects that was completed during the 
occupation was the Ring Road that circumnavigates Afghanistan and connects all the major 
cities, originally built by the Soviets prior to their own invasion.22 After decades of Soviet 
 
20 Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” Department of 
Defense, November 2013, 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf.  
21 Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” Department of 
Defense, November 2013, 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/October_1230_Report_Master_Nov7.pdf: 105.  
22 Rubin, Barnett R. The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State formation and collapse in the international system. 
Yale University Press, 2002. 
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occupation and civil war, the Ring Road was significantly degraded. By as early as 2004, a major 
portion of Ring Road reconstruction was completed, connecting the capital Kabul with the major 
southern city of Kandahar. By 2012, nearly the entire Ring Road had been either completed or 
reconstructed.23 The United States only funded the portions from Kabul to Kandahar, and from 
Kandahar to Herat in the East. Iran, the Islamic Development Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, and the World Bank funded the northern portions.  
 Telecommunications infrastructure increased significantly during the U.S. statebuilding 
operation. Cellular subscriptions went from approximately 0.1 per 100 people in 2002 to 66 per 
100 people in 2016.24 Telecommunications infrastructure was primarily funded privately. 
However, the bulk of the initial investment in telecommunications came from the U.S. military. 
The DoD contributed approximately $2.5 billion in 2002 in support of Afghan information and 
communications technology, “primarily to provide networked communications support for the 
ANDSF.”25 Again, as expected by Primary Mission Theory, the primary interest in infrastructure 
building capacity was the extent to which it contributes to conventional combat operations.  
 The Afghanistan Country Director for the Asia Development Bank said that, “better 
infrastructure can strengthen economic growth, enlist improved mobility to energize commerce 
and agriculture, and boost government revenues available for development spending.”26 
Infrastructure development throughout the occupation was important for both increased revenue 
and capabilities for the state. The best indicator of significant improvement in infrastructure in 
 
23 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Private Sector Development and Economic Growth: 
Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,” April 2018: 35.  
24 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Private Sector Development and Economic Growth: 
Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,” April 2018: 69.  
25 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Private Sector Development and Economic Growth: 
Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,” April 2018: 70.  
26 Samuel Tumiwa, “Infrastrucutre Development Key to Afghanistan’s Growth – ADB,” Asia Development Bank, 
April 3, 2019, https://www.adb.org/news/infrastructure-development-key-afghanistans-growth-adb.  
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Afghanistan during the occupation is an analysis of nighttime light maps between 2001 and 
2013, shown in Figures 3 and 4 respectively below.  
 
 
Figure 3: Afghanistan Nighttime Light Assessment – 2001 
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Figure 4: Afghanistan Nighttime Light Assessment – 2013  
 
Nighttime light can be an effective proxy indicator of economic activity and 
infrastructure presence.27 Primarily, it requires that electricity being delivered to the lit area that 
requires major projects like power generators and plants, along with the infrastructure to deliver 
it. It is also a good indicator since delivery of electricity is likely paralleled by roads and other 
infrastructure. As the maps show, there was vast improvement in infrastructure in Afghanistan 
between 2001 and 2013. Light was mostly confined to a few major cities in 2001, including 
Kabul, Helmand and Lashkar Gah (the two major southern provincial capitals), Herat in the 
West, and Mazar-i-Sharif in the North. By 2013, Kabul city has expanded to consume a major 
portion of Kabul province. In addition to the major provincial capitals, light is also present in the 
 
27 Mellander, Charlotta, José Lobo, Kevin Stolarick, and Zara Matheson. "Night-time light data: A good proxy 
measure for economic activity?." PloS one 10, no. 10 (2015): e0139779. 
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surrounding areas of these capitals and a significant number of minor cities are now visible at 
night.  
 
Strategic Level Assessment 
Throughout the reconstruction project in Afghanistan, quality was frequently sacrificed 
for the purposes of quantity or showing quick results. However, the measures used for success 
were often superficial, like the number of schools built rather than the number of students 
actually utilizing those schools. “Administrator Natsios argued that much of the failure 
surrounding infrastructure construction stemmed from the rush to show progress on development 
projects that would inherently be slow and messy, but sustainable and completed with Afghan 
buy-in.”28 
Funding for CERP expanded significantly throughout the life of the program as the 
military shifted focus to counterinsurgency, from $40 million in 2004 to $550 million by 2009.29 
As expected by the Primary Mission Theory, CERPs contribution to infrastructure and 
development was secondary to the primary objective of serving military priorities. CERP was 
only useful so long as it advanced the military objective as they saw it. “The increase in U.S. 
forces during the 2009–2012 period and the advent of a modified counterinsurgency strategy 
affected most aspects of coalition activity in Afghanistan, and CERP was no exception.”30 CERP 
went from being an instrument intended to improve development and stabilization to an 
instrument of the military’s COIN strategy, more narrowly defined. The program originally was 
 
28 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Private Sector Development and Economic Growth: 
Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan,” April 2018: 34.  
29 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in 
Afghanistan,” May 2018: 92.  
30 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in 
Afghanistan,” May 2018: 92. 
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placed under U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which is responsible for commanding the 
whole of U.S. military operations in the Middle East and Central Asia. After the surge, CERP 
was placed under the specific command in Afghanistan, U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A).31 
 The new directed purpose of CERP was to be used after a local U.S. commander had 
cleared an area of insurgents to rebuild and hopefully win local buy-in for the U.S. occupation 
and Kabul government. “In this way, the military came to regard the spending of money itself as 
a ‘weapon system.’”32 This designation of money as a weapon system was not an exaggeration. 
In 2009, the U.S. military in Afghanistan produced a document intended to serve as guidance for 
use of funds under the CERP program called “Money as a Weapon System – Afghanistan.”33 
Despite the effort of military leaders to direct CERP’s function to serve military ends, its utility 
was somewhat limited relative to traditional military means. Thus, the program lacked an 
overarching and consistent strategy, was frequently underprioritized, and there was no effective 
monitoring and evaluation regime to insure effective implementation of the program.  
 Poor monitoring and evaluation and questions raised over the effectiveness of the 
program led to the program being formally reviewed in Congress. “In September 2009, 
following congressional scrutiny of CERP, the CENTCOM commander sent a memorandum to 
the commanders of USFOR-A and Multi-National Force-Iraq instructing them to establish and 
use more refined project evaluation and validation criteria for CERP in order to “preserve the 
program as a key non-kinetic COIN tool.”34 Because senior leaders viewed the CERP program as 
 
31 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in 
Afghanistan,” May 2018: 93.  
32 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in 
Afghanistan,” May 2018: 93.  
33 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in 
Afghanistan,” May 2018: 96.  
34 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in 
Afghanistan,” May 2018: 97. 
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a weapon similar to kinetic weapons, guidance on monitoring and evaluating performance of 
CERP programs was given as if they were monitoring other weapons systems; similar to 
something like a “battle damage assessment.” This method of monitoring did not translate well 
to something as complex as infrastructure and development projects, especially not at the level of 
its strategic impact. “Interviews with personnel who attempted to develop metrics revealed they 
struggled to devise methods to measure a project’s impact on the counterinsurgency fight.”35 
 The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction conducted an overview of 
analysis and research of the impact of CERP. Broadly, SIGAR concluded that the program had 
no impact on violence in the areas in which programs were implemented. Some studies found 
that CERP decreased violence, but this was usually only consistent for small projects under 
$50,000 and in areas already controlled by the government. In contested districts, CERP 
programs were shown to actually increase violence.36 
 The CERP program provides a clear demonstration of the limited strategic impact 
infrastructure had in Afghanistan, especially that which was directed or constructed by the 
military specifically. However, the beginning point for infrastructure in Afghanistan was as close 
to a blank slate as one can get in the 21st century. Decades of conflict and poor management by 
the Taliban regime resulted in extreme decay and atrophy of the infrastructure in Afghanistan. 
Improving the infrastructure from this point was far easier than doing the same in any other 
similarly sized country. The statebuilding function of infrastructure is to increase economic 
activity and enable the state to penetrate society. The inhibiting force against this in Afghanistan 
was more the increasing strength of insurgent forces than it was an inability to actually build the 
 
35 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in 
Afghanistan,” May 2018: 97.  
36 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in 
Afghanistan,” May 2018.  
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infrastructure. The map in Figure 7 below shows that the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) was 
increasingly unable to control major portions of the territory, preventing the state from 
penetrating those regions and areas, regardless of available infrastructure.   
 
Testing Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan 
 The conduct and performance of the U.S. military in training and advising the Afghan 
National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) was widely consistent with Primary Mission 
Theory. The military possessed the expertise to effectively train the ANDSF, but the ability to 
train themselves was not effectively translated into the ability to train others and was not tailored 
to the unique context of Afghanistan. This inability was exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. 
military trains for conventional combat against foreign powers, whereas Afghanistan needed 
security forces for internal control. However, because the capability is only valued to the extent 
it contributes to the U.S. military’s ability to perform conventional operations, utilizing this 
capacity for other purposes proved difficult. The strategy of building a military in their own 
image was ill-suited to the conditions in Afghanistan which required protection against an 
internal insurgency, not an external invasion. Training resources were prioritized for the training 
of U.S. forces and those allocated towards training the ANDSF were either of a lower quality or 
inconsistently applied.  
 The U.S. military was ill-prepared for the task when the operation started. Partially, this 
was the result of the complexity of training a foreign force with unfamiliar languages and 
cultural dynamics. “Training did not expose advisors to Afghan systems, processes, weapons, 
culture, and doctrine.”37 Additionally, a major part of the problem was that the military maintain 
 
37 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. “Divided Responsibility: Lessons from U.S. security 
sector assistance efforts in Afghanistan.” June 2019: XII.  https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-19-39-
LL.pdf 
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few foreign training institutions prior to the war and made little effort to prioritize it during the 
war. “The U.S. government was ill-prepared to conduct SSA [Security Sector Assistance] 
programs of the size and scope required in Afghanistan.”38 Ultimately, the complexity of the 
problem and the low priority given to addressing it interacted to produce the result of marginal 
tactical success and strategic failure.  
In Afghanistan, where literacy rates are low and education is limited, it was 
nearly impossible to recruit the necessary staff. Instead, U.S. advisors often 
performed critical functions themselves, such as developing policy, budgets, and 
human resources, and managing the design of the forces—rather than actually 
advising Afghans on how to do it. Moreover, the U.S. military had limited to no 
capability to train its own military officers on how to advise at the ministerial 
level, which resulted in untrained and underprepared U.S. military officers 
advising the highest echelons of both ministries.39 
 
Methodology 
 The tactical level of assessment for security force assistance seeks to measure the degree 
to which the U.S. military was able to train personnel, assist in building structures, and assist in 
establishing basic operating procedures and doctrines. The security force assistance mission in 
Afghanistan, like many similar missions conducted by international forces in the country, was 
consistently plagued by poor measurement and monitoring and evaluation regimes. An example 
of this was an attempt to rate the readiness of trained ANDSF military units. This method was so 
plagued by shortcomings of inaccuracy and counting of “ghost soldiers” as to be entirely useless.  
Therefore, the information available on the quality of troops produced is insufficient for such a 
study. As a result, the primary measures for success or failure at the tactical level is based on the 
 
38 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. “Divided Responsibility: Lessons from U.S. security 
sector assistance efforts in Afghanistan.” June 2019: IX.  https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-19-39-
LL.pdf 
39 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. “Divided Responsibility: Lessons from U.S. security 
sector assistance efforts in Afghanistan.” June 2019: X.  https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-19-39-
LL.pdf 
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structures of the military produced, the number of personnel trained, and the types of units they 
built (e.g., conventional versus special forces units).  
 The above shortcomings make the strategic level of assessment even more important. 
This level of assessment for security force assistance seeks to determine the degree to which the 
military was able to accomplish the objectives given to it by its political leaders. These 
objectives were to secure the population from violent non-state actors and to conduce offensive 
operations against Taliban held territory. This measure of military effectiveness is consistent 
with other scholars’ measures of military effectiveness and discussed in previous chapters.40 
 
Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan 
 Consistent with Primary Mission Theory, the U.S. military had significant training 
capabilities prior to the initiation of the statebuilding operation, but this was tailored to training 
themselves. Therefore, a massive surge effort was still required to fill the demand of training 
foreign forces. Additionally, even when effort was placed into SFA, there was passive resistance. 
Few forces were reallocated to the new role, those that were allocated were of lower quality than 
those dedicated to conventional operations, and the existing institutional capacity biased the 
effort into trying to create an Afghan army in the image of the U.S. army that was ill suited to 
conditions and missions in Afghanistan.  
The initial invasion of Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks was focused 
primarily on the overthrow of the Taliban regime and the destruction of the Al Qaeda terrorist 
network operating in the country. These initial political objectives did not require the 
reconstruction of an Afghan state and thus very little effort was directed toward any statebuilding 
 
40 Brooks, Risa. Creating military power: The sources of military effectiveness. Stanford University Press, 2007. 
 133 
tasks. SFA was given a very low priority relative to pursuing Taliban and Al Qaeda members. 
Initial plans, formed in 2002, called for 70,000 soldiers to comprise the new Afghan National 
Army (ANA). As the security situation began to deteriorate, plans quickly revised these force 
strength goals to eventually asking for 200,000 ANA soldiers (along with another 100,000 other 
security forces).41 
 The U.S. military focused primarily on conventional forces and did not allow enough 
training time to produce quality soldiers. The United States did not start training special forces 
soldiers until long after the training of conventional forces began and did not recognize they 
needed to be the primary effort until a surge in training around 2016. See Figure 5 below. 
“Increases in the ANSF were authorized, but no fundamental reexamination of the types of 
forces needed, how they operate together (if at all), and how they work with other important 
governmental functions, such as the judiciary and corrections systems or traditional forms of 
justice and security provision, were considered until very recently, if at all.”42 
 
 
41 Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, and Olga Oliker, Security force assistance in Afghanistan: identifying lessons 
for future efforts, (Rand Corporation, 2011): XV. 
42 Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, and Olga Oliker, Security force assistance in Afghanistan: identifying lessons 
for future efforts, (Rand Corporation, 2011): XVI.  
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Figure 5: Conventional Afghan Military Growth Versus Special Forces 
 
 Although Afghanistan is uncapable of maintaining a large conventional military and its 
strategic environment demands a small specialized and elite force structure tailored to degrading 
an internal insurgency rather than repelling a foreign invasion, the U.S. was primarily interested 
in building a conventional military in its own image. The Taliban resurgence began around 2005, 
but the training of special forces soldiers did not begin until 2007.43 
 
 
43 Tom Bowman, “Taliban Resurgence Strains Alliance in Afghanistan,” NPR, 2008, 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18125911.; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
“Military Balance,” (2002-2018).  
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Figure 6: Violent Events in Afghanistan44 
 
 Afghanistan faced significant structural and pre-existing limitation that inhibited the 
ability of the U.S. military to construct a competent Afghan army. However, strategic choices 
exacerbated these limitations rather than mitigated them. The U.S. attempted to create a large 
conventional military better suited to deterring and countering a foreign invasion. This creates an 
expensive and vast force structure that the Afghan economy was always going to be incapable of 
supporting and sustaining independently. “The main problem with Western assistance to the 
ANA has been its tendency to import external models into a country which lacks the structural 
and educational capacity to implement them.”45 
 
44 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism 
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Furthermore, this type of military is inept at the type of fighting that the Afghan army 
needed to do. A large conventional military is less effective at targeting insurgent forces and 
executing complex operations to take territory from non-uniformed fighters and target hidden 
and mobile guerrilla leaders. Training a small number of highly capable forces is less resource 
intensive. This is evident in the time it took to train the conventional ANA relative to the 
commandos and their respective capabilities. Vast resources were dedicated to training a 
conventional ANA that took years before they ever actually contributed to combat operations, 
and even then, they were very ineffective at it. The first contributions to combat operations did 
not come until 2005, even then they were only partially committed to these operations until 
2010.46 “By August 2011, just one ANA battalion was rated able to operate independently, that 
is, without being accompanied by ISAF troops, but still supported by ISAF mentors, ISAF 
logistics, ISAF maintenance, ISAF medical evacuation, etc.”47 
The drivers of the decision to focus on conventional forces was not exclusive to 
international norms, the U.S. military’s bias towards, and familiarity with, conventional combat, 
was also driven by the assumption that taking quality soldiers from conventional units to man the 
commando formations would decrease the effectiveness of the conventional units. Again, 
revealing the assumption that quantity was more important than quality. According to one report 
to Congress, “… The U.S. military must analyze the impact that removing the potential cadre of 
promising leaders will have on the conventional forces.” That same report also recognized that, 
“while the elite units have performed admirably, the conventional units have struggled.”48  
 
46 Antonio Giustozzi and Peter Quentin, The Afghan National Army: sustainability challenges beyond financial 
aspects, (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2014): 1. 
47 Antonio Giustozzi and Peter Quentin, The Afghan National Army: sustainability challenges beyond financial 
aspects, (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2014): 11. 
48 SIGAR, October 2017 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 14.  
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 The U.S. military was consistently motivated by the preference of the institutions to serve 
conventional military needs that it was unable to transition into serving the Afghans in an 
Afghan context. A clear demonstration of this comes from the writing of Afghan military 
doctrine. All militaries need written doctrine that guides their strategic vision and creates a unity 
of effort across the entire organization. U.S. advisors sought to develop such doctrine for the 
ANDSF. However, rather than study what was required for these forces in their specific context, 
they took their own existing doctrine developed for a global superpower that engages in great 
power competition and translated them into Dari for a small, land-locked power facing an 
insurgency. “To the extent that the ANA had written doctrine, it was the US Army’s one since 
manuals were translated without much thought or editing.”49 This again demonstrates that 
statebuilding tasks are only prioritized the extent to which they contribute to conventional 
combat.  
 
Assessment Results  
 The tactical level assessment shows a basic competency in training and building a 
military. Vetting and recruitment of new soldiers was conducted, training facilities and programs 
constructed, and new units with centralized command structures were fielded. Producing a 
military almost entirely from nothing with almost all external resources to over 200,000 
personnel is certainly an accomplishment. However, the strategic level of analysis shows that 
this impressive production was of little strategic value. The ANDSF were able to secure large 
population centers with Taliban only being able to gain control of these centers for short periods. 
After a long delay in beginning the training of commandos, eventually these forces were 
 
49 Antonio Giustozzi, The Army of Afghanistan: A Political History of a Fragile Institution, Hurst, 2015: 206.  
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deployed in sufficient numbers to conduct offensive operations against Taliban held territory. 
However, the strategic mismatch between the instinctual drive to build a conventional army in 
the U.S.’s image and the ineffective systems grafted onto it by the U.S.’s standard operating 
procedures, the ANDSF is incapable of achieving the political objectives given to it by Kabul. 
By the time combat operations officially ended for the United States in 2014 and security 
responsibilities were handed over to the ANDSF, Taliban forces held more territory than at any 
point since 2001 and was continuing to gain ground.50 
 
 
Tactical Level Assessment 
 Assessment of the U.S. military’s ability to conduct SFA at the tactical level show mixed 
results. They were able to train a military force and field it. However, the quality of these forces 
was limited, the fielding of units was consistently delayed, and they continued to be dependent 
on the United States for logistical and intelligence support after the official end of combat 
operations in 2014.  
Early efforts at training Afghan security forces were led by U.S. army special forces. 
Initially, basic training for the ANA was 10-weeks long. This length of time is an indication of 
the extent to which the U.S. military was relying on its own experience training itself to train the 
conventional ANA, U.S. army basic training last 9-weeks. The estimate for how long it would 
train the poor-quality of recruits that were available, however, was approximately 6-months. This 
 
50 Sources: SIGAR, “Addendum to SIGAR’s January 2018 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,” January 30, 2018, 
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Addendum_2018-01-30qr.pdf. 
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extended training period was never established, showing the low priority security force 
assistance received – especially early in the operation.51  
While the early SFA mission fell primarily to the special forces, which would indicate a 
high priority for the mission since special forces troops are few in number and resource intensive 
to train and field, the task was eventually handed off to the conventional 10th Mountain Division 
under Task Force Phoenix. However, the mission was eventually handed off again, this time to 
the National Guard. This was intended to free up higher quality active-duty troops for service in 
Iraq.52  
This strategy to focus on quantity over quality resulted in the fielding of a very poor 
quality of forces. The resulting defeats on the battlefield, along with other systemic problems like 
corruption, led to a high level of desertions and retention problems, further exacerbating poor 
performance.53 Early in the SFA mission the illiteracy rate was approximately 60% for new 
recruits. However, this number had increased to 80% as early as 2005.54 The result of this poor 
strategy was a steady increase in Taliban control of the country every year after the United States 
handed control over to the Afghan government in 2014.55  
The Afghan Commandos have been an exception to the poor performance of the broader, 
conventional ANA.56 The Commandos have been the only functional units in the Afghan 
 
51 Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, and Olga Oliker, Security force assistance in Afghanistan: identifying lessons 
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54 Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 40. 
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New York Times (2016). 
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security forces, and subsequently have been relied upon heavily since the handover over of 
combat operations in 2014. However, the training and construction of the Commando units did 
not even begin until 2007, well after the Taliban resurgence began.57 The U.S. and Afghan 
governments have both long viewed the training of the ANA as a vital part of securing the 
country. However, the most competent fighters, the Commandos, were only a small priority. 
After the handover in 2014, the Commandos importance to the security of the country became 
clear. Although conventional ANA strength has plateaued, the Commandos have been growing 
at increasing rates. The ANA Special Operations Command Headquarters was created in 2011 to 
facilitate the increased number of special operations recruits.58  
Support for the Commandos, although it has increased over time, remains very low 
relative to the degree to which they are relied upon to do the actual fighting. Afghanistan never 
needed a conventional army that is better suited to deterring or stopping a foreign invasion, they 
had U.S. security guarantees that deterred this threat for them. What they needed was a military 
that was highly specialized and mobile, one that is better suited to go after internal threats like 
terrorists and insurgents. Even after this recognition increased as the United States stepped back 
and the Afghans became more responsible for these missions, support remained low. In 2017, the 
Commandos comprised less than 10 percent of the whole ANA, but “they do from 70 percent to 
80 percent of the actual fighting.”59  
Recognition of the importance of the Commandos would eventually lead to an increased 
investment in growing the force, although far too late in the conflict to have a more meaningful 
 
57 SIGAR, October 2017 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 41-42.; Ann Scott Tyson, “Afghan 
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impact. Around 2016, plans were developed and announced to double the size of the 
Commandos from 17,000 to 34,000 and the plan would take four years and cost approximately 
$200 million.60 As important as this realignment is, it is far from sufficient. Total U.S. 
investment in the Afghan security forces far out paces this small reinvestment in the 
Commandos.  
 
Strategic Level Assessment 
 Assessment of the U.S. military’s ability to conduct SFA at the strategic level shows 
nearly an abject failure to accomplish its objectives. The mission was only able to achieve some 
marginal successes in the Commandos, who are the only units in the ANDSF capable of 
conducting offensive operations. However, their development began too late for them to be 
effective in suppressing the Taliban to acceptable levels and they were still dependent on some 
U.S. support for logistics and intelligence after the end of combat operations in 2014.  
The SSA mission in Afghanistan lacked an enduring, comprehensive, expert-
designed plan that guided its efforts. As a result, critical aspects of the advisory 
mission were not unified by a common purpose, nor was there a clear plan to 
guide equipping decisions over time.61 
 
In the early stages of the SFA operation in Afghanistan the security situation steadily 
deteriorated. With the objective being the creation of a western-style conventional military, the 
security situation dictated that quality of training be sacrificed for the purposes of putting bodies 
in the field. Very little consideration was given to the quality of these troops, just that they show 
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progress by fielding them in large numbers. Faced with a worsening security situation, the fact 
that they were fielding poorly trained troops led to predictable battlefield failures. This in turn 
contributed to poor retention rates. John Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction (SIGAR) chief, said, “As security deteriorated, efforts to sustain and 
professionalize Afghan security forces became secondary to meeting immediate combat 
needs.”62 
 Even with the poor level of training, the U.S. Government was substantially increasing 
the amount spent on training these forces, from $362.7 million in 2003 to $1.736 billion in 
2005.63 This drastic increase in funding failed to even deliver proportionally larger numbers of 
ANA troops deployed. Such a military is resource intensive and requires a substantial amount of 
logistical, intelligence, and other support to maintain. This is called the teeth to tail ratio. For 
every soldier you have on the front lines actually engaging in the fight (the teeth), you need a 
substantial amount of personnel and resources behind them (the tail) supporting the logistical 
network around the country, or globe, and providing non-combat services like intelligence, 
medical evacuation, vehicle maintenance, and air support.  
The United States, and only a few other countries, can support these kinds of militaries 
capable of foreign expeditionary missions because of their sizable economies, industrial bases, 
and military specific expenditures. Most countries, even many of those that ineffectively choose 
the wrong force structure, cannot afford to maintain such a military.64 Afghanistan in particular, 
 
62 CSIS, “SIGAR John Sopko: Lessons from Developing Afghanistan’s Security Forces,” 2017, 
https://www.csis.org/events/sigar-john-sopko-lessons-developing-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-security-forces. 
63 United States Government Accountability Office, “GAO-08-661 - Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional 
Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National 
Security Forces,” Report to Congressional Committees, June 2008, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-08-661/pdf/GAOREPORTS-GAO-08-661.pdf.  
64 Farrell, Theo. "Transnational norms and military development: Constructing Ireland's professional army." 
European Journal of International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001): 63-102. 
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lacks almost every condition needed to maintain such a military. Afghanistan, and the SFA 
operation in support of it, failed to field a large military in the early years of the operation in 
large part due to the inability to deliver logistics in support of it and keep it in the field. Many of 
the recruits lacked basic literacy or spoke different languages, and many lacked a basic 
education.65 
Because effort was being placed in trying to stand up the wrong kind of military and not 
being able to accomplish it, Taliban forces faced essentially no resistance when they began to 
return to villages and towns throughout Afghanistan around 2004.66 This made constructing the 
ANA even more difficult and they began to face increasingly high casualty rates. This was not 
enough to force a strategic realignment. The assumption was almost always to rely on the 




65 Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 35.  
66 Kelly, Bensahel, and Oliker, Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, 39. 
67 SIGAR, October 2017 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4. 
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Testing Governance in Afghanistan 
 As the statebuilding operations began in Afghanistan, the U.S. military had no existing 
institutional capacity to provide governance assistance. With the initial effort, units that seemed 
most closely related to governance assistance were tasked with the job. This meant assigning 
soldiers that were trained in the occupational governance of territory were now trying to build 
indigenous institutions, two things that require significantly different skills and resources. As the 
operation progressed and civilian pressure to perform statebuilding increased, the military 
 
68 Sources: SIGAR, “Addendum to SIGAR’s January 2018 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,” January 30, 2018, 
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Addendum_2018-01-30qr.pdf.; and  FDD’s Long War Journal, ‘Mapping 
Taliban Control in Afghanistan,’ https://www.longwarjournal.org/mapping-taliban-control-in-afghanistan.  
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created ad hoc institutions to fill the role. This job was, eventually, primarily performed by the 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Table 1 below shows which provinces has a PRT 
operating and which country was predominantly in command. There was a significant increase in 
attention paid to PRTs around 2008-2009 as they reached their peak operations in the country. 
Since then, there has been far less attention and analysis. The result is a broken and inconsistent 
record of the timeline and location of the various PRTs. This is the only comprehensive timeline 
of PRTs from their establishment in 2003 to their closures in 2013.  
The PRTs started late, were not given enough priority once they did start, and were 
quickly dismantled once official combat operations ended. As a result, their impact was minimal 
according to subsequent analysis and statements from local Afghans. An interviewed of a local 
Afghan journalist in 2010 is illustrative.  
local people never consider the PRTs as a body to be supporting the local 
government. They think this it is a body representative of the foreign troops in 
Kabul. In practical to, as far as I know and I have seen the operations, they are 
not cooperating the way that they have written in their strategy papers and online, 
their websites and whatever you find. In practical they have their own projects, 
their own purposes, and they very little consider the suggestions of the provincial 
government.69 
 
 There are no military units trained to do such work, so they were staffed by soldiers 
trained to do other tasks. The lack of preexisting institutional capacity meant that early 
governance assistance was nearly non-existent. Performing such tasks takes quality soldiers 
away from conventional operations. Therefore, subsequent efforts to perform the task were 
resisted by the U.S. military, or it was handed off to poorly trained or lower quality soldiers. The 
result was a poor performance across the tactical and strategic level of analysis.  
 
 
69 Christie, Ryerson. "The pacification of soldiering, and the militarization of development: contradictions inherent 
in provincial reconstruction in Afghanistan." Globalizations 9, no. 1 (2012): 64.  
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 The tactical level of analysis assesses the degree to which the military assisted in building 
governing structures, extending the institutional reach of Kabul, and in helping those institutions 
provide goods and services. Importantly, the contribution of the U.S. military needs to be 
disaggregated from the general efforts from the United States and international donors. Simply 
measuring the growth of institutional capacity would combine indigenous processes with 
external efforts and contributions. The primary assessment must be based on the extent to which 
U.S. military institutions contributed to the building and extension of state power into the 
 
70 Information and accuracy are approximate and based on a body of information from official government reports, 
military reports and information, open-source information, and first-hand knowledge. Many less authoritative 
reports provide contradictory information so assessing exact dates of command is difficult.  
Province PRT Name 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Badakhshan Feyzabad Germany Czech Czech Czech Germany Germany Germany Germany
Badghis Qaleh-ye Now Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain
Baghlan Pol-e Khomri Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary Hungary
Balkh Mazar-e Sharif US UK UK Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden
Bamyan Bamyan US New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand
Daykundi
Farah Farah US US US US US US US US US US
Faryab Meymaneh UK Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway Norway
Ghazni Ghazni US US US US US US US US US US
Ghor Chaghcharan Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania Lithuania
Helmand Lashkar Gah US US UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UK
Herat Herat US US Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy
Jowzjan Sheberghan Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey
Kabul
Kandahar Kandahar US Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada US US US
Kapisa US US US US US US US
Khost Khost US US US US US US US US US
Kunar Asadabad US US US US US US US US US US
Kunduz Kunduz US Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany
Laghman Mihtarlam US US US US US US US US
Logar Czech Czech Czech Czech Czech Czech
Nimroz
Nangarhar Jalalabad US US US US US US US US US
Nuristan Nuristan US US US US
Paktia Gardez US US US US US US US US US US US
Paktika Sharana US US US US US US US US US US
Panjshir Panjshir US US US US US US US




Uruzgan Tarin Kowt US US US Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands US US US
Wardak Wardak Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey
Zabul Qalat US US US US US US US US US US
0 6 18 22 24 26 27 27 28 27 26 23 0Total PRTs
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provinces. The strategic level of analysis assesses the degree to which these efforts generated 
legitimacy in both the local and national governments.  
 
Governance Assistance in Afghanistan 
Institutions focused on infrastructure within the U.S. military could quite easily be shifted 
to building infrastructure in Afghanistan. This is not a significant departure from their intended 
purpose in conventional operations. Shifting training institutions towards SFA was less of an 
equivalent transition. The training capacity existed, but not for the specific contexts required. 
Governance assistance is an exponential departure from intended institutional capacities relative 
to infrastructure and SFA. Not only did the institutions created have a difficult time working 
within the Afghan context, but they had to be created from scratch after the operation had begun. 
Governance assistance for the U.S. military in Afghanistan was never considered before the war, 
was consistently underprioritized once the war began, and was systematically dismantled after 
combat operations officially ended in 2014.  
When governance assistance efforts began after the initial phases of the war were over in 
2002, there was an effort to push the personnel determined to be already doing work most 
closely related to governance assistance into completing that task. Like many wars before it, in 
Afghanistan that meant pushing Civil Affairs units and National Guard/Reservists into 
governance assistance roles. Civil Affairs units seem like a natural fit for the role, they cite their 
origin to the military governance schools set up prior to the invasions of Europe and the Western 
Pacific during WWII. However, both the governing units of WWII and the Civil Affairs units 
today are not designed to build indigenous governing capacity but to administer territory after 
being conquered. They are not intended to be state builders but occupiers. National Guard and 
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reservist soldiers were pushed into the roles because they have civilian jobs and are only soldiers 
part-time. This was thought to qualify them to build civilian governance capacity.  
Once the initial overthrow of the Taliban regime was over in late 2001, ISAF did not 
extend much beyond Kabul. Rebuilding the Afghan state was essentially left to the UN and they 
were under resourced. President Bush spoke frequently that so-called nation-building was not a 
job for the U.S. military, and as such, the early mission in Afghanistan focused on eliminating 
Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters rather than statebuilding. Then Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, when asked about ISAF and U.S. forces expanding outside Kabul, said it would 
essentially be a waste of time and resources.71 Eventually, only after the U.S. military had 
committed itself to a war in Iraq, it became clear that statebuilding efforts would have to expand 
if Afghanistan was to prevent slipping back into civil war.  
Prior to the establishment of PRTs, a number of more ad hoc institutions chaotically 
attempted governance assistance. These included Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and U.S. 
Army Civil Affairs Teams–Afghanistan, which supported humanitarian assistance, relief, and 
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Even after the establishment of PRTs, coalition forces had 
multiple vehicles that engaged in governance assistance, like “Village Stability Operations”, 
which created redundancies and damaged unity of effort.  
 The first PRT was established in Gardez province in January 2003. This means that from 
approximately November 2001 when the Taliban fell, to January 2003, almost no governance 
assistance was occurring by the military on the ground in Afghanistan. Even after the first PRTs 
were stood up, it would take years before they were engaging locals in a substantial way and at 
scale across the country. Although all the PRTs that would be established had the same stated 
 
71 Jones, Seth G. In the graveyard of empires: America's war in Afghanistan. WW Norton & Company, 2010: 113. 
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mission, the structure, command, strength, and priorities varied based on location and country in 
command. The intended purpose of the PRTs were to extend the authority of Kabul into the 
provinces. They combined military and civilian personnel and were often influenced by the 
particular goals and objectives of the country in command.72 PRTs eventually became the 
primary vehicles for stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan.73 They were essentially the 
vehicle through which a state was to be constructed and expanded throughout the territory. The 
PRTs reached a peak in funding and prioritization around 2009. After 2009, much of the 
prioritization and resources were increasingly shifted to conventional military needs.74  
 A clear indication of the ad hoc and chaotic nature with which these PRTs were set up 
and run is the fact that each country that operated a PRT did so with slightly different priorities 
and strategies, and even attempts to measure success and failure were poor and inconsistent. It’s 
been said about Italy’s PRT in Herat:  
There are no distinct and objective metrics used to assess the performance of the 
Italian PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. While both PRTs maintain some standard 
information on projects (number, type, expenditures), this input-based 
information does not provide useful measures of effectiveness of PRTs and their 
operations.75 
 
Common measures of success included literacy rates, infection rates, or school 
attendance. These numbers often lack context and the very fact that they are the sole measure of 
outcomes for many of these PRTs means that the projects are completed under questionable 
 
72 Dziedzic, Michael J., and Col Michael K. Seidl. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations with 
International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan. (report, United States Institute of Peace, 2005): 3-
4.  
73 Farrell, Theo. "Improving in war: military adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–
2009." The Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (2010): 567-594. 
74 Interview with civilian advisor to military commander, March 20, 2019.  
75 Abbaszadeh, Nima, Mark Crow, Marianne El-Khoury, Jonathan Gandomi, David Kuwayama, Christopher 
MacPherson, Meghan Nutting, Nealin Parker, and Taya Weiss. "Provincial reconstruction teams: lessons and 
recommendations." In Woodrow Wilson School Graduate Workshop on Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 
Washington, DC. 2008: 37.  
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conditions or well below acceptable standards in the interest of inflating performance metrics to 
show results. Building schools has little impact if you do not have teachers to staff them or if 
girls are being systematically excluded.  
Consequently, quality control is spotty at best. Widespread anecdotal accounts 
describe large-scale corruption. The most common are tales of tribal elders 
absconding with money meant for the community’s project. In some cases, money 
is suspected to have gone to insurgents.76 
 
 As the official end of combat operations approached, PRTs began to be shut down, 
whereas other institutions focused on statebuilding like naval construction units moved back to 
their home bases ready for follow-on assignments. Some marginal capacity for governance 
assistance survived the end of combat operations, like the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 
Institute (PKSOI) that was intended to maintain institutional memory and knowledge on how to 
conduct such operations.77 However, this effort operates on a very small budget and has been 
threatened to be cut, nonetheless.  
 
Assessment Results 
Governance assistance produced poor results at the tactical level of analysis, and even 
poorer results at the strategic level of analysis. At the tactical level, governance assistance 
institutions needed to be built from nothing, soldiers that staffed them were not trained to do the 
work, and they were consistently underfunded and underprioritized. At the strategic level, there 
is no indication that the governance assistance efforts by the U.S. military had anything but a 
 
76 Malkasian, Carter, and Gerald Meyerle. Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How do we know they work?. Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2009: 35.  
77 Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College, https://usawc.org/peacekeeping-
stability-operations-institute-pksoi-2/.  
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superficial impact. There was no discernable impact on the legitimacy of the provincial or 
national governments.  
 
Tactical Level Assessment 
 Early governance assistance efforts in Afghanistan were essentially non-existent. Aside 
from the UN directed effort to build the framework for the new regime at the Bonn conference, 
no effort was being made within Afghanistan to establish this government and extend its 
authority outward from Kabul. This is primarily because of the factors predicted by Primary 
Mission Theory. The U.S. military had no institutional capacity before the war to perform such 
tasks, and when forced to perform these tasks in Afghanistan the institutions set up were ad hoc, 
under-resources, and weak on human capital. As a result, U.S. and coalition officials relied on 
warlords to establish the authority of Kabul. Essentially, they attempted to co-opt and 
incorporate former warlords and local power brokers into the new system through title changes. 
Warlords became generals and secretaries in the Ministry of Defense, powerful officials in the 
Ministry of the Interior, or high-ranking officials in the Karzai administration.  
 This strategy had the effect of building a façade of a Kabul dominated state structure that 
extended its institutional capacity throughout the country. In reality, state authority outside Kabul 
was little more than a weak consensus among powerful warlords that could easily switch 
allegiances based on the personal self-interest of the powerful individuals. The system of keeping 
the previous warlord and patronage system in place was a Kabul that could dictate few orders to 
the periphery and local administration that was directed by corrupt officials. The retribution 
against former Taliban fighters and the exploitation of powerless civilians was largely the basis 
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upon which the Taliban were able to reconstitute their power and position when they began their 
resurgence in 2006 and 2007.78 
 Once attention shifted to counterinsurgency for the U.S. military, more effort was placed 
into making the PRTs successful. This focus allowed for some improvement in governance 
capabilities, reinforced significantly by the fact that these local governments being supported by 
the PRTs had millions in foreign aid money to hand out. This created a similar façade effect as 
did the reliance on warlords. District and provincial governments received buy-in, but only when 
they had money to feed into the patronage system. Two problems with this, is that it was not 
robust buy-in but merely performative in order to ensure funds would flow, and what little buy-in 
existed was dependent on the continued flow of foreign financial aid since domestic Afghan tax 
revenue could not sustain such high levels of funding.  
 
Strategic Level Assessment 
Some PRTs experienced marginal successes, but much of this was driven by 
circumstance and personalities that were able to make things happen in difficult circumstances. 
These successes were not standardized across the whole governance assistance system. An 
example of this is with the PRT in Khost province around 2008. The State Department 
representative for the PRT in that province, Kael Weston, asked for a specific response to the 
distribution of aid. Weston “pressed tribal leaders and village elders to cooperate with the 
Afghan police and the Afghan government on security matters in return for projects.”79 This 
strategy was more likely to succeed than some of the other strategies attempted, like the hopes of 
creating attention and recognition around provincial governance efforts by inviting media to 
 
78 Giustozzi, Antonio. The Taliban at War: 2001-2018. Oxford University Press, 2019. 
79 Malkasian, Carter, and Gerald Meyerle. Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How do we know they work?. Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2009: 14.  
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ribbon cutting ceremonies in a country that is largely illiterate.80 However, the effort is still 
dependent on the continued flow of foreign aid to sustain. 
This massive effort in Khost, which involved a large surge in money being paid out for 
projects, did provide a legitimacy bump for the Khost Provincial Council. When asked how 
much confidence they have in their Provincial Council, Khost residents answer with 89% saying 
either a great deal of confidence or a fair amount of confidence in 2007, and 71% saying the 
same in 2008. The confidence level fluctuates between high 60s and low 70s for the next few 
years, never approaching the previously achieved 89%. After 2014 when the United States began 
to draw down, this number dropped down to mid-50s and high-40s for the next four years.81 This 
temporary statebuilding success was dependent on the continued flow of money and patronage, 
which could not be translated into genuine statebuilding.   
Additionally, the high rates of confidence in the provincial councils that are observed in 
Khost are largely the result of a popular provincial governor. The same report above also claims 
that the governor, “… is experienced, intelligent, active, and seen as trustworthy by both the 
people and coalition forces, promotes good governance.”82 We see similar bumps in confidence 
with other popular officials or warlords, like Abdul Rashid Dostum in Balkh province in the 
North. What this analysis of Khost province suggests is that local conditions were more 
consequential in generating legitimacy for the government than anything that was contributed by 
the U.S. military.  
 
80 Malkasian, Carter, and Gerald Meyerle. Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How do we know they work?. Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2009: 12-15.  
81 Survey data analyzed from: The Asia Foundation, “Survey of the Afghan People,” 2006-2018, 
https://asiafoundation.org/where-we-work/afghanistan/survey/.  
82 Malkasian, Carter, and Gerald Meyerle. Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How do we know they work?. Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2009: 12.  
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Analyses of other regions of Afghanistan show the same. To demonstrate this, confidence 
in provincial governments is systematically analyzed in the North and South. In order to control 
for pre-existing structural conditions, two provinces each have been chosen from three different 
regions. These provinces are compared in the context of their region, rather than in the context of 
the whole country. This design controls for regional disparities like ethnicity, geography, 
population densities, issues related to bordering countries, and poppy cultivation.  
 This assessment seeks to measure the level of legitimacy achieved in a given province. 
Answers to survey questions produced by the Asia Foundation are used as indicators of 
provincial legitimacy. Survey data collected by the Asia Foundation starting in 2006 is separated 
by region, and then by province. Descriptive statistics are gathered on responses to the following 
question: How would you rate your confidence in your provincial council? Analyzing this 
question quantitatively gives us a measure of the people’s opinions of their specific province, 
isolating the performance of that province’s PRT (specifically, their ability to generate 
legitimacy for the Afghan state within that province). Once the descriptive statistics are gathered, 
they are compared to the region as a whole. All of this is considered in the context of the strategy 
of PRTs and military tactics/missions in each province. The North averages higher levels of 
confidence in provincial councils while the south tended to have lower levels of confidence in 
provincial councils. See Figure 8.  
In the north, Balkh and Kunduz provinces are analyzed. In Kunduz, the Germans utilized 
a highly integrated PRT command structure with both a civilian and a military officer sharing 
command. In Balkh, the Swedish model was similarly structured with a focus on cooperation 
between civilian and military leaders. The security situation of the north was relatively secure 
and allowed for focus on capacity and governance over security. In the south, Helmand and 
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Kandahar province are analyzed. The UK began with a military centric PRT in Helmand and 
changed to a civil-military hybrid around 2008. Canada utilized a civil-military hybrid model for 
their PRT in Kandahar.  
 
Figure 8: Confidence levels in Afghanistan 2006-2018 (Kabul Province excluded)  
 
Figure 9: North/South Regional Division 
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Northern Region: Balkh and Kunduz  
 Kunduz province is selected because it is an outlier in the north with one of the lowest 
confidence rates in the region. The north generally has high confidence levels relative to other 
regions. Kunduz is compared to Balkh province for several reasons. Both provinces host major 
cities as their provincial capitals, Kunduz city and Mazar-e-Sharif. They both have an 
international boarder and are geographically close. Understanding why legitimacy was so low in 
Kunduz can provide insight into what is driving legitimacy more generally.   
 Among all the provinces of the north, Kunduz is somewhat unique. Although the bulk of 
the Taliban’s Pashtun support is isolated in the south and southeast, Kunduz city has a sizable 
Pashtun population surrounding it. While pockets of Pashtun populations around the north is not 
unusual, it is unusual to be around a major city. Prior to the U.S. invasion in 2001, Kunduz 
served as the Taliban’s major outpost in the north as they continued their campaign against the 
Northern Alliance. The city of Kunduz experienced heavy fighting during the civil war and 
resisted the rise of the Taliban until it was seized in 1997. After the fall of the Taliban, the large 
Pashtun population meant that the Taliban had a ready supply of potential support surrounding 
the city.83 
 As the Taliban pushed back into the country, and eventually up into the north, Kunduz 
became a major target. In the relatively peaceful north, Kunduz experienced heightened levels of 
attacks. Many of the personalistic networks that dominated the insurgency after the U.S. 
intervention were those that dominated prior to it.84 These same groups could also rely on 
 
83 Wormer, Nils. 2012. "Afghanistan Analysts Network." German Institute for International and Security Affairs. 
Accessed May 30, 2016. http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/wrm_2012_the_networks_of_Kunduz.pdf. 
84 Giustozzi, Antonio. The Taliban at War: 2001-2018. Oxford University Press, 2019.  
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previously established networks of support. “All of them could fall back on existent networks 
that had persisted over time when they re-emerged in Kunduz province.”85 
 Kunduz was a part of ISAF’s initial expansion out of Kabul in 2003. Germany approved 
the deployment of troops for a PRT in Kunduz in October of 2003 and almost immediately sent 
an initial force to the area. By 2012, ISAF had 2,500 troops serving in Kunduz province, about 
half were German.86 The model that the Germans built in Kunduz was significantly different 
from the one the U.S. initially established there.  
 Formally, the PRT was a civilian reconstruction team with a military protection element. 
Both civilian and military elements worked on the same level with a similar political objective in 
mind. PRT Kunduz has a dual civil-military command, with the civilian commander coming 
from the Foreign Ministry. Germany held a similar belief to early U.S. policy; in that they should 
maintain as small a military footprint as possible. Germany’s footprint in the region increased 
only once the insurgency picked up in the north around 2007. By 2008 the PRT was comprised 
of around 470 troops. The civilian element was comprised of around 15 individuals from various 
agencies.87 
The city of Mazar-e-Sharif is located in Balkh province, which borders Kunduz province. 
Much like Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif is a large city with strategic significance. Unlike Kunduz, 
Mazar-e-Sharif saw a certain level of peace and security following the withdraw of Soviet forces. 
The city was conquered by General Dostum and he was able to displace competing warlords and 
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their networks for some time. “During this war Dostum carved out an autonomous zone in the 
north based upon the holy shrine town of Mazar i Sharif.”88 Dostum was betrayed in 1997 and 
fled to Turkey in 1998. It was during this time that Mazar-e-Sharif was exposed to the 
characteristic violence and destruction of the Afghan civil war. However, Mazar-e-Sharif was 
one of the first cities to be freed from Taliban control in 2001.  
Dostum returned to Afghanistan in early 2001 to help the hard-pressed Northern 
Alliance. When news of the attacks on New York and Washington spread, Dostum anticipated 
that the United States would respond with force and reached out to the U.S. Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) to offer his support. Dostum’s forces were augmented by CIA operatives, Special 
Forces A-Teams, and Air Force ground controllers. Dostum helped liberate the city of Mazar-e-
Sharif in a very short amount of time. “In recognition of his contributions to making the new 
post-Taliban Afghanistan possible Dostum was named Deputy Minister of Defense and later 
Chief of Staff of the Afghan army.”89 Furthermore, several important regional headquarters for 
the central Afghan government were established in Mazar-e-Sharif, including for the Afghan 
police and army. Relations between Dostum and the Afghan central government get complicated 
as the Taliban insurgency increases. However, his presence and his connections in Mazar-e-
Sharif established order early and helped maintain them over the long-term.  
Command of PRT Mazar-e-Sharif (PRT MeS) was officially handed over to Sweden in 
2006 from the British, with the British taking command of combat operations in the region at the 
same time. At the time of the change of command, Sweden had around 250 troops in 
Afghanistan. The majority of them were assigned to PRT MeS, with others assigned to combat 
 
88 Williams, Brian Glyn. 2010. "General Dostum and the Mazar i Sharif Campaign: new light on the role of 
Northern Alliance warlords in Operation Enduring Freedom." Small Wars & Insurgencies 21 (4): 613.  
89 Williams, Brian Glyn. 2010. "General Dostum and the Mazar i Sharif Campaign: new light on the role of 
Northern Alliance warlords in Operation Enduring Freedom." Small Wars & Insurgencies 21 (4): 628.  
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operations in Mazar-e-Sharif and some assigned to Kabul.90 The Swedish PRT attempted a 
comprehensive approach, focusing on security, governance, and development. Along with the 
military component, there were several civilian advisors assigned to PRT MeS. These included 
representatives from political, development, and police agencies from both the Swedish and 
Finnish governments. The U.S. State department and USAID were also represented.  
The strategies taken by the PRTs in Kunduz and Balkh provinces were very similar. 
Because of the security situation compared to other regions, the PRTs focused on capacity and 
governance rather than emphasizing security. They fully integrated civilian and military elements 
of the PRT. Their military elements favored a light footprint, and their civilian elements could 
meet frequently with local officials. However, outcomes were significantly different. Support for 
the provincial council in Kunduz was universally more negative than the rest of the region 
(except for one instance of a more positive response and five instances of similar responses). 
Because of the similarity of the PRTs and the military mission in the area (all of Regional 
Command North was commanded by the Germans), this divergence in outcomes can only be 
explained by the variance in the structural conditions present in the two provinces. Much higher 
levels of legitimacy were enjoyed by the provincial government in Mazar-e-Sharif.  
State-building efforts often occur in contexts marked by the breakdown of long-
established and widely accepted political roles. Under such conditions, 
personalistic relations can provide the basis for new institutional forms. 
Comparativists, for example, have readily noted cases in which charismatic 
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Figure 10: Confidence in Provincial Council: Northern Provinces 
 
The order established by the Taliban was rapidly swept aside and Mazar-e-Sharif, unlike 
Kunduz, had a strong, charismatic leader that quickly stepped in and replaced the old order. 
Mazar-e-Sharif was the home of General Dostum. During the civil war, he was able to 
consolidate his control over the city and eliminated rival warlords and their support networks. 
Eventually he was supplanted by the Taliban only to be swept back into power following the 
U.S. intervention. Because of his early support and success, Dostum was integrated into the 
official ranks of the Afghan central government. Support for Dostum was translated into higher 
levels of support for the Afghan central government. Dostum was also a traditional and 
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Events unfolded quite differently for Kunduz. During the civil war, no one group or 
network was able to consolidate control. Once the Taliban pushed into the north, they used 
Kunduz as a base of operations and built networks of support in the region. This was facilitated 
by the large Pashtun diaspora that lived in and around the city. Once the Taliban began their 
resurgence into the region, they could draw upon these support networks. Violence was thus 
higher in Kunduz than in any other province in the north. Furthermore, unlike Mazar-e-Sharif, 
their hatred for the Taliban was less entrenched. Conditions for statebuilding were less amenable 
in Kunduz than they were in Balkh.  
Similar strategies and tactical choices in these two provinces show the strength that local 
conditions have on the prospects of statebuilding operations. They were similar provinces facing 
fairly similar security situations following the U.S. intervention. The two PRTs employed similar 
strategies. The only difference of consequence was the power brokers’ network and their ability 
to consolidate control. This enabled stability and the distribution of goods from Kabul through an 
established patronage system. The PRT and governance assistance cannot account for the 
difference.  
 
Southern Region: Kandahar and Helmand Province 
 Similar to the case selection in the North, Kandahar and Helmand are both very similar, 
border each other, and show important differences in local government legitimacy. A major 
difference between the two was that Helmand bore the brunt of a major U.S. military surge 
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around 2011.92 Analysis of the South shows how military occupations can undermine their own 
statebuilding objectives through unintended consequences.  
The PRT in Kandahar was created in December of 2003 by the U.S. The Canadians took 
command in 2005 and face initial coordination issues when they did.93 Canada improved their 
approach for their PRT over time. They have attempted to better coordinate the various agencies 
working for the PRT, known as a “whole of government approach.” Furthermore, Canada 
established the multi-agency Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) to 
coordinate all of Canada’s operations in Afghanistan.94 START is “intended to provide a 
platform for prompt, government-wide response to the challenges of preventing and responding 
to crises, including coordination of military and civilian activities in post-conflict operation.”95 
The PRT was headed by a nine-member board of directors, each board member representing an 
agency within the PRT. The security situation in Southern Afghanistan had required that the PRT 
be commanded by a military officer. The PRT’s stated main objectives center around local 
capacity building.  
 Canada has been involved in OEF since they deployed almost 3,000 troops to Kandahar 
in February 2002. Canada also contributed soldiers to the NATO-led ISAF mission in Kabul 
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starting in August 2003. A car bomb killed Glyn Berry, a Canadian diplomat, in August of 2005. 
Following the incident, Canada reassessed their role in Afghanistan. The number of personnel 
assigned to the PRT were reduced from 250 to 120 and all civilian members were withdrawn 
from the country. Canada began to recommit to their PRT mission in April of 2006, redeploying 
civilians and bringing the total number of personnel to 380. This new arraignment included 
representatives from several Canadian civilian agencies, including one member from the U.S. 
Department of State and USAID each. This PRT contingent shared space with 2,500 (in 2006) 
Canadian troops under OEF.96 
Due to an active insurgency in Kandahar Province, reconstruction has proven 
difficult. Canadian troops have shifted from their traditional peacekeeping role to 
a more militaristic role in an attempt to counter the insurgency. After years of 
engagement in the province, OEF and now ISAF have been unable to stabilize the 
region and remove or even appreciably minimize the threat from insurgents. As a 
result, very little development has taken place in Kandahar since 2001.97 
 
 
The United States established a small PRT in Helmand in 2004 with limited resources 
and capacity. The UK took command of this PRT in 2006. The UK officially handed control of 
Helmand’s capital, Lashkar Gah, over to Afghan officials in 2011.98 According to Foreign 
Secretary William Hague, “The UK has put a particular emphasis on the sustainability of its 
reconstruction work in Helmand to ensure our investment continues to deliver benefits into the 
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future.”99 When the British officially took command of the PRT in Helmand, they were taking 
over for a small U.S. PRT and “the British PRT was staffed by a handful of civilians from the 
Stabilization Unit, the Foreign Office, and the Department for International Trade.”100 
The whole of UK operations in Afghanistan were coordinated by a central committee in 
London and the PRT was composed of civilian and military elements. Civilians deployed along 
with military elements during the initial takeover in 2006, but the military led the effort. Initial 
efforts focused on counterinsurgency. The focus was on kinetic (conventional military) 
operations to establish a strong presence relative to the Taliban. Local politicians were consulted 
to identify targets and problem areas. However, this strategy began to shift as early as the spring 
of 2007. By the fall of 2007 the UK was engaged in a complete review of the mission’s strategy. 
In 2008, “The Helmand Road Map” was approved and placed a higher-ranking civilian in charge 
of the PRT that officially outranked the highest-ranking military official in the UK’s mission. 
The reconstruction effort in Helmand thereafter was civilian/political led.  
It was around this time that the UK’s military strategy in the region was also adapting. 
Their strategy was shifting towards a “hearts and minds” mentality. This shift was criticized by 
many as too little, too late.101 However, PRT Helmand after the 2008 shift was considered one of 
the most civilianized PRTs in the country with over 50 civilians. It was also considered well-
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Southern Region 
 One clear pattern emerges when Helmand and Kandahar are compared to the whole of 
the south. Helmand before 2011 is consistently more negative than the rest of the south, and 
Helmand after 2011 is consistently more positive than the rest of the south. Whereas Kandahar 
shows no pattern of variance with the rest of the south. Before 2011, survey results for 
confidence in provincial councils in Helmand province only returned 2 results (out of 4 years) 
that were more positive than the average for the south. However, during and after 2011, survey 
results returned 12 positive results in 5 years. Outlook for the country as a whole is even clearer; 
between 2006 and 2010, the people of Helmand always held more negative views, while during 
and after 2011 they always held more optimistic views. Something happened in 2011 that caused 
this shift, and this shift cannot be explained by divergent reconstruction efforts or a difference in 
the strategies taken by the UK and Canadian PRTs.  
 










2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Kandahar Helmand South Average
 166 
The shift in the UK’s strategy in Helmand province occurred in 2008. Compared to 2007, 
the people of Helmand had worse opinions of their provincial government in 2008. 2009 saw a 
slight improvement from the year before, but they saw a relatively greater change towards the 
negative in 2010. If the change in the PRT’s strategy actually resulted in positive outcomes, we 
would see a longer trend in improving perceptions towards the provincial government since the 
shift was maintained over the years rather than reversed. Instead, the changes fluctuate between 
better and worse changes over time, with no fundamental changes in the PRT’s strategy after 
2008. So, what does explain the 2011 shift?  
 NATO officially ended combat operations on December 28th, 2014. However, the end of 
combat operations was preceded by a gradual drawdown of forces. The announcement of a 
drawdown and the handing over of authority began in 2011, the same year we see a shift in 
Helmand’s confidence in their provincial councils. The announcement to withdraw forces was 
preceded by a troop surge that saw a significant push to establish the government’s control over 
districts in the south. Because the south was a major focus for the Taliban, it also became the 
major focus of ISAF and NATO efforts to destroy the Taliban movement.  
 However, this in itself is not sufficient to explain the difference. If the large footprint of 
coalition forces fomented resentment among the population, or if the large Pashtun populations 
in the south were traditionally sympathetic to the Taliban cause and they maintained that support, 
the announcement of NATO’s withdraw would improve the populations outlook. However, this 
should be consistent across the south, and it’s not. The key to the difference is consistent with 
what some scholars have theorized about foreign occupations and statebuilding operations, 
specifically David Edelstein.102 Edelstein argues that occupations are more likely to succeed the 
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longer they last and the larger the footprint of the occupier, but that both of these factors induce 
resentment among the population and can undermine the success of the occupation unless certain 
mitigating factors are present.  
Turning Edelstein’s theory towards southern Afghanistan, a clear prediction should 
emerge. Since we see a significant shift towards a positive outlook in Helmand Province 
beginning with the announcement of a withdraw, that this occurs within the same time period as 
all other provinces in the south, and that a similar shift does not occur in other provinces with the 
same intensity as in Helmand Province, we should expect a larger military footprint in Helmand 
relative to the other provinces in the south. This is exactly the case, especially leading up to the 
withdraw beginning in 2011.  
During the initial period after the fall of the Taliban, local communities essentially 
governed themselves. The military presence certainly was not big enough to take on this role at 
the time. Local warlords who had been pushed out prior to the US-led intervention returned 
under the pretense of being President Karzai’s allies. This, combined with corruption and gaps in 
security meant that when the Taliban returned between 2004 and 2006, they were able to present 
themselves as the just ones. The British did not arrive in Helmand until 2006 as ISAF expanded 
its reach from Kabul. According to Farrell and Giustozzi, this British force was just small 
enough to be ineffective but large enough to antagonize the local population.103 2007 saw an 
adjustment on the part of the British military’s COIN tactics towards a more population-centric 
strategy. This appears to have had no impact on the populations outlook for Helmand Province, 
or the nation as a whole.  
 
103 Farrell, Theo, and Antonio Giustozzi. 2013. "The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004–2012." 
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Up until this point, the occupation’s footprint in both Kandahar and Helmand was 
relatively similar. However, with the election of President Obama and the decision to send a 
troop surge to Afghanistan, Helmand province started to receive disproportionate attention by 
international forces. Even though the number of attacks from 2001 to 2011 were either the same 
or higher in Kandahar than in Helmand, ISAF decided to send the larger contingent to Helmand. 
The number of ISAF troops had doubled during the surge with the arrival of a Marine 
expeditionary brigade, bringing the total number to around 20,000 troops in Helmand Province 
alone. U.S. General Stanly McChrystal designated the south as having a major strategic 
significance for the whole of the war in Afghanistan, and Helmand was chosen as the focus of 
the south. “Debate within ISAF headquarters over whether to concentrate on Helmand or 
Kandahar first was settled in favor of Helmand, on account of the already massive US Marine 
Corps (USMC) and British military presence in the province.”104 
Not only was Helmand chosen first, but it was also chosen first repeatedly. While 
numbers were drastically increasing in Helmand, the Canadians in Kandahar were in the middle 
of a strategic retreat. The Canadians were withdrawing from certain districts in Kandahar 
Province in order to focus their efforts on higher priorities, such as Kandahar city. The number of 
NATO and ISAF troops in Kandahar were simply too insufficient to maintain a presence, much 
less provide security, in the whole of Kandahar province. Even as the Taliban were moving into 
positions around Kandahar city in 2008 and 2009, the majority of ISAF resources were still 
being focused on Helmand and the border regions.  
By the end of 2009, with a NATO presence in significantly less territory, and with high 
levels of enemy entrenchment already occurring in key areas, those meager forces that were 
 
104 Farrell, Theo, and Antonio Giustozzi. 2013. "The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004–2012." 
International Affairs 89 (4): 845-871. 
 169 
assigned to Kandahar were inadequate. “During this critical period, ISAF focused its resources in 
southern Afghanistan on fighting in Helmand and border interdiction.”105 
In February of 2009, the U.S. Department of Defense announced the deployment of two 
additional brigades to the south. In a move that was characteristic of the disparity of attention 
and resources given to each province, one full brigade deployed to Helmand, while the other was 
to be split between Kandahar and Zabul Provinces (preferencing Helmand once again). 
Furthermore, in anticipation of this new deployment, the still over-stretched Canadians refocused 
on an increasingly small area of Kandahar and Kandahar city. “ISAF ’s Regional Command 
South Headquarters has prioritized the fight in Helmand and severely under-resourced Kandahar 
province, despite the Quetta Shura Taliban’s focus on Kandahar.”106 This larger footprint 
explains the differences in legitimacy seen in the analysis. 
Because the heavy footprint created resentment in Helmand province, the people of 
Helmand were happy to see the foreign troops leave even though the Afghan security forces 
were incapable of providing for their security. Conservative estimates at the beginning of 2016 
showed that the Taliban controlled or contested 20% of the country at the time.107 Helmand’s 
opinions towards the Taliban and other combatants are also telling. In general, 2015 survey 
results show that people in Helmand feared any armed organization significantly more than 
people of other provinces in the south (including Taliban, International, and Afghan National 
Forces). Furthermore, the people of Helmand are more willing to negotiate with the Taliban than 
the south as a whole.108 This is significant. The people of Helmand are now more willing to talk 
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with the Taliban even though violence has significantly increased since 2012 and that for the first 
time in the war (beginning in 2012 and continuing to 2015) the number of attacks in Helmand 
outnumber those in Kandahar.  
The provincial reconstruction teams started late, were not given enough priority once 
they did start, and were quickly dismantled once official combat operations ended. Tactically 
they were able to achieve some marginal gains, but this was primarily driven by the distribution 
of goods which bought superficial and temporary support. The early reliance on local power 
brokers strengthened and legitimized power structures that existed outside of the state’s control, 
limiting the long-term potential of governance assistance.  
 
Conclusion  
 Primary Mission Theory predicts that a military should be capable of building 
infrastructure early in the initial stages of a conflict and sustain such capabilities throughout the 
operations. Initial efforts will focus on areas that contribute the most to their ability to operate in 
the battle space, because the most important factor is the extent to which such capabilities 
contribute to conventional combat. Once this ability is improved, they will be more willing to 
divert effort to more civic projects that have less overt military benefit. In Afghanistan, there is 
little deviation from this expectation. Construction efforts began almost immediately but was 
primarily focused on base infrastructure for themselves and the construction of roads that 
allowed them to more effectively move on the battlefield. They then began to focus on necessary 
infrastructure to help the Afghans operate in the battle space, further improving roads and 
indigenous telecommunications infrastructure. After this, effort then shifted to more general 
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civics projects. However, even this was only justified once it was thought to be an important part 
of the military mission they were being forced into, counterinsurgency.  
 The U.S. military was highly effective at building infrastructure in Afghanistan. The vast 
improvements can somewhat be attributable to the poor state of Afghan infrastructure before the 
war and the flood of civilian and aid organization money and effort that supplemented the 
military effort, but early efforts and continuing efforts in insecure areas was enabled by the fact 
that the military maintains significant internal construction capabilities. These efforts 
dramatically improved the Afghan state’s ability to access and penetrate society, although this 
ability eventually began to erode as insurgent forces began controlling and contesting more 
territory.  
 Primary Mission Theory predicts that a military will have robust training capabilities for 
security force assistance but that these capabilities will only be reluctantly diverted away from 
training their own people, if diverted at all, and that such capabilities will default to training 
strategies best suited for themselves rather than for the foreign military they are attempting to 
train. The initial stages of the Afghan operation saw almost no security force assistance. Once 
the need to train a larger Afghan military was clear, the default resulted in the U.S. military 
attempting to build and train an Afghan military in their own image, going so far as to provide 
manuals and doctrine that was directly translated into Dari from U.S. manuals and doctrine. It 
was not until after the Taliban had reconstituted that there was any effort to train special forces 
for an insurgency. Even when this was finally recognized, resources were still preferenced for 
the U.S. military’s own operations. More poorly trained reservists and National Guard soldiers 
were often tasked with the security force assistance tasks and most of the institutions built up 
during years of operations were quickly dismantled as the conflicts wound down.  
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 Initial security force assistance efforts were hampered by the belief that a large Afghan 
security force just was not necessary. Once efforts began, the military was successful in 
producing at least the framework for an Afghan Army. The training and quality were 
consistently sacrificed for the sake of producing quantity quickly. Even when the ANA began to 
take shape and take on responsibilities it was structured incorrectly for the challenges it faced. It 
was built in the U.S.’s image and little effort was placed on tailoring training for the Afghan 
context. Because of a reluctance to dedicate the appropriate level of personnel and time, quality 
suffered, and strategic success was always out of reach.  
 Primary Mission Theory predicts that no institutional capacity will exist for governance 
assistance once a statebuilding operation begins, and such capacity will only be built reluctantly 
and in an ad hoc nature. Furthermore, this capacity will be quickly jettisoned as the operation 
approaches an end and focus is diverted. No effort was made towards security force assistance in 
Afghanistan when the operation began. Once effort was directed towards such tasks it was a 
patchwork of groups and institutions that attempted the task with a patchwork of personnel from 
other organizations or tasks. Eventually, efforts were somewhat consolidated under provincial 
reconstruction teams, but these remained small and mostly under resourced. Once official 
combat operations ended in 2014, the teams ceased to exist.  
 Governance assistance efforts were only really able to produce façades rather than 
functioning and legitimate state institutions. The power and legitimacy that was produced was 
fleeting and built on local power brokers (which could turn away from the state whenever they 
choose to) and money, which ceases as soon as the flow of external donor money stops. 
Legitimacy for governing institutions was mostly a result of traditional patronage networks that 
distributed goods and resources and the state was unable to transition this into a genuine state in 
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which the only legitimate source of force and violence was Kabul. This in turn hindered the 
development of the other two tasks.
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Chapter 5: Vietnam: Irresistible Forces 
 
Introduction 
Circumstances surrounding the Vietnam war were such that military commitment to non-
conventional statebuilding operations should have been easily achieved. The military recognized 
the uniqueness of Vietnam early and often.1 The Kennedy administration recognized the 
importance of non-conventional efforts and was heavily focused on encouraging and pressuring 
the military to do exactly that. Additionally, the Vietnam conflict for the United States did not 
begin as a conventional war that required the military to transition to statebuilding after 
conventional operations had concluded. It was always a statebuilding conflict, unlike other major 
statebuilding operations like Afghanistan, Iraq, Germany, or Japan that were initiated following a 
conventional campaign.  
Essentially, Vietnam is a hard case for Primary Mission Theory. If there was any case in 
which forces were unified behind the military being able to justify, and effectively engage in, 
statebuilding, it was Vietnam. Both civilian and military leaders recognized the supremacy of 
statebuilding tasks over more conventional military strategies. Thus, it should have been very 
easy for the U.S. military to engage in operations that its own leaders, reports, and doctrine said 
was necessary and that civilian leaders both recognized and were willing to pay to make it 
happen. Despite all of this, the military still systematically favored a conventional military 
strategy of attrition to the detriment of statebuilding efforts.  
The two facets of the overall mission, military preparedness and the physical 
processes of state building, competed for resources and emphasis over the next 
 
1 Daddis, Gregory. Westmoreland's war: Reassessing American strategy in Vietnam. Oxford University Press, 2013: 
15-37.  
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several years… By the mid-1960s, this military buildup overwhelmed all other 
efforts in Vietnam.2 
 
 Even though the current mission was in Vietnam, the ongoing competition with the 
Soviet Union was still ever present. At any point the U.S. military could be asked to engage in 
conventional combat against a near-peer adversary, that this fact could not be ignored. The U.S. 
military is frequently criticized for the mismatch between its chosen strategy and the conflict at 
hand. However, insights from Primary Mission Theory show that while there was a mismatch 
and not all of the reasons for this mismatch were rational, the military is placed in an impossible 
position. They are essentially asked to restructure, retrain, and retool for a statebuilding 
operation, all the while still being expected to defend against a near-peer adversary and defeat 
them in combat if necessary. Doing both well at the same time is impossible and because near-
peer competition presents the greatest threat to the military’s primary responsibility of defense 
and survival of the state, conventional competencies must always be protected and maintained.  
The U.S. military recognized that Vietnam needed a new kind of warfare, but genuine 
efforts to that effect were suppressed and leaders did little more than pay lip service to anything 
but conventional combat. The term “pacification” was often used to describe governance 
assistance efforts in Vietnam, although the term was used liberally and often without clear 
distinction. “Originally used to describe a comprehensive strategy for achieving American 
political and military objectives in South Vietnam, it now often served as no more than a catchall 
expression for either the nonconventional, or alternatively, the nonmilitary aspects of the war.”3 
General Westmoreland was heavily criticized for his conventional preference, but even when 
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Westmoreland was replaced by the more unconventional thinking Abrahams, very little actually 
changed. “Kissinger described Abrams as a senior military officer stuck in the ‘routine’ of 
conventional warfare.”4 
Civilian leaders also clearly recognized that Vietnam needed a new kind of warfare. As 
noted in Chapter 3, the U.S. Army Green Berets are the primary institution that performs security 
force assistance (SFA). The Green Berets mission of SFA matured during Vietnam and their 
ranks ballooned because of President Kennedy’s strong support for unconventional statebuilding 
operations. Green Beret training and education today occurs at the John F. Kennedy Special 
Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Kennedy clearly and frequently 
articulated the importance and significance of unconventional and statebuilding tasks as a vital 
part of Soviet containment. At a speech to graduates at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, 
Kennedy said, “… new in its intensity, yet ancient in its origin – war by guerrillas, subversives, 
insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, 
seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.”5 Statebuilding 
was to be the solution to this new kind of war.  
 
Debates Over Statebuilding in Vietnam 
A significant challenge in assessing armed statebuilding in the Vietnam case is that both 
civilian and military leaders at the time, and subsequent researchers and scholars, primarily 
viewed the conflict, not as a statebuilding operation, but as a counterinsurgency operation. The 
language and focus shift in the post-Cold War era towards building institutions, establishing a 
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ruling regime, and economic development, but in Vietnam, the language was about pacification 
and counterinsurgency. While Vietnam is primarily viewed as a counterinsurgency operation, it 
was most certainly an attempted statebuilding operation. All of the statebuilding tasks that the 
U.S. military says it should be able to conduct in such an operation were conducted in Vietnam. 
Infrastructure was the primary statebuilding effort during the war. Security force assistance was 
also a major effort especially after the strategy shifted to “Vietnamization” under President 
Nixon. To a lesser extent than Afghanistan and Iraq post-2001, governance was an issue that was 
delt with by the U.S. military mission to Vietnam through the CORDS program. Thus, in 
addition to the Vietnam case serving as an ideal hard case for Primary Mission Theory, the 
assessment of Vietnam here is unique to most previous treatments in that it is primarily focused 
on the military statebuilding efforts rather than counterinsurgency efforts alone. While there are 
clear overlaps between these two efforts, important aspects of the U.S. military activity in 
Vietnam are missed when only looking at counterinsurgency efforts exclusively.  
Not everyone buys into the narrative that the military was stubbornly resistant to fighting 
a new kind of war and consistently preferenced conventional warfare. This debate is illustrative 
and Primary Mission Theory offers an answer to the disagreement. Daddis, in particular, notes 
that Westmoreland consistently understood the political nature of the conflict and that social and 
economic revision was vital for victory. Essentially, Westmoreland understood that Vietnam was 
a statebuilding operation and not a conventional war, and he constructed a statebuilding strategy 
in accordance with that view. Daddis argues that the failure was not in waging a conventional 
war in an unconventional setting, but an issue of the right strategy just not being enough. Armies 
can employ the right strategy and still lose, and sometimes structural conditions are too strong to 
overcome by manipulating inputs. Daddis is right that Westmoreland, and many others, 
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understood what kind of war they were fighting, and they did construct a statebuilding strategy. 
The problem was that they focused too heavily on the conventional side of the strategy and 
neglected the non-conventional elements of the strategy. Daddis writes, “The lure of battle was 
ever present in Vietnam and destructive military operations too often nullified social and 
political progress within the country-side’s rural villages.”6 
 Essentially, both sides of this debate are right in part, and wrong in part. Daddis is right 
that Westmoreland, and the broader military, understood what kind of war he was asked to fight 
and constructed a strategy that incorporated statebuilding and counterinsurgency elements. 
However, the other side is also right because conventional warfare was still consistently 
preferenced. Money and resources were dedicated to statebuilding tasks, but it was consistently 
less than what was devoted to conventional war fighting and institutions designed for 
statebuilding were understaffed and under prioritized.  Those military units that were making 
significant progress in pacification and statebuilding were often ignored, redeployed to 
conventional tasks, and their innovation was never scaled up to other units to maximize the 
impact.  
Primary Mission Theory predicts that when asked to perform statebuilding operations, the 
military will prioritize conventional tasks and will minimize the effort and resources diverted to 
statebuilding tasks. This is what happened in Vietnam. Daddis argues that a military in Vietnam 
fixated on conventional tasks misses the mark. However, in his own discussion of military 
doctrine of the time Daddis writes, “The very title of Field Manual (FM) 31-16, Counterguerrilla 
Operations, indicated that many officers often conflated terms like insurgent, guerrilla, and 
revolutionary… Doctrine thus urged commanders to ‘orient their efforts continually on the 
 
6 Daddis, Gregory. Westmoreland's war: Reassessing American strategy in Vietnam. Oxford University Press, 2013: 
xxi.  
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destruction or neutralization of the guerrilla rather than the terrain.’”7 This recognizes the 
uniqueness of non-conventional warfare but still preferences the conventional aspects of it, the 
pursuit and destruction of an enemy force in battle. As another clear example of a willingness to 
engage with non-conventional ideas without actually committing to serious realignments of 
strategy or actions, Daddis writes:  
True, officers serving in Vietnam tended to emphasize military considerations 
over political ones. True, the army’s faith in military force to solve political 
problems too often went unquestioned. Nonetheless, uniformed leaders 
demonstrated a genuine willingness to study the unconventional side of war even 
while they were maintaining their proficiencies in conventional war.8 
 
 
Preferencing the Conventional  
The conventional military preference was even apparent before combat operations 
officially began in 1965. In 1963, the U.S. Operations Mission gave $203 million in economic 
aid to Vietnam. Of that, $184 million went to Vietnam’s military budget and only $9.4 million 
went to economic and social development.9 “Milton Taylor, an economist for the Michigan State 
University Vietnam Advisory Group (MSUG), found that the American aid program had 
emphasized military concerns too heavily.”10 MSUG was eventually forced out of the country 
because of their critical assessments, at which time even greater percentages of aid were directed 
 
7 Daddis, Gregory. Westmoreland's war: Reassessing American strategy in Vietnam. Oxford University Press, 2013: 
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towards the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).11 As the situation deteriorated, the 
already tilted focus on the conventional military effort became even more pronounced.  
The uncertainty following the removal of Diem proved a particularly important 
factor in stalling all other efforts aimed at reform and development. Numerous 
programs were shelved and/or ignored as aid resources moved to remedy the 
most pressing problems with the experiment. Not surprisingly, those problems 
centered on military solutions to security problems and political illegitimacy.12 
 
The U.S. military, for most of the operation in Vietnam, was nearly singularly focused on 
conventional operations and statebuilding was viewed as either a distraction or wholly 
unnecessary. This conventional effort was not merely the result of one commander in General 
Westmoreland. When Westmoreland was replaced, his replacements largely continued his 
strategy. This occurred despite an early, and recurring, recognition that statebuilding was in fact 
necessary and prudent. President John F. Kennedy, shortly after being elected believed 
insurgency in small countries to be a major national security threat and set up an interagency 
special group on counterinsurgency that included representatives from the Department of 
Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The 
doctrine produced was enumerated in National Security Action Memorandum 182. The memo 
stated that, “the U.S. must always keep in mind that the ultimate and decisive target is the people 
[emphasis original].”13 General Westmoreland said in 1966 that, “It is abundantly clear that all 
political, military, economic, and security (police) programs must be completely integrated in 
order to attain any kind of success in a country which has been greatly weakened by prolonged 
conflict.”14  
 
11 Carter, James M. Inventing Vietnam: the United States and State Building, 1954-1968 New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008: 138.  
12 Carter, James M. Inventing Vietnam: the United States and State Building, 1954-1968 New York: Cambridge 
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13 National Security Action Memorandum 182, “Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” August 24, 1962: 6-8.  
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World War II to the Iraq War. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014: 179.  
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Even suborganizations recognized that Vietnam required something different from 
conventional strategies. “Army doctrine therefore emphasized the importance of reform while 
stressing that military force was only part of counterinsurgency…”15 Marine Corps doctrine 
largely echoed that of Army doctrine of the time and recognized an insurgency as the symptom 
of political and economic grievances that cannot be solved through conventional military 
operations alone. “Commanders must realize that operations against guerrillas will seldom solve 
the problems of the area in which they occur.”16 Austin Long’s study on counterinsurgency 
doctrine notes a substantial divergence between written doctrine and behavior during Vietnam, 
saying, “Yet at the same time, public comments by some senior officers betrayed a hesitance to 
fully embrace the implications of the written doctrine.”17 The U.S. military, and the U.S. 
government more generally, was perfectly aware of the need for statebuilding and the limits of 
conventional strategies in such a conflict but the military overwhelmingly and consistently chose 
to preference conventional strategies, nonetheless.  
The distribution of aid spending in Vietnam is a telling account of preferences in the 
overall statebuilding operation. Many historical accounts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam note 
that military projects and organizations received the bulk of total U.S. spending there.18 “From 
1955 to 1959, military aid was four times greater than economic and technical assistance, and of 
the nearly $1 billion in counterpart funds, more than 78 percent went for military purposes.”19 
However, these accounts are contradicted by tabulations that measure aid earmarked for 
 
15 Long, Austin. The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK. Cornell 
University Press, 2016: 107.  
16 U.S. Marine Corps, Operations against Guerrilla Forces, FMFM-21, August 1962: 72.  
17 Long, Austin. The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK. Cornell 
University Press, 2016: 109.  
18 Milton C. Taylor. “South Viet-Nam: Lavish Aid, Limited Progress.” Pacific affairs 34, no. 3 (October 1, 1961): 
242–256. 
19 Herring, George C., and George C. Herring. America's longest war: the United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986. 
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economic and development purposes and those earmarked for military assistance. Figure 1 below 
shows that the large preference for military assistance over economic development did not 
become significantly pronounced until combat operations began. Neither of these accounts are 
incorrect. Early economic and development assistance was fairly even with military assistance 
before 1967, but funds under this early economic and development assistance was still 
distributed with a military preference in mind. For example, a large portion of early development 
money was spent on the primary and secondary road systems in the South, a project that was 
consistently justified on the grounds of its necessity to military strategy. Both the Vietnamese 
and American militaries needed to quickly move personnel and material around the country to 
fight the war, creating a national network of infrastructure was necessary to accomplish this. 





Figure 1: Economic aid and military assistance in Vietnam20 
 
 A significant portion of the debate over military performance in Vietnam, 
understandably, is over to what extent the military was able to innovate for counterinsurgency. 
While counterinsurgency is categorically different from the statebuilding dynamics studied here, 
there are some similarities in the requisite tasks and in their divergence from conventional 
combat. Both counterinsurgency and statebuilding require a military to absorb substantial costs 
in shifting tactics, techniques, organizational structure, and equipment for a different kind of 
operation. The adoption of air mobility prior to combat operations in Vietnam, and its extensive 
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use during, is an illustrative example of how innovation is resisted for both counterinsurgency 
and statebuilding by the military.  
 Air mobility was an operational concept developed in the U.S. military beginning around 
the mid-1950s that relied heavily on organic, or internal rather than relying on the Air Force, 
rotary wing aircraft to transport large military units around the battlefield. It was originally 
developed with a nuclear European battlefield in mind. The U.S. Army believed air mobility 
would be the only way to remain effective on such a deadly battlefield by quickly moving forces 
great distances. The concept was then adapted to the counterinsurgency needs of Vietnam. Air 
mobility is often used as an example of how the military was in fact capable of embracing 
innovation for counterinsurgency as a counter to criticism that the military was unwilling or 
unable to innovate.  
Greater battlefield mobility enabled massing of forces and firepower at a decisive 
point, which had great appeal, but bombing and shelling communities killed 
scores of innocent people and alienated the population. Nevertheless, the U.S. 
military was determined to use its greatest asset, firepower, to fight the war in 
Vietnam, regardless of the implications for the Vietnamese people. Air mobility 
could also be used in the European theater – the focus of Army leadership as well 
as congressional budgetary outlays.21 
 
 The capability was not developed for counterinsurgency but for their primary mission to 
fight near-peer militaries on the European battlefield. It was used for counterinsurgency because 
it was available, regardless of its effectiveness or efficiency. Other necessary tools of 
counterinsurgency were resisted and not developed because there was no conceivable way for 
them to contribute to a conventional war. The development of air mobility provided budgetary 
incentives, requiring larger budgets to be allocated to the Army relative to the requisite budget 
changes of other counterinsurgency changes. Air mobility units were easily organized into 
 
21 Patterson, Rebecca. The Challenge of Nation-building: Implementing Effective Innovation in the US Army from 
World War II to the Iraq War. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014: 181.  
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traditional military structures, that of large battalion and brigade sized fighting units. It easily fit 
into traditional military assumptions about how to organize to fight. Essentially, air mobility was 
not developed because it contributed to counterinsurgency capabilities. It was developed because 
it contributed to conventional combat capabilities and could at the same time placate civilian 
pressure to adapt to the current counterinsurgency reality.  
Yet, even as the U.S. Army embraced air-mobility in Vietnam, it actively 
sabotaged the plans of both civilian and some military principals to sustain 
counterinsurgency operations via population security. Rather than merely 
shirking change, the Army sought to mislead deliberately by creating the 
appearance of accepting the mission of counterinsurgency. It created manuals 
and training courses for counterinsurgency, and claimed to be highly interested. 




Testing Infrastructure in Vietnam 
  The infrastructure improvement project in Vietnam undertaken by the United States was 
one of the most expansive and resource intensive efforts of its kind. Much of this was borne out 
of necessity, and in particular a military necessity. As U.S. involvement in Vietnam increased, 
the military faced significant logistical barriers to the conduct of their operations. Significant 
amounts of personnel and supplies needed to be brought ashore and distributed throughout the 
country. Decades of war and colonial mismanagement made this task nearly impossible with the 
infrastructure that existed within Vietnam. To facilitate the logistical needs of the growing 
military mission, the entire infrastructure network from ports to roadway arteries to local villages 
was either renovated or created to facilitate the movement of military personnel and supplies 
throughout the country.  
 
22 Stulberg, Adam N., Michael D. Salomone, and Austin G. Long. Managing defense transformation: agency, 
culture and service change. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007: 157.  
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 The majority of this effort was channeled through commercial contractors that used 
civilian U.S. and Vietnamese labor. However, a significant portion was conducted by uniformed 
U.S. military personnel. Importantly, both the civilian and military effort was focused on the 
needs of the military first. Chapter three demonstrated how U.S. military institutions dedicated to 
infrastructure in Vietnam focused on building ports and military installations first. After these 
projects were completed, only then did they turn a substantial portion of their attention to civil 
projects for Vietnamese locals. The infrastructure building project in Vietnam was substantial 
and effective, but fixated on conventional military needs above statebuilding needs, limiting its 
statebuilding impact.  
 
Methodology 
  Similar to the methodology used for the Afghanistan case, the tactical level of 
assessment is simply the degree to which the military built, and enabled the building of, 
infrastructure in Vietnam. This is slightly complicated by the fact that a great number of actors 
contribute to infrastructure construction, including Vietnamese firms and foreign contractors. 
Significant portions of the infrastructure in Vietnam built during U.S. involvement in the country 
was done through private contractors. This is similar to infrastructure efforts in Afghanistan. The 
U.S. military institutions responsible for infrastructure contributed significantly, and civilian 
efforts were tied to military necessity. To the degree that it is possible, the contributions from the 
military are disaggregated from non-U.S. Military contributions for the purposes of analysis 
here.  
 The strategic level of analysis is the degree to which this infrastructure allowed the state 
to penetrate and extract from society throughout its territory. This analysis draws on qualitative 
 187 
measurements of changes in infrastructure levels in Vietnam over time. Additionally, it draws on 
reports, analysis, and research conducted on Vietnam related to infrastructure efforts. 
 
Building Infrastructure in Vietnam 
 The U.S. military operation in Vietnam officially began in 1965. This was the year that 
marine combat troops first deployed to Vietnam. Prior to this, the U.S.’s role in Vietnam was an 
advisory mission and the direct involvement of the U.S. military was limited. Prior to this, 
substantial effort was already placed into the building up of Vietnamese infrastructure. This 
primarily was channeled through U.S. contractors. However, because the Vietnamese 
infrastructure was in such a state of disrepair, substantial infrastructure building still needed to be 
conducted once the U.S. military began conducting statebuilding tasks in 1965. Around 1959, “in 
the arena of public works involving canals, roads, bridges, and telecommunications, 
infrastructure was either nonexistent, destroyed, or in disrepair.”23 Between 1963 and 1965 the 
range of options to build a South Vietnamese state were becoming narrow. As the military option 
increasingly became viewed as the only option, infrastructure projects became substantial and a 
necessary prelude to the introduction of combat troops to South Vietnam. However, much of this 
effort focused first on that infrastructure that was vital for conventional U.S. combat operations 
before any real resources were diverted to true statebuilding infrastructure. “By the time the 
Johnson administration decided to escalate the war, the U.S. mission had already outstripped the 
capacity of southern Vietnam to receive it.”24  
 
23 Carter, James M. Inventing Vietnam: the United States and State Building, 1954-1968 New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008: 89.  
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 Even before direct U.S. involvement, the primary infrastructure effort was being diverted 
to military needs. Vietnam saw a construction boom in 1962 and 1963, much of which was to 
accommodate the growing size of the ARVN. It was also necessary to accommodate increase 
U.S. military advisor forces, strategic hamlets, and increasing military operations in rural areas.25 
As early as 1962, large portions of the construction began to be funneled through American 
construction firms, primarily Raymond International and Morrison-Knudsen (RMK). Of the 
$700 million in additional allocation that Congress earmarked for preparatory work for an 
increased U.S. involvement, $100 million was exclusively for construction.26 
 Ultimately, the bulk, approximately 90 percent, of the U.S. funded construction in 
Vietnam was completed by private contractors. RMK was eventually joined by Brown and Root 
and J.A. Jones Construction (BRJ). Together, RMK-BRJ was the exclusive construction 
contractor for the U.S. in Vietnam. U.S. Army construction, the Navy SeaBees, and Air Force 
Base Engineering Emergency Forces completed the rest of the projects. Even with heavily 
favoring commercial enterprises for infrastructure development in Vietnam, the preference was 
first, and always, for the military utility of the effort. “The RMK-BRJ negotiated a cost-plus-
fixed-fee contract via the U.S. Navy and sped up work on an array of construction projects aimed 
to quickly prepare Vietnam below the seventeenth parallel for a major U.S. military presence.27 
 Even with the dominant share of construction projects going to private companies, 
military needs were supreme to all other economic or development considerations. As such, it 
was the military that designed and implemented plans for a nation-wide integrated 
 
25 Carter, James M. Inventing Vietnam: the United States and State Building, 1954-1968 New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008: 140.  
26 Carter, James M. Inventing Vietnam: the United States and State Building, 1954-1968 New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008: 158.  
27 Carter, James M. Inventing Vietnam: the United States and State Building, 1954-1968 New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008: 159.  
 189 
infrastructure.28 It began with the construction of numerous deep-water ports, of which Vietnam 
was severely lacking. During the initial build-up of American forces, transport ships for material 
good could sit idle at sea for weeks or months because of an inability to find port space. Next 
was an emphasis on airfields that could handle jet engines and a nation-wide network of primary 
and secondary roadways.  
 In mid-1965, the Johnson administration made a major push to promote economic 
development of South Vietnam. The effort was intended to both win international and local 
South Vietnamese support for the effort, and also to induce Hanoi to the negotiating table. The 
effort was only briefly successful on the former, and not successful at all on the later. The push 
included plans to completely remake the Mekong delta area into a massive economic engine and 
engage in other forms of economic development throughout the country. The speech that 
articulates the plan won the administration brief approval for the operation in Vietnam. However, 
the development side of the operation quickly succumbed to military concerns and financing for 
economic development quickly decreased.  
Though successful in the short term, the president’s speech and the development 
initiative more generally did not change the complexion of the conflict. The 






Tactical Level Assessment 
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 The infrastructure building effort in Vietnam was one of the most ambitious undertakings 
of its kind, ever. The increase in the infrastructural capacity of Vietnam between the beginning 
of U.S. involvement and its peak effort around 1967 is astounding. The early efforts focused on 
establishing the ability of the U.S. military to connect the Vietnamese territory with its vast 
logistics network. Therefore, the ability to deliver goods to shore and transport them around the 
country were the focus of early efforts. The port infrastructure around Saigon exponentially 
expanded its capacity during the U.S. construction effort. Early Saigon port facilities were 
designed to handle about 1.5 million tons per year. By 1966, the port facilities were bringing in 
about 5 million tons annually.30 Similar increases in capacity also occurred at port facilities 
around the country, in Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and Quang Ngai.31 
 In line with the preference that infrastructure primarily contribute to conventional 
military operations, the infrastructure work in Saigon resulted in a sprawling military complex 
around the port facilities and newly renovated and expanded airfield that could now 
accommodate heavy military aircraft. The complex became known as the “Little Pentagon” and 
housed all of the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV) offices and tens of thousands 
of soldiers. “In this sense, the completion of work on the base in 1967 represented a crucial step 
in the larger plan to create a modern, national military infrastructure that would link the disparate 
parts of southern Vietnam and render them defensible.”32 Despite the fact that American and 
Vietnamese, military and civilian officials praised the massive construction projects undertaken 
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as a boon for the South Vietnamese people and economy, the purpose was always to support the 
conventional military operations and were always tailored to their needs.  
 
Strategic Level Assessment 
 The biggest question in assessing the quality of infrastructure assistance to Vietnam is the 
extent to which gains in infrastructure building were offset by one of the most intense bombing 
campaigns in history. “Vietnam War bombing thus represented at least three times as much (by 
weight) as both European and Pacific theater World War II bombing combined, and about fifteen 
times total tonnage in the Korean War.”33 Most assessments of this time criticize military efforts 
having offset any political, security, or economic gains made in the statebuilding effort. Some 
provinces in Vietnam were bombed far more than others. Only 11 of Quang Tri Province’s 3,500 
villages were not bombed.34 Miguel and Roland’s research found that bombing intensity was not 
significantly related to poverty traps in that area, something we would expect to see if bombing 
substantially damaged infrastructure.35 However, Miguel and Roland test U.S. bombing against 
economic performance in 1999. Bombing certainly took a substantial infrastructure toll, but their 
research indicates that these regions were able to recover over the long-term. As for the near-
term, subsequent research has found that the effects of U.S. bombing were myriad but 
consistently negative for U.S. statebuilding efforts. U.S. bombing increase insurgent activity, and 
undermined local governance and statebuilding activity.36 Essentially, conventional military 
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coercion strategies and hearts-and-minds statebuilding strategies operated in opposition to each 
other.  
The vast resources and effort to build infrastructure in Vietnam was obviously able to 
produce significant results in the road coverage, port facilities, airports, and other major 
infrastructure improvements. However, as the infrastructure improvements moved along, so did 
the destruction caused by the increasing severity of the war. The quantitative improvements in 
infrastructure were consistently undermined in the impact it could have because of the increasing 
threat of hostile forces and the consistent destruction of newly created infrastructure throughout 
the country. “One of the reasons the paradox of construction and destruction ran parallel 
everywhere in southern Vietnam without arousing much interest beyond congressional 
investigative committees is precisely because the military effort garnered so much attention.”37 
 
The overall system of funding also favored the military and related programs. 
Congress authorized $1.4 billion for construction in Vietnam, for example, in the 
1966 military budget, while the issue of refugees, the most visible manifestation of 
the destruction, received $22.5 million, of which all but $3 million as actually 
designated for Agency for International Development (AID) salaries, equipment, 
and logistics. The Vietnam Builders spent lavishly with little oversight, principally 
because that effort made the war possible. And the war, policy makers believed, 
was the only way to stay on in southern Vietnam and to avoid having to face the 





Testing Security Force Assistance in Vietnam 
 Security force assistance in Vietnam was a monumental undertaking and received the 
bulk of the attention and resources of the statebuilding effort. It provides another clear example 
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of the U.S. military resisting the pressure to divert resources from conventional operations 
towards the statebuilding effort. There was some clear examples of effective innovation and 
institutional learning with some units shifting well to statebuilding tasks. However, many of 
these efforts were undermined or dismantled before they could be brought to scale. The U.S. 
marines are praised for effective pacification efforts, but they were quickly reassigned to 
conventional missions. U.S. army special forces (Green Berets) shifted away from conventional 
operations towards security force assistance and then back to conventional operations, resulting 
in the collapse of the programs they were directing and the forces they were training.39 
A report was published during the Johnson administration called the Program for the 
Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam (PROVN) and it criticized 
Westmoreland’s way of war. Its main finding stated that the security of local villagers in rural 
South Vietnam was paramount and all other military operations should be secondary. Consistent 
with expectations of the Primary Mission Theory, the report had little, if any, impact on the 
behavior of the military. “What is most striking about this period in terms of the Army is the 
deviation from written doctrine made in the statements of senior Army officers and in the actions 
of advisers on the ground.”40 
SFA in Vietnam began before combat operation officially began in 1965, thanks to the 
covert capabilities of the CIA and a modest advisory mission from the U.S. military. This is also 
a product of the uniqueness of the Vietnam operation being a statebuilding operation before it 
was a conventional operation. Quick expansion of the ARVN forces began following the Tet 
 
39 Patterson, Rebecca. The Challenge of Nation-building: Implementing Effective Innovation in the US Army from 
World War II to the Iraq War. Rowman & Littlefield, 2014: 180. 
40 Long, Austin. The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK. Cornell 
University Press, 2016: 114.  
 194 
Offensive in 1968, and a CIA net assessment of North and South forces indicated that this 
expansion completed in 1973 with a total armed forces manpower of 460,000.41 
   
Methodology 
The tactical level of assessment for security force assistance seeks to measure the degree 
to which the U.S. military was able to train personnel, assist in building structures, and assist in 
establishing basic operating procedures and doctrines. Poor information and biased evaluation 
methods means a simple evaluation on the quality of troops produced is insufficient for such a 
study. As a result, the primary measures for success or failure at the tactical level is based on the 
structures of the military produced, the number of personnel trained, and the types of units they 
built (i.e., conventional versus special forces units).  
 The above shortcomings make the strategic level of assessment even more important. 
This level of assessment for security force assistance seeks to determine the degree to which the 
military was able to accomplish the objectives given to it by its political leaders. These 
objectives were to secure the population from violent non-state actors and to conduct offensive 
operations against insurgent held territory. This measure of military effectiveness is consistent 
with other scholars’ measures of military effectiveness and discussed in previous chapters.42 
 
Security Force Assistance in Vietnam 
 Early U.S. efforts at security force assistance in Vietnam were directed by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). Many of these early programs would eventually become the 
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responsibility of military special forces units. By at least 1963, the majority of military and 
paramilitary CIA programs had been turned over to the DoD.43 As these programs expanded, so 
too did their complexity and the variety of actors involved in implementing them. A primary tool 
through which the United States engaged in security force assistance was the Combined Action 
Program (CAP). This program would pair a 14-person U.S. marine platoon with around 30 
ARVN counterparts. They would be assigned to a village composed of several dispersed 
Hamlets. The program grew to 57 platoons in 1966, and 79 in 1967.44 
The program was relatively effective, and as such the marines often get significant credit 
for more effectively adjusting to the non-conventional nature of the Vietnam statebuilding 
operation. The marines would eventually be pulled away from the program from commanders 
that viewed statebuilding as a distraction. During the time of CAP, however, the ARVN soldiers 
benefited from the marine’s firepower and experience and the marines benefited from quality 
information gathered through the ARVN forces.45 
There is a consistency in the Vietnam operation with which the U.S. military fixated on 
conventional combat despite the obvious demand for statebuilding and intense civilian pressure. 
“President Kennedy urged Army leaders to develop a COIN program, yet the Army continued to 
focus its efforts on conventional warfare, which stressed big-unit operations, and massive 
applications of firepower.”46 Even after a COIN doctrine was developed, Army leaders chose not 
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to implement it, at least not honestly and to scale.47 Even after the publication of the PROVN 
study, which very starkly criticized Westmoreland’s reliance on conventional strategies, no one 
directly challenged Westmoreland on his strategy, not even the Joint Chiefs of Staff.48 
 Despite PROVN being an attempt to bring all government agencies in line with a 
consistent strategy in Vietnam and being authored in part by military personnel, the report was 
overtly resisted by the military, especially the Army. Army officers refused to authorize its 
distribution and its conclusions were disputed by Westmoreland. “In short, PROVN was an 
attempt to bring operations in Vietnam in line with written doctrine that failed because it ran 
counter to the essence of U.S. Army culture.”49 Stated another way, it ran counter to the U.S. 
military’s perceived primary mission of conventional operations.  
Even the metrics used to gauge success and performance heavily preferenced 
conventional over statebuilding tasks. The measures included body counts and battalion days in 
the field. Important for the battalion days in the field metric was the fact that search and destroy 
missions counted for this metric whereas pacification, stabilization, and statebuilding missions 
did not.50 Additionally, although the special forces were best able to adapt to the unconventional 
circumstances, few if any were tapped for senior leadership roles outside of the special forces 
community. A typical example of a successful special forces commander was that of Francis 
Kelly, who commanded the Fifth Special Forces Group in Vietnam from 1966 to 1967. Kelly 
was sent to the National Guard following his command and retired shortly after that as a colonel 
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in 1972.51 An unimpressive career trajectory despite the successful command of a brigade sized 
element in wartime.  
 The U.S. marines were a unique bright spot in the battle between conventional 
preferences and unconventional realities in Vietnam. They were uniquely effective at adapting to 
the statebuilding realities of the operation they found themselves in. They were among the first to 
effectively work with local villagers and militias to build their unconventional capabilities. 
Unlike the army, they were more willing to actually implement the new counterinsurgency 
doctrine as written, focusing on generating economic opportunities and self-sufficiency for 
villages. The success of the marines, however, was limited by two factors. The first was the 
limited personnel and resources of the marines relative to the army. Their successes were 
difficult to replicate at scale because they just did not have the manpower to do so. The second 
was the increasing conventional threat from the North Vietnamese beginning early 1966.  
As the North Vietnamese Army began large scale excursions across the demilitarized 
zone into South Vietnam it was the marines who were largely taken off their unconventional 
statebuilding tasks to address the rising conventional threat. This move of the marines north and 
focusing on conventional operations greatly diluted the combined unconventional statebuilding 
effort as the need for such efforts continued to increase.52 From that point on, marine resources 
were divided between conventional operations near the border with the north and statebuilding 
operations in the south with the quality of marines increasingly being diluted by the increase in 
draftees and recruits that could not meet normal enlistment standards. Their statebuilding 
effectiveness, likewise, became similarly diluted.  
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 Where Austin Long sees sub-cultural differentiation with how the marines and U.S. army 
special forces were able to better adapt to the unconventional war they were presented with, for 
this study it shows how the perception of what a primary mission is can vary. This perception 
can vary at the top level for the military as a whole, but it can also vary within subunits of the 
military. The marines and army special forces were unique organizations that had slight 
variations on what they perceived to be their primary mission. However, army special forces 
were always subordinate to the wider army and significantly limited in their relative resources 
and potential impact. Furthermore, as the security situation deteriorated, they were pulled from 
their preferred statebuilding role to contribute more to the wider army’s preference of countering 
conventional threats. The marines too face this issue. Although they were able to focus efforts on 
more statebuilding tasks, their impact was superseded by the senior military leaderships’ 
perception that the conventional threat was always more important.  
 When the ARVN was created from the remnants of the Vietnamese National Army, The 
U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) debated the most desirable force structure for 
the new army. The debate centered around whether the ARVN should concentrate efforts and 
resources more on conventional tasks or non-conventional tasks.53 Both the Americans and the 
ARVN were facing two distinct threats that required two distinct force structures. Eventually, the 
debate settled on the compromise that the ARVN would be structured for both missions. U.S. 
military advisors early on recommended the division of the ARVN into two forces, one focused 
on deterring an invasion from North Vietnam and the other focused on domestic security against 
the insurgency, a territorial force. Other units were formed to address domestic political turmoil 
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in the South. In the late 1950s, the Self-Defense Corps and the Civil Guard were formed to 
address these domestic issues and received significant funding from the U.S. mission.54 
Much of the priority and emphasis went to the conventional units that the U.S. military 
was more familiar with in terms of equipment and training needs. The territorial forces, on the 
other hand, were consistently under resourced and under prioritized. The Self-Defense Corps in 
particular were especially poorly equipped and trained. One report from 1964 observed that 
portions of the Self-Defense Corps was “equipped only with primitive weapons such as clubs 
and spears.”55 Daddis explains the poor equipping and training of the territorial forces because of 
president Diem’s efforts at regime security.56 Diem did not want highly trained and well-
equipped forces that could instead be used to overthrow his regime rather than fight the 
insurgency. This certainly played a role but cannot explain the disparity entirely. There is little 
reason to think that territorial forces posed a threat, but regular ARVN units did not. If Diem was 
intentionally limiting fighting capacity for regime security, his incentive is to engage in this 
limitation throughout the armed forces. The biggest difference, then is the low preference 
attached to the territorial forces by U.S. military assistance.  
In February of 1961, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) drafted, and had approved, a 
plan for counterinsurgency in South Vietnam. The plan did reflect a nuanced understanding of 
what was required in this non-conventional conflict, but the plan still fixated on the military 
aspects.  
Of the plan’s four major tasks, only one related to security; the other 
undertakings included political, economic, and psychological measures. Without 
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question, military operations remained at the core of the JCS plan. So too did 
South Vietnam’s armed forces.57 
 
Daddis goes on to say that by 1962, MAAG officers were convinced that all roads to success ran 
through the ARVN. Despite a clear recognition of the importance of non-military needs, military 
means were still preferenced.  
U.S. security force assistance to South Vietnam took on new urgency with the 
announcement of “Vietnamization” under President Nixon. During the first few months of his 
presidency, he believed there was a military solution to the war. As this optimism waned, the 
“madman” theory of victory was replaced by Vietnamization, the belief that U.S. interests could 
be secured by an increased effort to train up Vietnamese forces to hold the line against the North 
Vietnamese in place of the U.S. forces.58 
The U.S. military developed several new programs and institutions to assist in the 
training of local defense forces, including the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) and the 
Combined Action Platoons that combined 12 U.S. marines and 24 Vietnamese Popular Force 
militiamen. Similar to efforts in Afghanistan, initial efforts at SFA were fixated on developing 
conventional capabilities within the ARVN. Only latter were attempts made to improve their 
unconventional capabilities through specialized units and paramilitary units. Also, like 
Afghanistan, these efforts came too late in the development of the conflict to have any real 
impact.  
 U.S. Army Green Berets played a significant role in the Vietnam statebuilding operation 
once the focus shifted to building unconventional capabilities. However, even the special forces, 
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which have a dual operational and training mission, needed to adjust to the new circumstances 
that preferenced the training mission over conducting their own strike operations. The Green 
Berets were able to achieve some early successes in SFA and statebuilding more generally. They 
partnered early with the CIA to begin the CIDG program that worked first with the Rhade tribe 
of the Central Highlands. This success was quickly expanded and began to incorporate 
Vietnamese special forces throughout 1962.  
 This was all accomplished with a relatively small force of about 24 special forces teams 
and a few CIA personnel. In April of 1962, there were about 1,000 local Vietnamese personnel 
under the CIDG village defense program. By the end of 1962, there were over 23,000. The 
program had grown so much it was no longer classified as covert, the CIA participation ended, 
and the program was transferred completely under the control of the U.S. military. The transfer 
of the program to MACV resulted in a significant shift from development and self-defense for 
the villages involved in the program. MACV stopped development programs and saw the 
personnel as potential contributors to offensive operations. MACV attempted to move the 
defense forces from unconventional, small forces to greatly expanded conventional forces. 
Similar to their mistakes in Afghanistan of preferencing quantity over quality, MACV attempted 
to rapid expand the number of personnel in the program and utilize them for conventional 
operations, for which they had neither the training nor the equipment to carry out.  
Even the Green Berets were gradually pushed out of SFA and statebuilding, and back 
into support for conventional and offensive operations. “Over time, the Army changed the focus 
of Special Forces units from pacification efforts to offensive operations, making them less 
effective at nation-building.”59 Once this reorganization occurred, the security force assistance 
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programs they were assigned to atrophied and collapsed. “Under MACV control, the village 
defense program piloted by the Special Forces collapsed.”60  
 
Assessment Results  
 SFA in Vietnam saw some marginal successes. The U.S. military was able to construct 
the corpus of a local military organization in Vietnam. The effectiveness of this organization, 
however, was severely lacking. Aside from occasional successes in the field from select units, 
the organization was unable to perform to the level it needed to. Some U.S. units were able to 
effectively innovate and train and support effective units. These efforts were frequently 
undermined or halted all together. Successes from a few Vietnamese forces were therefore 
unable to be scaled up to the point of having a strategic impact. Thus, at the tactical level of 
assessment, the massive flow of resources and training were able to create at least the auspices of 
a modern military organization. The unwillingness or inability to commit enough resources and 
personnel to the type and scale of training necessary resulted in a failure to translate tactical level 
successes into strategic level effectiveness.  
 
 
Tactical Level Assessment 
The U.S. SFA effort in Vietnam built up South Vietnamese forces from around 150,000 
in 1956, to its eventual authorized force strength of over 1 million around 1970.61 A net 
assessment conducted by the CIA in 1972 indicated that 460,000 troops were in the ARVN or 
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the Vietnamese Marines. The other roughly 500,000 troops were part of the Regional Forces, the 
Popular Forces, and the Vietnamese Air Force and Navy.62  
The CAP program was one of the more effective efforts at SFA in Vietnam. The program 
grew steadily through 1967 but was prevented from growing large enough to have strategic 
effect and eventually allowed to atrophy. Westmoreland prevented this growth because of a 
misalignment with his strategic vision.  
In the end, Westmoreland never put the CAP concept fully to the test and 
ultimately vetoed the strategic concept. Perceived as a competition with “the Big 
War,” CAP was never allocated the manpower resources it required, and, lacking 
a grand strategic direction, its local successes were never able to be replicated on 
a larger scale.63 
 
All of the programs in Vietnam, including CAP, and the massive flow of resources, enabled the 
rapid expansion of the security forces of Vietnam. Police paramilitary forces went from 60,000 
in 1967 to over 120,000 in 1971.64 The territorial militia increased their manpower over the same 
period to about 500,000 in 1971.65  
While these numbers are impressive, they only tell part of the story. Peak manpower 
came around 1971, but the Tet offensive came in 1968. The Tet offensive changed the dynamics 
and priorities of everyone involved in the war. By this point, ARVN forces were facing the dual 
threat of the insurgency and conventional incursions from North Vietnamese forces. “The entire 
pacification program went on hold as the allies fought to keep the Communists from taking 
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entire cities.”66 This mass of ARVN forces came too late to have strategic effect, even if they 
were effective fighting forces, which they were not. Even assessments of these numbers which 
tries to present the SFA effort in a positive light must recognize these shortcomings. “What 
effect did all of this have on the security situation? Numbers alone do not make for successful 
pacification, but they are a big step in the right direction.”67 Renewed effort was placed into SFA 
following the Tet Offensive, but the effort was too late and still had to divide its resources with 
the conventional war effort.  
 
Strategic Level Assessment 
 The U.S. military was able to build up a major security structure from very little. In the 
cases of Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s and 2010s, the type of military did not match the 
threat they faced. The military instinctually built a conventional military to face an 
unconventional threat. In Vietnam, the security force they were building at least faced a 
significant threat of foreign invasion, whereas Iraq and Afghanistan did not. When presented 
with the dilemma of how to address both a conventional external threat and an unconventional 
internal threat, the U.S. military’s primary emphasis was conventional. Therefore, ARVN forces 
were built for a conventional conflict. “The basic problem was that the army was trained for the 
wrong mission… Confronting the near-impossible task of building from scratch an army capable 
of performing two quite diverse missions, the MAAG naturally leaned toward the conventional 
warfare with which it was most familiar.”68 Compounding the problem was the fact that although 
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they were built for a conventional mission they were almost all committed to the pacification 
mission as there was little trust that any force but the U.S. military could address the 
conventional threat.69 So ARVN was built for a conventional mission and then tasked with 
pacification.  
Measurement of success become a major point of contention in the Vietnam operation. 
Military and civilian leaders (mostly the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara) favored the 
body count over any attempt to measure a “hearts and minds” approach. The body count method 
had the advantages of being easily calculated and understood. Population centric approaches 
could not be easily quantified and were even hard to explain to others. This fight over how to 
measure success or effectiveness highlights the military command’s preference for pursuing a 
conventional war in Vietnam.  
Ewell [U.S. Army Major General in command of the 9th Infantry Division] 
explained, “I guess I basically felt that the ‘hearts and minds’ approach can be 
overdone.” “In the 9th Division,” he wrote, “we always stressed the military 
effort.” By and large, the Army high command shared Ewell’s point of view.70 
 
One of the ways to measure pacification was developed by marine Major General Lewis Walt. 
Walt essentially created an index indicator that measured the pacification of a village based on 
five factors: degree of development of the New Life Program, Vietnamese establishment of local 
governance, Vietnamese establishment of security, destruction Viet Cong infrastructure, and 
destruction of enemy units. If a village scored enough points across all indicators, it would be 
declared pacified.71 The veracity of this methodology and institutional biases aside, even 
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sophisticated methods attempting to measure pacification still could not resist the allure of body 
counts. Walt’s index was criticized on the basis that a village could achieve enough points to be 
declared pacified even if there was no change in Viet Cong infrastructure.  
 Qualitative assessments of the quality of the ARVN forces were also critical of the 
ultimate effectiveness of SFA efforts in Vietnam. “None of these deficiencies in the officer corps 
or among other South Vietnamese leadership groups can be easily eradicated, and one of them – 
Corruption – is probably as rampant today as it ever was.”72 This CIA net assessment identifies 
that preexisting conditions and structural constraints probably limited the potential of any SFA 
program, even if the SFA programs had been appropriately resourced and prioritized.  
Consistent with the overall problem of knowing that unconventional and statebuilding 
strategies were necessary, but preferencing conventional operations nonetheless, SFA focused 
too heavily on training ARVN to conduct conventional operations. General Maxwell Taylor 
commented after a visit to Vietnam in 1961 that,  
… by and large, training and equipment of the Vietnamese armed forces are still 
too heavily weighted toward conventional military operations. There has 
undoubtedly been a shift towards guerrilla and counter-guerrilla training, but it 
has not gone far enough. Even the Rangers are not adequately trained or 
equipped for sustained jungle warfare.73 
 
Military advice to the Vietnamese was always split between the demands of a dual mission. The 
Vietnamese and their American partners needed to deter an invasion from North Vietnam while 
also combating an active insurgency in the south. MAAG recommended early in August of 1950 
that the ARVN be 150,000 strong and split between four conventional divisions and six non-
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conventional security forces to deal with the insurgency.74 Despite a clear understanding that the 
non-conventional counterinsurgency aspect of the operation was important, there was still a 
fixation on the conventional side. “While MAAG staff planners surveyed possible invasion 
routes into South Vietnam (their main concern), they concurrently developed ARVN training 
programs for counterinsurgency operations.”75 Even with the formation of local and domestic 
security forces in the late 1950s, the purpose of the organizations was for MAAG advisors so 
that conventional ARVN forces would not be distracted and could focus on the North 
Vietnamese threat.76 
 Even with the massive buildup of forces, desertions remained a major limiting factor for 
ARVN. “In 1967 the South Vietnam armed forces desertion rate had been reduced to 10.5 per 
thousand, but efforts to lower this figure still further were unsuccessful.”77 The same CIA net 
assessment cited above assessed that the South Vietnamese forces suffered from a sever 
leadership deficit. “On the South Vietnamese side, there are leadership problems of a different 
kind, which at least until recently have been considerably more severe than those of the North.”78 
Ultimately, the entire SFA effort in Vietnam was only able to produce a few small units that 
were capable of conducting effective military operations. These were the ARVN Marines, the 
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Rangers, and the Airborne forces.79 These forces were too small to impact the strategic direction 
of the conflict.  
 
Testing Governance in Vietnam 
By the time the U.S. military became seriously involved in Vietnam, a political regime 
already existed that the United States sought to preserve and strengthen. Scholars would call 
such an operation a regime promotion, rather than a regime change.80 This point is appropriately 
challenged by some historians that say only the façade of a state existed in the South Vietnam 
territory since long before U.S. military involvement.81 These arguments say then that an entirely 
new entity was constructed from top to bottom. These arguments are legitimate and point to 
important dynamics that existed. The operation can still be placed under the category of regime 
promotion since the state that was attempting to be built was within the structures of this façade. 
It was an exceedingly weak state, but the state was not overthrown first before the statebuilding 
operation began.  
As such, discussion about governance assistance in Vietnam tend to focus on the local 
level promotion rather than higher level design of the central government or advising that was 
happening in Saigon. However, for the military’s part, there is actually little difference in their 
governance assistance between Vietnam and Afghanistan, between regime promotion and regime 
change. There is significant difference for the United States as a whole between these two types 
of operations, but the military has little, if any, involvement in high-level governance design. The 
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military did not contribute to conversation at the Bonn conference about the makeup and design 
of the central Afghan government. Their primary role was the extension of Kabul’s authority and 
power out into the provinces, which mirrors closely with their role in Vietnam.  
 A primary effort in the extension of Saigon’s control to the provinces was the Agroville 
program. This was a land redistribution program that sought to resettle the Vietnamese peasantry 
that was widely dispersed across the land into concentrated farming communities. However, the 
military, and even the United States in general, was largely absent from this project. President 
Diem sought to control the program to maintain autonomy over decisions regarding the 
program.82  
 Another primary mechanism in governance building in Vietnam was the Strategic Hamlet 
Program, which sought to mirror British colonial efforts in Malay by relocating geographically 
dispersed Vietnamese into defensible centralized villages. This program faced a similar fate to 
the Agroville program. Vietnamese did not want to be relocated, they were not compensated for 
their labor in building the villages and were not compensated for the relocation to poorer land 
that had not been improved over generations.83 Additionally, the U.S.’s involvement in the 
program on the ground level was limited. By 1963, it became clear that the numbers of those 
living in these Hamlets were being inflated by the South Vietnamese government in order to 
deceive the United State.84 
 Governance assistance finally came under military command with the creation of the 
Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), which was stood up in 
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1967. Although there was an attempt to effectively blend civilian and military agencies into 
CORDS, the program was heavily militarized. Similar to governance assistance efforts in other 
operations, the effort in Vietnam failed to produce strategic effects and was plagued by failures 
at even the most basic levels.  
 
Methodology 
 The tactical level of analysis assesses the degree to which the military assisted in building 
governing structures, extending the institutional reach of Saigon, and in helping those institutions 
provide goods and services. Importantly, the contribution of the U.S. military needs to be 
disaggregated from the general efforts from the United States and international donors. Simply 
measuring the growth of institutional capacity would combine indigenous processes with 
external efforts and contributions. The primary assessment must be based on the extent to which 
U.S. military institutions contributed to the building and extension of state power into the 
provinces. The strategic level of analysis assesses the degree to which these efforts generated 
legitimacy in both the local and national governments. 
 
Governance Assistance in Vietnam 
The U.S. operation in Vietnam up to 1965 was primarily and advisory role. It was only 
after March of 1965 that combat troops were introduced to Vietnam and the United States began 
engaging in its own offensive operations. Even then, statebuilding efforts were poorly organized 
and executed. It was not until 1967 that statebuilding efforts were consolidated under the 
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CORDS program. Prior to this, statebuilding (or pacification) efforts were poorly conducted and 
primarily conducted under the Vietnamese government.85  
The U.S. military developed several ad hoc institutions in an attempt to address the 
demands of statebuilding in a conflict largely viewed through a conventional lens. However, 
many of these efforts, as expected by Primary Mission Theory, were under resourced, 
underutilized, and often came too late in the conflict. Of the few successful innovations that took 
place in Vietnam, they were not recognized and expanded to scale. “Unfortunately, their 
[statebuilding] efforts were not replicated on a large scale and were largely ignored by the 
Army.”86  
Early in the Vietnam conflict, before the United States entered an overt war, civilian 
agencies lead the attempted statebuilding operation. As the situation deteriorated for South 
Vietnam and the United States, the use of military force increased, and the military took a more 
leading role in the statebuilding effort.  
Key military leaders believed that if they increased the number of troops in 
theater, killed more Vietcong, and dropped more bombs, then victory would be 
theirs. Unfortunately, few efforts focused on political or economic development; 
the military saw their role as solely conventional war fighting and ignored the 
civil considerations.87 
 
A primary mechanism through which the U.S. military engaged in governance assistance was the 
CORDS program.88 The program was started in 1967 and the “Revolutionary” in the name was 
eventually changed to “Rural.” The CORDS program was under the military chain of command 
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but had civilians assigned to various positions within. This effort was similar to that of the 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) of Iraq and Afghanistan. They attempted to unify the 
government’s efforts to extend the control and legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government 
throughout the provinces to help limit the local support available to the insurgency. They focused 
on local development, governance assistance, and also the establishment of local police forces.  
 Before the establishment of CORDS in 1967, civil governance assistance was under the 
Office of Civil Operations. Consistent with Primary Mission Theory, this office was understaffed 
and under resourced for the tasks it was responsible to perform. With the creation of CORDS, a 
civilian with the rank of ambassador was placed in charge and more resources flowed to 
governance assistance. Both civilian and military efforts fell under CORDS, but the director of 
CORDS reported directly to the military commander of MACV, which was General 
Westmoreland at the time. Because president Johnson’s policy of the time was for the 
commander of MACV to be the singular manager of U.S. efforts in Vietnam, CORDS was 
heavily militarized. The ambassador in charge of CORDS had military staff under them and the 
whole organization was completely incorporated into the MACV command structure.89 25 of the 
provincial advisors for CORDS were military personnel, with 19 being civilian personnel.90At 
the provincial level, CORDS staff were responsible for military and logistic issues, agriculture, 
education, local administration, and public health.91 
 While this reorganization was an impressive feat, it still paled in comparison to the 
conventional military effort and continually fell short of the requirements of governance 
 
89 Daddis, Gregory. Westmoreland's war: Reassessing American strategy in Vietnam. Oxford University Press, 
2013: 128-129.  
90 Daddis, Gregory. Westmoreland's war: Reassessing American strategy in Vietnam. Oxford University Press, 
2013: 130.  
91 Andrade, Dale, and James H. Willbanks. "CORDS/Phoenix: counterinsurgency lessons from Vietnam for the 
future." Military Review (2006): 77. 
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assistance in Vietnam. “The sheer breadth of pacification requirements, however, constrained the 
capacity of Americans in the field. In short, reorganization could accomplish only so much.”92 
Additionally, “too often in South Vietnam, American military operations sill worked as cross 
purposes with pacification.”93 Despite Westmoreland’s enthusiastic support for the CORDS 
program and concept, conventional military priorities still won out.  
 
Assessment Results 
 Some successes were achieved in governance assistance, but many of these successes had 
dual security purposes like building up local police. Metrics used to assess the success of these 
programs often showed progress, but the methodology of such measures were questionable and 
likely did not reflect reality. Much of the governance work was undermined by sources outside 
of the military and broader U.S. effort, like corruption of top Vietnamese officials. However, 
corruption at the local governance level was also enabled to a large extent by U.S. practices. The 
large flow of money and resources without much oversight enabled a high level of corruption. 
Additionally, so much emphasis was diverted away from the “other war” that very little effort 
was actually directed towards governance efforts.  
 
Tactical Level Assessment 
 Building up the local police became a major component of the governance assistance 
operations. Local police training is partly security force assistance but is also a primary 
component of extending governance since it is a vital component of governance at the local 
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level. The CORDS program was able to significantly increase the number of uniformed national 
police forces from 75,000 in 1967 to 114,000 by 1972.94 The program found less success in more 
traditional governance assistance. Officials interviewed after the operation about the conduct of 
CORDS conceded that the pressure to show quick results had the effect of selecting easy and 
secure areas for “pacification” rather than areas that needed more effort and would take more 
time to show results. The effect of this was an ineffective and inefficient distribution of resources 
and effort.95 
   
 
Strategic Level Assessment 
 Comprehensive and sub-national polling of the views of Vietnamese during the 
statebuilding operation do not exist like they do for the Afghanistan operation. The measures 
used by the U.S. to gauge the success of pacification exist but are too faulty to be useful here. 
Thus, gauging success at the second level of assessment requires the identification of proxy 
indicators for legitimacy. The outcomes of many programs identified many legitimacy problems 
and certain proxies can be used to assess the likely presence or absence of legitimacy for the 
South Vietnamese government.96 The governance assistance mission in Vietnam struggled to 
produce any increase in legitimacy for a government which already had a low baseline of 
legitimacy with the local population. Programs intended to protect the local population and show 
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the value of the Saigon government to them often undermined the very intended purpose through 
shortsighted actions. A clear example of this was the strategic hamlet program. Intended to 
consolidate villagers into defensible concentrated settlements, the program impoverished the 
population by moving them off valuable agricultural lands, forcing them to build up new farms 
and villages and failed to compensate them for any of these depravations.  
 Another clear indication of low legitimacy of the government was the high rates of 
desertions among the ARVN. Significant efforts were made following the Tet Offensive in 1968 
to rectify the desertion problem. Despite the massive effort by the military and the resources 
dedicated to it, desertions remained a problem up until the collapse of South Vietnam.97  
 Corruption was a persistent problem that governance assistance was unable to subdue. 
The corruption at the national level is well known and documented, but corruption at the local 
level was also widespread and unaddressed. “… Corruption in the central Vietnamese 
government and among higher-level Vietnamese officials was harmful to the overall operations, 
but corruption at the local levels was most destructive for development work.”98 This same 





 The U.S. statebuilding operation in Vietnam is a hard test case for Primary Mission 
Theory. All of the conceivable forces that are likely to exist in favor of statebuilding existed in 
 
97 Collins, Brigadier General James Lawton Jr. The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-
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the Vietnam case. The mission did not begin as a conventional war, it was always an 
unconventional statebuilding operation. The military, in statements from leadership, their 
organizational decisions, and in written doctrine, always recognized the unconventional nature of 
the operation. The President in the early stages of the war was enamored with unconventional 
war, gave it the highest priority, and enabled the military to make the necessary adjustments. 
Ultimately, this was not enough for the military to make sufficient adjustments. “In the end, the 
military fell back upon its traditional, institutional repertoire.”99 The military favored the 
conventional, nonetheless.  
The CORDS system was an impressive attempt at intergovernmental coordination. The 
U.S. marines effectively engage the local population to build security cooperation and 
institutions. The U.S. Army special forces expanded their numbers and their role. Programs were 
instituted that specifically targeted statebuilding objectives. None of these programs and efforts 
were given sufficient effort, personnel, or resources. The marines were pulled from their 
statebuilding successes to fight near the demilitarized zone. CORDS was organized to be 
dominated by the military and their conventional preferences. Consistently throughout the war, 
funding clearly indicated a preference for conventional well over unconventional.  
 In Vietnam, specifically, the proclivity towards the conventional can be seen as 
driven or justified on the grounds of conventional warfare threats being the primary 
driver of the U.S. military. The Soviet threat and the prospect of open land warfare 
against a powerful conventional Red Army consistently influenced manpower, weapon 
acquisition, and organizational structure choices throughout the conflict. The U.S. 
military knew it needed to reorganize for statebuilding in Vietnam, but the changes that 
 
99 Patterson, Rebecca. The Challenge of Nation-building: Implementing Effective Innovation in the US Army from 
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were made were only those that could also improve their fighting capabilities in a 
hypothetical Western European conflict. Vietnam was also unique from those 
statebuilding operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, in that the threat of foreign conventional 
invasion was real and, in later stages of the conflict, actually occurring. This was not 
different, however, from statebuilding operations post-WWII where the threat of further 
Soviet expansion was on the minds of those in the United States and those in defeated 
countries.  
 There is also clear institutional inertia and biases that drove this outcome. 
Preparing soldiers for conventional combat and organizing and equipping for said 
combat, is fundamentally different than training for statebuilding. Conventional combat 
requires the training of mass killers, prepared to compartmentalize their own humanity 
and to dehumanize their perceived adversaries. Historically, small portions of combat 
troops actually engage in killing on the battlefield. Military leadership is aware of this 
and constantly try to make as many soldiers as possible into killers who will act on any 
order. This is the polar opposite of the skill sets required to implement the type of 
statebuilding begin attempted in Vietnam, one of building trust, confidence, and 
legitimacy. Such interactions with the local population require different training, different 
habits, different equipment, different everything. When presented with this choice, the 
military chose to maintain conventional capabilities and divert as little as possible to 
statebuilding capabilities.  
The Army’s proclivity for high-intensity warfare detracted further from political, 
economic, and security integration. All of these factors contributed to the overall 
ineffectiveness of the U.S. Army in Vietnam.100 
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 218 
 
 What, then, does this mean for militaries asked to perform statebuilding 
operations? If all the forces were aligned in support of statebuilding operations and the 
military still chose conventional capabilities and operations. When will the military ever 
divert enough energy and capabilities to statebuilding? Much of the statebuilding 
literature is fixated on what makes militaries effective on the conventional battlefield. A 
better understanding of what determines effectiveness in the wider range of 
unconventional tasks they are asked to perform allows for a better assessment of what 
civilian leaders should and should not ask of the military. Any consideration of initiating 
a war that will ultimately require armed statebuilding must take into consideration the 




Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 Primary Mission Theory’s logical conclusion is that the world’s militaries are unlikely to 
ever divert enough attention and resources to statebuilding to do it effectively and consistently. 
There will only be a few exceptions to this since most militaries view conventional warfare as 
their primary mission. This is significant because militaries cannot ignore their role to play in 
such endeavors in the modern era. Leaders can choose not to conquer and control foreign 
countries, but if leaders are to ask the military to conquer territory in an era that dissuades 
annexation, militaries must engage in statebuilding. Achievement of political objectives are 
unlikely otherwise. Despite the desire to leave perceived civilian matters to the civilians, military 
strategy is inextricably linked to statebuilding. The desire to sequence or isolate different tasks in 
Vietnam has shown the ineffectiveness of such efforts.1 Seeking security through military might 
ignores the impact this will have on local government legitimacy. “… by early 2002 Washington 
was not only engaged in nation-building [statebuilding] in Afghanistan, but the Pentagon had 
begun planning the military invasion of Iraq and the State Department had begun developing 
plans (officially known as the ‘Future of Iraq Project’) for post-war nation-building there (plans, 
however, that the Pentagon ignored after the fall of Baghdad).”2 
 Primary Mission Theory is more broad than previous theories of armed statebuilding 
operations. Unlike other scholars who have studied armed statebuilding operations, this study is 
not confined by a particular type of statebuilding, liberal international statebuilding.3 
 
1 Paul Miller thoroughly addresses the fallacy of sequencing tasks. Miller, Paul D. Armed state building: confronting 
state failure, 1898-2012. Cornell University Press, 2013. 
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and the changing global order,” in Berger, Mark T. From Nation-Building to State-Building (London: Routledge, 
2008): 1-22. 
3 See for example: Miller, Paul D. Armed state building: confronting state failure, 1898-2012. Cornell University 
Press, 2013. 
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Consequently, this study is not unnecessarily confined to a liberal, western conception of what a 
state is, and therefore what armed statebuilding is. This allows for the comparison of a broader 
set of cases, like the comparison of the armed statebuilding operations in North and South Korea 
following WWII. Despite this broader scope, there are still limits to the scope and applicability 
of Primary Mission Theory.  
 The first limit is the theory’s generalizability outside of the U.S. military. Most of the 
cases of armed statebuilding operations are cases of U.S. interventions. There are few modern 
examples outside of this. There are indications that the generalizability of Primary Mission 
Theory extends beyond the U.S. military. The ancient Roman military demonstrated similar 
institutional prioritization patterns as expected by the theory, most modern militaries organize for 
conventional warfare despite security situations better served by unconventional organizations as 
predicted by the theory, and the few cases of non-U.S. armed statebuilding operations shows that 
different perceptions of the primary mission result in different prioritization patterns as predicted 
by the theory. However, without more non-U.S. cases, it is difficult to achieve sufficient levels of 
confidence to claim a broader scope.  
 The second limit is that this study focuses on studying comprehensive cases of armed 
statebuilding operations, which is not the universe of armed statebuilding activities. Militaries, 
especially the U.S. military, frequently engages in the activities required during an armed 
statebuilding operation outside of comprehensive operations that require all three tasks 
simultaneously. It is important for the theory to explore the extent to which the key expectations 
still hold in these less-than-comprehensive operations. The remainder of this chapter attempts to 
define this scope, explore possible applicability outside of this scope, and analyze the 
implications of Primary Mission Theory on military strategy.  
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Tasks in Isolation 
 The cases selected for analysis in this study were cases of U.S. statebuilding operations in 
which effort was comprehensive and all three tasks were being conducting in the same 
operations more or less simultaneously. This is not, however, the only instances in which the 
U.S. military engages in statebuilding operations. The U.S. military is frequently deployed in 
support of partner countries and engage in just one of the three tasks. While there are no true 
examples of governance assistance in isolation, the military’s involvement in this activity is 
saved only for the most intensive operations, there are many examples of the U.S. military 
engaging in infrastructure building and security force assistance in isolation. A brief exploration 
of these operations further confirms many of the assumptions and hypotheses of the Primary 
Mission Theory.  
 One of the most consequential differences between operations consisting of a single task 
and comprehensive operations involving all three tasks is the level of state failure. 
Comprehensive operations are essentially always failed states. Either a preceding conventional 
invasion overthrows the local state prior to being constructed anew (i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq), 
or the exceptional weakness of the state justifies the comprehensive intervention to prop up the 
fledgling state (i.e., Vietnam). For smaller operations, the state is often stronger than those that 
receive comprehensive operations and thus it is much easier to focus efforts on the individual 
statebuilding task.  
 
Infrastructure in Iceland 
 U.S. military engagement in the construction of infrastructure is extensive, both 
internationally and domestically. The case of the U.S. effort in Iceland during WWII is 
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illustrative. Most U.S. cases of armed statebuilding operations were either abject failures, 
mitigated failures, or they were only marginal successes (the substantial financial and human 
costs of which undermined the value of such success). Cases such as Iceland demonstrate that 
statebuilding does not always require a Marshal Plan sized effort and can, under the right 
conditions, be significantly beneficial for national security relative to the costs involved. 
Ultimately, it demonstrates the importance of assessing when the U.S. should or should not 
initiate such an operation in the first place, rather than trying to argue the best strategy during 
such an operation.  
 Most are surprised to even hear there was a U.S. occupation of Iceland at all. Iceland is 
located in the North Atlantic in a position of significant strategic value. It forms the center of 
what is called the Greenland, Iceland, UK (GIUK) Gap, the narrow sea lanes one must control in 
order to ensure free movement of naval and merchant vessels in the North Atlantic. During 
WWII, there was concern on the allied side that Germany would seek to control Iceland and use 
the advantageous position to deny naval resupply from the United States to the United Kingdom. 
The United Kingdom occupied the island first to dissuade the Germans from making such a 
move and the United States took over responsibility for the security of the island on July 7th, 
1941.4 The GIUK Gap was also a strategic asset during the Cold War, since the Soviet’s Atlantic 
fleet was required to sail through the Gap to reach open waters. The United States did not close 
its last base in Iceland until 2006.5 
 The occupation of Iceland, and all related activities, was a purely conventional military 
consideration, denying the Germans a strategically advantageous naval position. This intent was 
 
4 Zimmerman, John L. "A Note on the Occupation of Iceland by American Forces." Political Science Quarterly 62, 
no. 1 (1947): 103-106. 
5 Thorhallsson, Baldur, Sverrir Steinsson, and Thorsteinn Kristinsson. "A Theory of Shelter: Iceland’s American 
Period (1941–2006)." Scandinavian Journal of History 43, no. 4 (2018): 539-563. 
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made clear by the release of a statement by the United States after taking over defense of the 
island that the presence of any German or Italian forces in the Western Atlantic or within 50 
miles of Iceland’s shores would be considered a hostile act and would justify response by the 
U.S. armed forces.6 However, occupation of the island required improvements to the existing 
infrastructure to allow for such an operation. Among the first of the U.S. forces to arrive on the 
island was one division of infantry, two antiaircraft regiments, a regiment for harbor defense, and 
an engineer regiment, along with some other smaller logistics and support units.7 Original plans 
called for 2,200 engineers to arrive first to Iceland to ensure the necessary infrastructure was 
built in time for the later arrivals.8 
 The plan for the United States to replace British forces in Iceland with approximately 
30,000 troops and their requisite supplies and equipment was no simple task, especially with war 
appearing closer and limited naval shipping capacity being diverted elsewhere. The Navy made 
the necessary transport ships available, but the main port in Reykjavik was too shallow. Early 
trips could be accommodated even with the poor infrastructure conditions, but eventually the 
port needed renovations and improvements to accommodate the expanded operation.9 
Additionally, thousands of living quarters needed to be constructed to house all the troops. Some 
of the remains of these makeshift structures are still visible today and preserved as historical sites 
in Iceland.  
 
6 Zimmerman, John L. "A Note on the Occupation of Iceland by American Forces." Political Science Quarterly 62, 
no. 1 (1947): 103-106. 
7 Fairchild, Byron. Decision to Land United States Forces in Iceland, 1941. Vol. 70. Center of Military History, 
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United States Army, 1990. 
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Remains of Camp Hopkins and Camp Rising memorial in Hafnavegur, Iceland. Photo taken 
October 3rd, 2018.  
 
The U.S. military constructed Keflavík airport to facilitate operations related to the 
occupation. When WWII ended, the United States sought a permanent basing agreement with 
Iceland. Iceland, preferring neutrality with U.S. security guarantees, declined. Instead, Iceland 
granted the United States access to the now civilian Keflavík airport with only civilian staffing.10 
As the Cold War intensified and the Korean War broke out, Iceland reconsidered its neutrality. 
Iceland joined NATO in 1949 and granted the United States military basing rights in 1951. The 
infrastructure effort also built a submarine naval base and included substantial improvements to 
roads and other infrastructure. The effect of the minor occupation and statebuilding effort in 
Iceland was significant, both for U.S. national security interests and Iceland’s interests. “By the 
 
10 Thorhallsson, Baldur, Sverrir Steinsson, and Thorsteinn Kristinsson. "A Theory of Shelter: Iceland’s American 
Period (1941–2006)." Scandinavian Journal of History 43, no. 4 (2018): 539-563. 
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end of World War II, Iceland had been transformed from one of Europe’s poorest countries to 
one of the world’s wealthiest.”11  
Why was the statebuilding effort in Iceland so successful? Primarily, it was the result of 
preexisting conditions, not strategy. Iceland was already a well-established state. Legally, it did 
not have full sovereignty at the time but was considered and independent state under the Danish 
crown. The Icelandic parliament, the Althing, is one of the longest continuously running 
deliberative governing bodies in the world having been established in 930.12 Many statebuilding 
operations fail due to resistance to the occupation or the rise of ethnic tensions and eventually an 
insurgency. Iceland recognized the need for the occupation because they feared a German attack 
and preferred Allied occupation to a German invasion.13 Iceland is also an exceptionally 
homogenous society, eliminating any possibility of ethnic or religious tensions. This 
homogeneity was evident in Iceland’s successful demand of the United States not to station black 
soldiers in Iceland.14 Essentially, the timing and the conditions of the Iceland statebuilding 
operation were overdetermined for success. Strategy could have been poorly developed and even 
more poorly implemented and the external forces were such that success would still have been 
likely. The strength of external factors in determining success in statebuilding operations should 
force an examination, not of the strategies employed in statebuilding operations, but of the 
decision-making process that elects to initiate these types of operations in the first place.  
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Security Force Assistance in Colombia 
 U.S. military engagement in security force assistance (SFA) is only slightly less extensive 
than their engagement in infrastructure building, in stark contrast to governance assistance 
(which does not even always occur in the comprehensive cases). SFA has always been a 
common feature of U.S. foreign policy, especially since WWII. However, the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks and the subsequent legal authorities granted under the umbrella of the Global War on 
Terror has enabled a vast expansion of the activity. A significant difference between 
infrastructure and security force assistance is that infrastructure is frequently employed outside 
of military diplomacy. Security force assistance is much more connected directly to military 
strategy and the intent to strengthen weak states’ security apparatuses so they can pursue military 
operations (usually counterterrorism or counterinsurgency in nature) so the external state can 
avoid a costly introduction of its own soldiers into the conflict.  
 Those analysts and experts that advocate for SFA operations argue it is a ‘war on the 
cheap’ option, replacing one’s own troops for the troops of some foreign country.15 The quick 
victory in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 which relied primarily on local fighters and U.S. special 
forces and airpower was seen as vindication of this light footprint strategy. The subsequent failed 
attempt to build a security force in Iraq draws the utility of this strategy into question. Recent 
research has found that, for the United States, these SFA operations often fail due to the principal 
agent problem.16 The agent in the foreign countries almost always wants something different 
than the principal, the United States, so the security forces built do not pursue the interests of the 
 
15 See Biddle, Macdonald, and Baker for an overview of this line of argument. Biddle, Stephen, Julia Macdonald, 
and Ryan Baker. "Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance." Journal of 
Strategic Studies 41, no. 1-2 (2018): 89-142. 
16 Biddle, Stephen, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker. "Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of 
security force assistance." Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 1-2 (2018): 89-142. 
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United States or fearful power brokers seek to undermine the effort to build a security force that 
could threaten their own power.  
 There are certain factors that can alleviate the effects of the principal agent problem, 
alignment of interests and strong leverage on the part of the principal. For the purposes of 
identifying the outer bounds of Primary Mission Theory, it is necessary to identify when the 
principle’s military is actually employing the correct strategy in building the agents security 
forces. Even if leverage and conditionality of assistance can alleviate the dynamics of the 
principal agent problem, if the United States is attempting to build a conventional military 
against an unconventional adversary failure is still likely. Tactical success in this scenario will 
still result in strategic failure, as occurred in many of the comprehensive statebuilding 
operations, particularly Vietnam and Iraq.  
 Since, as Primary Mission Theory expects, the U.S. military almost always trains foreign 
militaries for conventional war, it is necessary to identify the circumstances under which they 
train for unconventional warfare. Two conditions are almost always present when the U.S. 
military actually trains appropriately for an unconventional threat. 1) The basic structures of a 
military are already present, and they are not forced to build from nothing but only need to 
improve in certain capabilities and skills. 2) The ruling regime is either secure enough to not be 
threatened by the increased power and effectiveness of the armed forces, or the insurgent forces 
pose such an existential and pressing threat that the increased power and effectiveness of the 
armed forces is an acceptable risk comparatively. This eliminates the either overt or passive 
resistance to their training and equipping activities from the local ruling government.  
 Colombia is an outlier to the expectations of Primary Mission Theory and a clear success. 
The implementation of the peace deal has been difficult, as peace deals always are, but the 
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improvement in the Colombian armed forces was a clear cause in the changing circumstances on 
the battlefield that led to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) coming to the 
negotiating table in a weak position. The U.S. effort was undertaken by a small force of advisors 
and the capabilities they sought to build were appropriately focused not on conventional 
capabilities, but on unconventional capabilities of counterinsurgency, leadership raids, and 
counternarcotics. The capabilities forced the insurgent forces into territorial losses, revenue 
losses, and weaken cohesion and coordination with the frequent loss of leadership to Colombian 
special forces raids. A clear indication of the improvement of the capabilities of the Colombian 
armed forces was the shift in the insurgent forces away from conventional attacks on fixed 
positions towards more guerilla style and indirect terrorist attacks. Successful insurgency 
movements tend to start with indirect attacks when they are weak, towards more direct attacks 
against armed forces as the gain strength. Figure 1 shows that as U.S. SFA substantially 
increases in 2000, the number of total insurgent attacks decreases and the percentage of attacks 












Figure 1: Types and Level of Violence in Colombia 1988-201217 
 
U.S. involvement in the support and training of the Colombian armed forces has a long 
history, beginning with the U.S. Army Rangers playing a key role in establishing the Lancero 
training facility in the 1950s. “…beginning in 1952, Colombian officials realized that they 
needed to remodel the military establishment to cope with its new domestic security and state-
building missions. Colombian officers turned to the United States for assistance.”18 U.S. 
presence in the country has been almost continuous since.19 However, the primary effort came 
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through Plan Colombia in the early 2000s, especially following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the 
U.S., which justified new efforts to strengthen various countries’ counterterrorism forces.  
In July 2000, President Clinton signed legislation to give more than $1.3 billion in aid to 
Colombia and its neighbors over the next two years. About 75% of this aid, known as Plan 
Colombia, was for military and police assistance, including training. As a result of this program, 
U.S. military aid to Colombia had increased six-fold since 1997—to $1.5 million a day by 2002. 
Prior to Plan Colombia, U.S. SFA almost exclusively focused on the police. As part of the 
counternarcotics effort, the United States had trained elite airborne police squads, known as 
Jungle Commandos, or Junglas. The Colombian military was excluded from U.S. SFA at this 
point because the United States focused on anti-drug efforts, a mission that the Colombian 
military had previously rejected.20 However, in order to gain access to SFA, the Colombian 
military agreed to stand up new, specifically anti-drug units that the United States desired.21 
While much of the aid focused on military equipment (such as Black Hawk and Huey 
helicopters), a large portion went to the creation, equipping, and training of three new 950-man 
counternarcotics battalions in the Colombian Army.22 
This was all accomplished with substantial limits placed on the number U.S. personnel 
allowed in the country. U.S. Special Forces trainers and contractors allowed in country at any 
given time was capped at 400 and limited to training missions.23 “…the majority of the 
Colombian security forces never saw an American trainer.”24 Thus from the beginning, and in 
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order to maximize these efforts, the training effort focused almost exclusively on the elite forces. 
From the late 1990’s and the beginning of Plan Colombia, the primary focus of the US-
Colombian partnership was the forming of an elite Counter Narcotics Brigade.25  
Alexandra Nariño, who is a Dutch national who fought with the FARC and played a key 
role in the Cuba negotiations, was interviewed by the Journal of International Affairs. The 
Journal asked why the negotiations beginning in 2011 were so different from the failed round of 
negotiations from 1999 to 2002. Among other factors like the establishment of regional 
organizations that could serve as impartial actors in the negotiations, Nariño attributes the 
differences in success to the increased pressure from the Colombian military. Nariño contends 
that the FARC and other leftist elements was never in a position of having “almost been 
defeated.” However, she does say, “… the war against the insurgency has increased, too, with 
Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota, the latter of which was carried out by former President Alvaro 
Uribe Velez.”26  
 The U.S. military defied the limitations of Primary Mission Theory for Security Force 
Assistance in Colombia. The other cases in which this happens, like in Colombia, show that 
doing so is often the result of preexisting conditions rather than a conscious strategy choice. The 
Colombian military was already well established; thus, it was reasonable to rely solely on U.S. 
special forces to do the training, rather than bringing in more conventional units to fill the 
demand of training up an entirely new military organization. Vietnam showed that these sub-
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organizations can have divergent perceptions of their primary mission relative to the broader 
military. This increases the likelihood that special forces trainers will focus on training for 
unconventional special forces. The Colombian government was also in a position to be accepting 
of U.S. SFA efforts, decreasing the resistance to such efforts. Outside of these pristine 
conditions, the limitations of Primary Mission Theory remain difficult to break away from.  
 
North and South Korea: The Effect of Differing Primary Missions 
 Most militaries view their primary mission as conventional combat, since this is both the 
source of the biggest potential threat and more comfortable for conservative military norms and 
traditions. International structures and norms also favor the construction of expensive, high-tech 
conventional militaries. However, not all militaries come to view conventional combat as their 
primary mission. The Soviet military faced significantly different domestic and international 
structures and therefore came to view its primary mission as something very different than did its 
U.S. counterparts. This divergent view of their primary mission is evident in areas outside of 
comprehensive statebuilding operations. Adam Casey argues this divergent structure and primary 
mission view resulted in a divergent SFA strategy. As a result, Soviet client militaries that 
underwent SFA have never staged a coup, whereas western SFA clients frequently engaged in 
coups.27 
If Primary Mission Theory is correct, a different view of what a military’s primary 
mission is should have deterministic effects on how that military views statebuilding tasks. These 
outliers provide insight into the power of Primary Mission Theory and how non-conventional 
focused militaries will diverge on armed statebuilding performance.  
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 At the conclusion of WWII in the Pacific, U.S. focus and attention were fixated on Japan. 
A small contingent of U.S. forces were sent to Korea, initially intended to facilitate the 
repatriation of surrendered Japanese forces. Eventually, the demands of statebuilding would 
expand this mission.28 The United States pursued a strategy to replace the Japanese imperial 
government with an independent democratic and capitalist regime. By September of 1945, there 
were 25,000 U.S. soldiers stationed in Korea.29 Rising tension with the Soviet Union began to 
focus U.S. attention on building a strong Korean military to counter Soviet pressure, with the 
ultimate hope of a unified Korean peninsula allied with the United States. The United States 
military did continue with statebuilding tasks, however, working to rebuild the economy, 
establish a justice system, and strengthen the education system.30  
 In 1948, the United Nations sponsored elections and the Republic of Korea was 
established. At the same time, the 50,000 U.S. troops that were in the country began to withdraw. 
By 1950, only 500 U.S. soldiers remained as advisors to train the South Korean military.31 
Eventually, the U.S.’s view of the importance of Korea would shift as the grand strategy of 
communist containment took shape in the late-1940s.32 By the time North Korea invaded the 
South, the U.S. no longer viewed the Korean peninsula as expendable. Thus, the United States 
committed to the war with North Korea. “The forces charged with nation-building [statebuilding] 
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did not receive any specialized training, nor was there any grand plan for how the military would 
go about transforming South Korea.”33 
 
North Korea 
 Whereas the United States abandoned its plans to completely restructure South Korea 
into a democratic and capitalist regime in favor of short-term military security concerns, the 
Soviets in the North saw a socialist style revolution and their immediate security concerns as 
related. The Soviets spent the entirety of 1945 to 1950 indoctrinating the North Korean military. 
They quickly worked to rebuild North Korea in their image to serve as a client state.34 Soviet-
trained communist party members were placed into positions of power, including the North 
Korea leader Kim Il Sung.35  
 The Soviet Army in North Korea was given significant freedom to make decisions about 
the statebuilding operation. The Russian army in the East initially viewed its primary mission as 
a war with Japan. As Japan surrendered and the 25th Army was sent to Korea, they quickly 
adjusted to this new primary mission. Militaries that only view their primary mission as 
conventional warfare, at this point, would exhibit passive resistance to any attempt to force them 
into statebuilding tasks. For the Russian army, their primary mission was conventional warfare, 
but it was also a revolutionary army and statebuilding fit well with that mission. Because of this, 
their behavior once that statebuilding operation began in North Korea diverges significantly from 
frequent behavior observed of the U.S. military. “Despite their initial lack of preparedness, the 
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Soviets undertook significant steps to address the political, economic, and security needs of the 
North Koreans.”36  
 Soviet military personnel were quickly sent to every major population center in the 
country and established local governing organizations. The Soviet Civil Administration (SCA) 
was established within the military to deal with the immense task.37 “The level of organization of 
the SCA in North Korea demonstrates an extremely high level of sophistication and 
demonstrates the intensity of involvement the Soviet Union planned to have in the development 
of North Korea.”38 A U.S. delegation to the North at the time seemed surprised that the Soviets 
were committing resources to North Korea rather than simply extracting resources.39 
The Red Army showed a significant interest in remaking Korean society and constructing 
a security force and government in the Soviet image. What explains the difference, the divergent 
view on what the military’s primary mission is. The Red Army, imbued with a communist, 
evangelical ideology viewed their primary mission as building client states in order to spread the 
communist revolution.40 The communist party in Moscow exercised significant control over the 
Red Army, placing political officers within its ranks. The Soviet Union pursued what Huntington 
called subjective control, where loyalty to that party was preferenced over independence and 
meritocracy.41 The variance in commitment made this difference clear. The United States at its 
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peak before the war committed 50,000 to govern 20 million people in South Korea. The Soviets 
committed between 220,000 and 250,000 to govern about 10 million in North Korea.42 
 
German and Japanese Exceptions? 
 Are the Germany and Japan post-WWII cases an exception to Primary Mission Theory? 
The answer to this question has significant implications. It was reported that L. Paul Bremer 
studied the post-WWII reconstruction of Germany and Japan in preparation for his assumption of 
command of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that governed Iraq after the U.S. 
invasion.43 The cases, because of their successful outcomes, are employed as rhetorical tools to 
argue that success is possible. It was also the nature of the success that so many cite these cases 
as examples for the potential of current operations. Germany and Japan were not just rebuilt 
economically, they were quickly integrated into the U.S. alliance system as strong partners 
against the Soviet Union. Why would we not want to replicate this success in other countries?  
 Scholarship on occupations has correctly noted the significant divergence in 
circumstances for the post-WWII cases relative to all other cases of occupation or even armed 
statebuilding operations since these cases.44 Armed statebuilding operations are unique 
endeavors, they attempt to take failed states and force them to govern in a way amenable to the 
intervening state. What makes the post-WWII cases unique from an armed statebuilding 
operation perspective is the reason why they were failed states in the first place. They failed 
because they lost the war that they themselves initiated. Prior to being failed states, then, they 
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were already industrialized and functional states. This then made the subsequent statebuilding 
operation much easier, since rebuilding on a foundation that had already existed is easier than 
building from nothing. This is significantly different form the Cold War containment operations 
or the post-Cold War preemptive operations since these all took place in states that had already 
failed from their own weaknesses, the invasion was perceived as necessary because of state 
weaknesses enabling terrorism activity or the perception that they will behave recklessly, or 
because the state weaknesses was perceived as making them vulnerable to communist 
revolutions. The circumstances that exist in these states are far less amenable to armed 
statebuilding operations than the post-WWII cases.  
 The circumstances that lead to the initiation of the conflict can have an impact on success 
and failure, but it does not have a similar impact on the behavior of the military. Behavior 
remained consistent within the U.S. military regardless of whether the armed statebuilding 
operation was initiated after defeating a great power competitor that launched a war of conquest, 
if the operation was always a statebuilding conflict intended to contain the spread of 
communism, or if the war was initiated by the U.S. itself justified as a preventive war. First-hand 
accounts from officers that attended the School of Governance and were expected to provide 
governance assistance in Germany and Japan shows how little they actually contributed to 
governance assistance rather than temporary occupational order.45 This is consistent with 
behavior in every other armed statebuilding operation.  
 The conduct of the military did not diverge significantly from its conduct in subsequent 
armed statebuilding operations. The successful outcome then cannot be attributed to something 
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the military did, or even U.S. policy. The difference was the local conditions and the 
international environment in which the operations occurred. Germany and Japan should not be 
held up as examples of how a military can be successful at armed statebuilding operations, but 
only as how local conditions and international circumstances can have a deterministic impact on 
success and failure regardless of strategy or policy on the part of the intervenor.  
 
The Unsolvable Proxy War Paradox 
 The story of armed statebuilding operations is one of many failures and cognitive 
dissonance. Those involved in a particular conflict will recognize it requires non-conventional 
strategies and tactics, and then employ conventional strategies and tactics, nonetheless. On the 
surface, this is irrational. However, military organizations face an unsolvable paradox with 
regards to armed statebuilding operations. Previous scholars and analysts of armed statebuilding 
operations have believed this paradox to be easily solvable, which is contradictory to the very 
definition of a paradox.46 In military strategy, efficiency and effectiveness are so intrinsically 
linked, the two words are frequently not differentiated. They should be distinguished, as they 
mean different things, but the difference is often ignored. To do something effective in war, it 
almost always must be efficient. Napoleon’s invasion of Russia was effective until a lack of 
efficiency depleted the vast majority of his forces, at which point he was no longer effective.47 
Thus, the paradox is that training and preparing for conventional, high-intensity warfare requires 
different training, equipment, and force postures relative to non-conventional statebuilding 
operations. Organizing to engage in one, exposes one to risks in the other.  
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Many organizations can effectively and efficiently do multiple things, but militaries are 
unique. They must do one thing better than any other in the world. They cannot afford to do 
multiple things somewhat well. The tight link between effectiveness and efficiency means the 
military cannot simply to both. As the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq made it clear quick 
victories were out of reach, a flood of research and analysis appeared in the late 2000s early 
2010s attempting to put forward plans for reorganizing the military to cope with the reality of 
statebuilding operations and their divergence from the necessary skills of conventional combat.48 
However, it is not easy to train for either of these tasks. Scholarship on the difficulty with which 
militaries sought to adapt from one type of conventional force structure to another conventional 
force structure during WWI demonstrates how difficult this is.49 Adjusting to a force structure 
that does both should be unthinkable.  
When viewed at the grand strategic level, this paradox creates problems for policy. If the 
military commits all of its resources to deterring, and winning if necessary, conventional near-
peer competitors, those competitors will simply commit its resources to proxy conflicts that its 
adversary is not prepared to counter. Many stop there and simply argue that proxy war 
capabilities must be maintained in an era of great power competition. The nature of a paradox, 
however, means that committing resources to proxy conflict then creates greater exposure at the 
conventional level. Nuclear weapons are often presented as a reason why the paradox can be 
solved because conventional war between nuclear powers is unlikely, but how safe is this 
assumption? Nuclear armed states have fought conventional wars without escalation to the use of 
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nuclear weapons before.50 Committing to one or the other necessarily means exposure 
somewhere and committing to both means exposure in both.  
Some might attempt to solve this paradox by simply extricating the military from such 
operations and delegating its tasks to civilian or non-governmental organizations. To some extent 
this is certainly feasible. The U.S. Department of State prior to the 9/11 statebuilding operations 
was the primary actor involved in security force assistance. So, for some tasks in some 
circumstances these tasks can be removed from the military, diluting somewhat the 
consequences of the proxy war paradox. However, absent a fundamental reshaping of patterns of 
U.S. foreign policy established over the past century, the U.S. military will remain a primary 
actor in armed statebuilding operations if the operations are selected for initiation. “The military 
will play a substantial role in many U.S. stabilization and reconstruction missions, either because 
military forces have been deployed to end violence or because they have been party to the 
violence in the first place.”51 
In statebuilding operations, this dynamic is often recognized but goes unheeded. 
“Confronting the near-impossible task of building from scratch an army capable of performing 
two quite diverse missions, the MAAG [U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group Vietnam] 
naturally leaned toward the conventional warfare with which it was most familiar.”52 
 Prior to major commitment to Vietnam, the National Intelligence Estimate of August 
1954 made clear that the likelihood of establishing a strong, functioning government in Saigon 
was poor.53 Why then was the decision made to attempt statebuilding in Vietnam, nonetheless? 
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Scholarship and commentary often fixate on the question of what strategy should be employed or 
why the current strategy is not working. Comparatively (surprisingly) far less time and effort are 
spent on actually considering if the likelihood of success and the costs necessary to expend for 
success are worth the potential benefits. “Dulles admitted that the chances of success might not 
exceed 1 in 10. On the other hand, he and the president agreed that to do nothing risked the 
probable loss to communism of a vital area.”54   
This line of thinking was based on the prominent theory of the time, dominoes theory. If 
one country falls to communism, the ideology will spread across borders via contagion. This 
theory was almost certainly exaggerated as it overestimated the extent to which communist 
revolutions were driven by an internationalized ideology or the intervention of foreign powers 
rather than by local conditions. Subsequent research has called into question the domino theory 
that was so pivotal in the justification to commit to Vietnam despite pessimistic outlooks.55 
Domino theory was used to justify major intervention into Vietnam, other theories, metaphors, or 
analogies have been required to justify subsequent statebuilding operations despite 
overwhelming evidence their likelihood of success is extremely low. Without these metaphors to 
justify intervention, it is difficult to see the benefit of costly statebuilding operations, especially 
when militaries will resist the operations.  
 
 
Conclusion: Implications  
 The anomalistic cases of Germany and Japan demonstrate how little military strategy or 
policy can determine the outcome of an armed statebuilding operation relative to the local 
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conditions and international circumstances. The U.S. has never been successful in armed 
statebuilding operations outside of the pristine preexisting conditions following WWII. This 
suggests that determination of whether to initiate an armed statebuilding operation should be first 
made on whether the local and international conditions make such an operation even feasible. 
Further determination can then be made based on the typical calculations of costs, benefits, value 
to national security, humanitarian concerns, responses from adversaries and regional powers, and 
potential of second and third order affects.  
 The discussion of the conventional/proxy war paradox in great power competition 
similarly suggests that feasibility of armed statebuilding operations should be considered first 
before more traditional considerations. “… outside governments can better recognize when little 
or nothing can be done and instead devote their resources to conflicts that can be solved.”56 If the 
rise of China is to define U.S. grand strategy in the decades to come, Primary Mission Theory 
should encourage an evaluation of which conflicts should and should not be initiated. A rapidly 
growing volume of scholarship suggests that many of the statebuilding, proxy, and 
counterinsurgency conflicts the United States once viewed as the indispensable battleground in 
the Cold War and the post 9/11 era are not only dispensable but also not solvable and should not 
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